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FEELING DIFFERENTLY AT THE FIN DE SIÈCLE: REPRESENTATIONS OF 
EMOTION AND CULTURAL CHANGE IN GERMAN LITERATURE, 1890-1901 
Holly A. Yanacek, PhD 
University of Pittsburgh, 2016 
This dissertation examines the representation of emotion in German literature of the fin de siècle, 
which I identify as a period of rapid cultural change when emotional codes and social mores 
were disputed. Compassion, honor, shame, love, pride, and pity were topics of contested public 
and intellectual debate around 1900, and I argue that the renegotiation of these emotional codes 
happened in part through literary works and other media. Building upon Bakhtinian discourse 
analysis and informed by current history of emotions research, my dissertation contributes the 
theoretical concept ‘heteropathia,’ which I define as the co-presence of differing ways of feeling 
represented in a single literary work or cultural object. I propose a methodology of reading for 
heteropathia that considers three aspects of a novel: the narrative situation, the depiction of 
emotional styles, and the reference to theoretical models of emotion. Chapter 2 analyzes 
compassion and honor as emotional antipodes associated with different moral systems in 
Theodor Fontane’s Effi Briest (1895). Although the novel depicts honor as an emotional practice 
that has lost its relevance in late nineteenth-century society, it ultimately admits the need for both 
compassion and self-regulatory emotions. Chapter 3 examines the subversion of nineteenth-
century gendered emotional imperatives of feminine shame and romantic love in Lou Andreas-
 v 
Salomé’s Fenitschka (1898). Fenitschka champions self-realization and validates alternate ways 
of feeling and gender roles, albeit not without admitting the difficulty in challenging familiar 
cultural narratives. Chapter 4 reads Thomas Mann’s Buddenbrooks (1901) as a critique of a 
range of emotions, from unreflective bourgeois pride to life-negating decadent sensibility, across 
four generations. Through its figure of the young writer Kai, who exemplifies both life-affirming 
pride and artistic sensibility, Buddenbrooks self-reflexively refers to its own mediation of 
emotions and thus highlights the role of literature in renegotiating emotions and social mores. I 
conclude that these three novels feature a heteropathic impulse that recalls the transitional status 
of the fin de siècle. These works acknowledge emotional alterity yet resist embracing any way of 
feeling uncritically. Instead, they mediate between diverse affective perspectives and create 
spaces for critical analysis and dialogue. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
Already over a century before the recent ‘emotional’ or ‘affective turn’ in academic disciplines, 
Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) called for a genealogy of emotions in Die fröhliche 
Wissenschaft (1882):  
Wer jetzt aus den moralischen Dingen ein Studium machen will, eröffnet sich ein 
ungeheures Feld der Arbeit. Alle Arten Passionen müssen einzeln durchdacht, 
einzeln durch Zeiten, Völker, große und kleine Einzelne verfolgt werden; ihre 
ganze Vernunft und alle ihre Wertschätzungen und Beleuchtungen der Dinge 
sollen ans Licht hinaus! Bisher hat alles das, was dem Dasein Farbe gegeben hat, 
noch keine Geschichte: oder wo gäbe es eine Geschichte der Liebe, der Habsucht, 
des Neides, des Gewissens, der Pietät, der Grausamkeit?” (§7 “Etwas für 
Arbeitsame”).  
Here, Nietzsche argues that, in order to study moral questions properly, it is necessary to 
research ‘all kinds of passions’ among different peoples and through historical periods. By 
recognizing that this would be an arduous but important task, Nietzsche essentially rejects the 
commonly held philosophical assumption that emotions are simple, involuntary affective 
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responses, and, as such, unworthy of serious study.1 His remarks also imply that emotions are 
not purely innate, but culturally and historically conditioned—an idea that conflicts with many 
deep-rooted beliefs about emotions in Western societies, not to mention with contemporary 
claims of affective neuroscience and evolutionary psychology.2 Do emotions have a history, as 
Nietzsche seemed to suggest? A growing number of researchers, including literary scholars, 
historians, philosophers, and social psychologists, are now exploring answers to this question.3 
Supposing that emotions do have a history, how has literature imagined, participated in, and 
shaped that history? 
This dissertation examines emotions and their literary representations in the context of 
the social upheaval and rapid modernization that characterized Wilhelmine Germany at the fin de 
siècle. Inspired by Bakhtinian discourse analysis and interdisciplinary research on emotion, I 
contribute a new approach for interpreting the literary representation of emotion through German 
cultural history. In German studies, the perceived antithesis between emotion and reason 
continues to inform the manner in which literary and cultural periods are understood. Studies of 
Empfindsamkeit, Sturm und Drang, and German Romanticism have generally treated emotions 
                                                 
1 In The Social Construction of Emotions (1986), Rom Harré (ed.) attributes the lack of in-depth studies of emotion 
before the 1970s and 1980s to “the predominance, since the seventeenth century of a philosophical conception of 
emotions as simple, and non-cognitive phenomena, amongst the bodily perturbations” (2). 
 
2 Evolutionary psychologists claim that emotions are not learned, but biologically based responses, which evolved 
for their adaptive value in dealing with universal human challenges. Paul Ekman and his supporters considered 
happiness, fear, surprise, anger, sadness, and disgust to be the six ‘basic’ emotions that exist across cultures, but the 
list of universal emotions now includes many other emotions, such as guilt, pride, contempt, embarrassment, and 
shame (Ekman “Basic Emotions”). 
 
3 Interdisciplinary centers for emotion research have been established at the Max-Planck-Institut für 
Bildungsforschung in Berlin, Queen Mary University of London, and five universities in Australia (Adelaide, 
Melbourne, Queensland, Sydney, and Western Australia). 
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as irrational, that is, as reactions against Enlightenment rationality.4 The limited critical 
consideration of emotion in late nineteenth-century German literature in particular stems from 
the impression that German realism, when described as the antithesis to romanticism, a literary 
movement commonly associated with the expression and valuation of strong feelings, is 
comparatively ‘unemotional.’5 I consider this a misrepresentation, however, and my approach 
challenges the simplified construal of each German cultural period as one in which either 
emotion or reason was valued. Emotions have long been a critical component of the Western 
concept of the self, and, as such, they infuse nearly every aspect of human life and history. The 
premise that emotions are socially and culturally conditioned and thus historically variable 
invites the question of how literary works of different periods have represented certain emotions 
and influenced the emotion discourse of their time. Thus, rather than discussing emotion through 
cultural history merely in terms of emotional (non-)expression or intensity, this dissertation 
examines how, for which reasons, and to what effect literary works represent emotions. My 
application of this new approach to German novelistic prose published at the fin de siècle not 
only leads to fresh interpretations of canonical texts, but also elucidates how changes in 
                                                 
4 See, e.g. Arnold Hauser, The Social History of Art: Volume 3: Rococo, Classicisim and Romanticism for a critique 
of Romanticism as ‘irrational and escapist […] all disguised and more or less sublimated forms of the same feeling” 
(qtd. in Solomon, The Passions 53). Compare the view of Robert C. Solomon, who considers Romanticism a 
movement that emphasized the passions, albeit without excluding reason (The Passions 54). 
 
5 This view of German Romanticism is evident, for example, in Jürgen Barkhoff‘s account: “The cultivation of 
emotion in the age of sentiment, the celebration of unbridled passion in the Storm and Stress, the practice of minute 
self-scrutiny that emerged from pietism […]—all these tendencies paved the way for the later, more radical 
Romantic explorations of the soul” (219). Although Barkhoff traces a continuity in the cultivation and celebration of 
emotion from Empfindsamkeit to German Romanticism, he considers sympathy with the irrational and pathological 
to be a distinguishing feature of romantic tales (219). In contrast to German Romanticism, German Realism is 
typically discussed in terms of emotional restraint or repression. According to Russell Berman, “Realism in German 
literature had, in effect, always represented an effort to control, to bridle, and to dismiss the romantic legacy of the 
beginning of the century…” (339). For Robert C. Holub, “Realism involves the maintenance of an order without 
passion, without desire…” because the absence of emotion and valorization of reason are associated with truth-
telling (44). 
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emotional practices and social mores coincide with larger cultural shifts and how emotions are 
renegotiated through literature.  
1.1 WHAT IS AN EMOTION? 
First, we must ask: what is an emotion? William James (1842-1910) posed this question in his 
seminal essay thus titled in 1884, 6 and contemporary answers vary widely due to the diverse, 
interdisciplinary nature of emotion and affect studies. Although this dissertation responds to the 
recent ‘affective turn’ in the humanities and social sciences, the definition of emotion that I offer 
here clearly departs from notions of affect inspired by the work of Gilles Deleuze and Félix 
Guattari. Theories of affect currently popular in media and cultural studies treat affects as pre-
discursive, unconscious, and non-rational intensities that transfer between bodies, not unlike 
contagion.7 Dissatisfied with discourse studies and post-structuralism, affect theorists have 
attempted to go beyond issues of representation and discourse, yet I find the usefulness of affect 
theory to literary studies, particularly to studies of literary realism, to be limited. Moreover, 
questions of the representation and social negotiation of emotions through history are central to 
my project. My theoretical approach to emotion has instead been influenced by Bakhtinian 
discourse analysis, narrative theory, and research in the emerging field of the history of 
                                                 
6 William James, “What Is an Emotion?,” Mind 9.34 (1884): 188-205. 
 
7 See, e.g., Melissa Gregg and Gregory J. Seigworth, eds., The Affect Theory Reader, (Durham, NC: Duke UP, 
2010), Teresa Brennan, The Transmission of Affect, (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2004), and Brian Massumi, Parables for 
the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation, (Durham, NC: Duke UP, 2002).  
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emotions. Thus, I understand emotions to be embodied, discursive social practices that result 
from social encounters between the self and others or the self and one’s environment.8  
The premise that informs my discussion of emotion in this dissertation is this: emotions 
are always-already social. Accordingly, if emotions arise in social and institutional contexts (e.g. 
family, education, politics, work, organized religion) that change over time, I argue that emotions 
do have a history.9 At first, it might seem easy to refute these claims. Western societies have 
typically treated emotions as inner feelings that express an individual’s personality, and, 
consequently, the relational nature of emotion becomes obscured. Yet what emotion can one 
genuinely experience independently of interactions with others or one’s environment? For 
example, we might experience jealousy if we know that another person possesses something that 
we would like to have, or if we perceive new social circumstances as a threat to a valued 
friendship or relationship. Similarly, we might feel pride in response to a perceived rise in social 
status, such as an achievement that earns us the respect of others. Even emotions evoked by 
simple sensory cues are relational. Sensory cues (e.g. hearing a meaningful song, seeing a certain 
color, smelling a familiar scent) trigger emotions because they call to mind memories of people 
and events in the past. By underscoring the social embeddedness of emotion, I am not arguing in 
                                                 
8 Social psychologist Ian Burkitt understands emotions similarly and critiques theories of emotion contributed by 
affective neuroscience (e.g. Antonio Damasio), affect theory, and evolutionary psychology (i.e. Paul Ekman’s ‘basic 
emotions’). See Burkitt, Emotions and Social Relations, (Los Angeles: Sage, 2014) 1-24.  
 
9 Focusing on modern German history, Ute Frevert presents a strong case for the argument that emotions have a 
history and shape history in Vergängliche Gefühle, (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2013) and in Emotions in History—Lost 
and Found, (Budapest: Central European UP, 2011). Burkitt, who refers to history of emotions research (i.e. Elias, 
Reddy, Rosenwein), maintains that one would expect emotions to vary through history as social relations change 
(25). He emphasizes, however, “how emotions are embedded in social relations and how emotion is a complex 
phenomenon that also involves the body and various feelings, not just the discursive understanding of emotion as it 
changes between historical periods and across different cultures” (Burkitt 22). 
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favor of a purely social constructivist view.10 Some emotions, including the examples of jealousy 
and pride, may be experienced very similarly across different cultures and through history, and, 
because there is evidence to support this, it is problematic to assert that emotions are entirely 
socially constructed. Although I agree more with pure social constructivism than evolutionary 
psychology’s ‘universalist’ theories of ‘basic’ emotions that exist across cultures, I find Jesse 
Prinz’s assertion that emotions are both evolved and constructed most persuasive and probable.11 
If all emotions are at once part of human nature and culturally determined, then there can be no 
truly universal or ‘basic’ emotions; historical and cultural contexts will always be important. 
Just as language is fluid, as demonstrated by the changing meaning and usage of words, I 
regard all emotions as likely to change over time and vary across cultures. Following Jesse Prinz, 
I consider intensity, incidence, form (i.e. expression or bodily response), and content the four 
primary aspects of emotion that can be shaped by culture (83). In other words, emotions such as 
love and grief can vary in terms of how deeply and how frequently they are felt, how the body 
responds, and how they arise, depending on the different socio-cultural environments in which 
they emerge. To this, I will add that the meaning and social, political, or moral value of an 
emotion, as well as the words used to describe that emotion, can change through history.12 One 
                                                 
10 See Jesse Prinz, “Which Emotions Are Basic?” (2004), for a concise treatment of the two main perspectives on 
the origins of emotions: evolutionary psychology and social constructivism. Arguing that emotions are “neither 
fixed bioprograms, nor cognitively mediated scripts,” Prinz positions himself between these two sides of the nature-
nurture debate (81). Compare William Reddy, who offers a critique of “emotional constructionism” and proposes a 
solution to the issues of agency and relativism associated with the constructivist view (“Against Constructionism” 
327-340). 
 
11 Prinz, dissatisfied with attempts to divide emotions into two categories (‘basic emotions’ and culturally 
constructed emotions), reasons that “Emotions are evolved and constructed” (69). 
 
12 In twenty-first century political, religious, and humanitarian discourse, ‘empathy’ or ‘compassion’ is preferred 
over the close synonyms ‘sympathy’ and ‘pity.’ The older German feeling-words, Empfindung and 
Gemütsbewegung, have declined in use and been replaced by Gefühl and the very recent Emotion. 
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could find evidence, for example, that honor and shame have undergone a loss of meaning and 
value that these emotions still had in nineteenth-century German society.13  
I do not suggest that, given the cultural and historical variability of emotion, it is 
impossible to relate to the emotions of people from other cultures or those who lived during an 
earlier historical period. A process of emotional translation may be necessary, however, to 
decipher the lost meanings and cultural values associated with a particular emotion.14 Whether 
through letters, diaries, journals, photographs, newspapers, or literary works, we only have 
access to past emotions through texts—in other words, “past” or “distant” emotions are always 
mediated and require interpretation. Literary texts and other cultural products provide insight 
into shifting thought-patterns and emotional practices—they can offer clues as to how certain 
emotions were perceived, experienced, expressed, and valued in different societies throughout 
history. Moreover, I find that the power of art and literature derives in part from the capacity to 
vividly depict and acquaint audiences with past ways of feeling—even if we ourselves have not 
directly experienced the despair and pain of Laocoön, medieval courtly love, or eighteenth-
century feelings of binding friendship and Geselligkeit. 
Emotions are an essential feature of literary works, even if they have not yet received the 
critical attention they deserve in German literary studies. One only needs to think of a few well-
                                                 
13 Frevert makes precisely this argument in Vergängliche Gefühle: “Scham und Ehre sind Gefühle, die in 
hochmodernen europäischen Gesellschaften, verglichen mit dem frühen 20. oder 19. Jahrhundert, ein Schattendasein 
fristen” (17). Ulrich Greiner traces a decline of shame and cultural shifts in the experience of guilt and 
embarrassment in Schamverlust: Vom Wandel der Gefühlskultur, (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 2014). 
 
14 Mark D. Steinberg, for example, emphasizes the need to account for what is lost in translation when studying the 
history of emotions: “…we must recognize that the evidence of emotion is already a translation—between, for 
example, bodily affect and culturally shaped emotions, between their past and our present” (77). Margrit Pernau 
describes the translation of emotions from one context into another as “not the finding, but rather the creation of 
equivalence,” and emphasizes that this process takes place not only across cultures and languages, but across 
everyday social boundaries, such as gender, age, and class (Frevert et al., Learning How to Feel 254). 
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known examples, such as Werther’s melancholy, Tony Buddenbrook’s bourgeois pride, Geert 
von Innstetten’s honor, and Gregor Samsa’s guilt.15 Literature does much more than merely 
depict different emotions. It can propagate emotional styles and social mores that are customary 
or desirable in a given culture or imagine and validate alternate ways of feeling. Thus, even the 
most ‘realistic’ literary works should not be read as mirrors of society that simply show how 
people ‘really felt’ during a given period in history. As clearly demonstrated by the ‘Werther 
Fever’ that Goethe’s Die Leiden des jungen Werthers inspired after its publication in 1774, 
literature has the potential to shape the emotions and cultural practices of readers. Yet this does 
not imply that literature furnishes emotional scripts, which passive readers then simply imitate—
the meaning and emotionality of a literary work are constructed through the interaction between 
the text and the reader. Critical and affective responses to a literary work vary according to the 
individual reader, but these also change over time.16 Werther presents an extreme example, but 
all literary works, by virtue of the way they affectively engage readers, are apt to crystallize 
readers’ emotions, negotiate between differing ways of feeling, and help readers clarify their 
views on life.  
                                                 
15 I refer here to the most striking emotions of figures in four canonical German literary works: Johann Wolfgang 
von Goethe’s Die Leiden des jungen Werthers (1774), Thomas Mann’s Buddenbrooks (1901), Theodor Fontane’s 
Effi Briest (1895), and Franz Kafka’s Die Verwandlung (1915). 
 
16 Like Goethe’s Werther, Henry Mackenzie’s sentimental novel Man of Feeling (1771) resonated with eighteenth-
century bourgeois readers. When a later edition of Man of Feeling appeared in 1886, however, it became clear that 
the emotional styles depicted in the novel had fallen out of fashion. This is evident in editor Henry Morley’s 
introduction to the 1886 edition and ‘Index to Tears,’ which lists all passages of the novel that reference crying and 
humorously notes that “Chokings, &c., not counted” (Mackenzie 110-111). 
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1.2 EMOTIONS AND CULTURAL CHANGE AT THE FIN DE SIÈCLE 
Imperial Germany (1888-1918) during the reign of Kaiser Wilhelm II presents a significant case 
of shifting emotional styles and social mores. After the German victory in the Franco-Prussian 
War (1870-1871), military ideology left its impression on German society. Enforced patterns of 
behavior and values included discipline, order, principles, character, strength, and the repression 
of feelings, all of which defined the masculine ideal and shaped the public sphere. In contrast to 
the Enlightenment view that, in order to be considered whole, a man must also cultivate his 
feelings, the late nineteenth-century imperative required men to demonstrate self-control and 
mastery over their emotions. The social consensus assigned separate roles, proper spheres of 
activity, and distinct emotional and intellectual traits to men and women: men dominated the 
public sphere, whereas women, who were believed to be naturally submissive, emotional, and 
nurturing, occupied the private sphere (Jefferies 19). Due to rapid modernization in the late 
nineteenth century, old and new social structures and values lived on in juxtaposition. 
Wilhelmine society, commonly described as “pillarized,” consisted of many sociocultural groups 
that determined cultural practices, and this pluralization had a destabilizing effect (see Fulbrook 
140; Retallack 269).  
Although the Prussia-dominated modern German nation-state endured great political and 
social tensions after unification in 1871, it was especially after Bismarck’s resignation in 1890 
that writers recognized its social conflicts. Referring to this period, historian Friedrich Meinecke 
famously wrote: “In ganz Deutschland ist um 1890 nicht nur politisch, sondern auch geistig 
etwas Neues zu spüren, und zwar beides zueinander in umgekehrter Kurve. Politisch ging es 
abwärts, geistig wieder aufwärts” (Meinecke 111). Industrialization, urbanization, and the 
decline of the aristocracy introduced large structural changes and social leveling in society. As a 
 10 
result of this democratization, different views of how society should proceed and apprehensions 
about these changes emerged. The fin-de-siècle women’s movement championed women’s rights 
and equality, but, at the same time, the destabilization of familiar nineteenth-century gender 
distinctions caused anxieties about gender roles and identities to deepen. Wilhelmine Germany 
witnessed both religious revival and secularization—tensions between religious confessions 
persisted after Bismarck’s Kulturkampf, yet the decline of worship attendance, the possibility to 
legally declare oneself ‘konfessionslos,’ and the rise of the openly secular SPD to the status of a 
mass party signaled a simultaneous process of gradual secularization (Clark 101-105). The new 
forms of art and cultural practices that emerged at the fin de siècle were met with enthusiasm 
from some and moral indignation or fear of degeneration from others.17 
In light of these modern developments, I identify the fin de siècle in German society as a 
period of rapid cultural change when emotional codes and social mores were disputed. In 
particular the ‘social’ emotions compassion, honor, shame, love, pride, and pity were topics of 
public and intellectual debate around 1900. Debates about honor, for instance, were tied to 
arguments for or against the practice of dueling.18 Print publications of the 1890s, including the 
satrical journal Simplicissimus, exposed honor codes and dueling as archaic, barbaric practices. 
A satirical cartoon by Josef Benedikt Engl conveys this message forcefully through its depiction 
of the outcome of a duel taken to the extreme (see Figure 1).  
 
                                                 
17 One of the best-known works to decry the changes in modern society and art at the fin de siècle is Max Nordau’s 
Entartung (1892). Friedrich Nietzsche, Henrik Ibsen, Oscar Wilde, Emile Zola, and Leo Tolstoy are among the 
writers whom Nordau denounced as decadent and dangerous to society. 
 
18 The inclusion of the publication “Für oder wider das Duell?” (1896) as the first volume of a series called 
Brennende Tagesfragen and satirical cartoons in Simplicissimus attest to the significant role that honor played in 
public discourse of the time. 
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Figure 1. Josef Benedikt Engl, “Ein Duell mit schwersten Bedingungen” (1896) 
Yet the question remained how reputation and masculine identity could be established if honor 
was lost. While the fin-de-siècle sexual revolution and women’s movement challenged double 
standards and the imperatives of feminine shame and modesty, it also presented a new challenge, 
because a woman’s personal honor was upheld through sexual purity.19 Calls for compassion and 
charity increased under the auspices of social reform movements and aid organizations, such as 
the Innere Mission and Deutscher Caritasverband. Yet especially influential at the fin de siècle 
were the works of Nietzsche, who rejected pity as a morality of weakness inimical to power and 
                                                 
19 Feminist Marie Raschke stressed the fact that female honor was based on sexuality in Die Frauenbewegung 3 
(1897): “Während die männliche Ehre sich hauptsächlich nach dem Beruf bemißt und ein Ausfluß der bürgerlichen 
Sonderrechte des Mannes ist, wurzelt nach den willkürlichen Einrichtungen unserer Zeit, welche der Frau jede 
bürgerliche Ehre versagt, die weibliche Ehre hauptsächlich im Geschlecht. Darum wirkt jeder Angriff auf das 
Geschlecht vernichtend auf die persönliche Ehre” (Raschke qtd. in Meyer-Renschhausen 102). 
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human flourishing. I find that these social emotions were debated so intensely around 1900 
because structural changes in Wilhelmine society demanded renegotiations of power and status. 
Emotions crystallize groups, regulate unethical/undesirable behaviors, motivate ethical/desirable 
behaviors, and maintain or dissolve social bonds. Public debates and philosophical discourses 
concerning these social emotions attest to the existence of differing emotional styles and 
competing visions for the future of society. 
Accepting the premise that emotions are historically and culturally conditioned and that 
literary works renegotiate emotional practices and social mores, this dissertation examines how 
emotions were perceived and represented in literature published during this period of 
unprecedented cultural change in German society. Focusing primarily on compassion, masculine 
honor, feminine shame, romantic love, bourgeois pride, pity, and decadent sensibility, I argue 
that literary works of this period renegotiated emotional codes and social mores. In the following 
chapters, I demonstrate how Theodor Fontane’s Effi Briest (1895), Lou Andreas-Salomé’s 
Fenitschka (1898), and Thomas Mann’s Buddenbrooks: Verfall einer Familie (1901) juxtapose, 
subvert, and validate differing affective perspectives and provide opportunities for readers to 
reflect critically upon their own emotions and values. Each work demonstrates a deep 
engagement with extra-literary discourses and focuses on different emotions and social questions 
that were of special concern at the fin de siècle. Together, these novels provide insight into how 
writers perceived shifts in emotional codes and social mores as coinciding with the late 
nineteenth-century Kulturwandel. My approach to analyzing the representation of emotion in 
novelistic prose is outlined below. 
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1.3 HETEROPATHIA: CONCEPTUALIZING THE REPRESENTATION OF 
EMOTION IN NOVELISTIC PROSE 
The term that I have coined to describe the co-presence of different ways of feeling represented 
in literature is ‘heteropathia.’ At first glance, one might too easily make the etymological 
connection to ‘pathology’ or ‘pathological’ and assume that an analysis using the concept 
heteropathia treats emotions as irrational or disruptive in a given cultural context. This is 
unfortunately part of the baggage that the word ‘emotion’ has carried with it since its 
introduction into English in the mid-sixteenth century, when it signified “political agitation, civil 
unrest; a public commotion or uprising,” a definition that persisted until the late eighteenth 
century according to the Oxford English Dictionary (“Emotion” def. 1a). Of course, it is not my 
intention to classify emotions as disruptive, irrational, or pathological. Rather, I seek to analyze 
different orientations to emotion represented in literature and elucidate how writers engaged with 
and shaped the emotion discourse of their time through their works. 
With its Greek roots (hetero-, different; -pathia, feeling), the English equivalent of 
heteropathia could be rendered as ‘different-feelingness.’ Russian philosopher and literary critic 
Mikhail Bakhtin’s concept ‘heteroglossia,’ which describes the conflict between different types 
of speech in a novel, inspired the development of this term. In his essay “Discourse in the 
Novel,” Bakhtin defines heteroglossia incorporated into the novel as “another’s speech in 
another’s language, serving to express authorial intentions but in a refracted way” (324). This 
artistic blending of a diversity of social speech types and individual voices, together with their 
links and relationships, is a defining feature of the stylistics of the novel (262- 263). Heteropathia 
expands the focus of traditional Bakhtinian analysis and examines not the unity of diverse 
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utterances, but the narration of and interaction between distinct ways of feeling as they are 
presented within a single literary work.  
Heteropathia informs my interpretations of a social novel (Effi Briest), a novella 
(Fenitschka), and a generational novel (Buddenbrooks) in the following chapters. This means 
that, in the present study, I will restrict my application of the concept to novelistic prose. The 
reason for this is threefold. First, compared to works of other genres, a novel, by virtue of its 
length, number of characters, and diegetic levels, has the greatest potential to represent a 
plurality of differing affective perspectives assembled into an aesthetic whole. Second, the length 
and openness20 of the genre make novels particularly well suited to engage with extra-literary 
social and emotional discourses. Third, my method of reading for heteropathia would need to be 
modified before it can be applied to non-novelistic genres. By no means do novels have a 
monopoly on emotions—poetry, drama, and film enact differing ways of feeling in meaningful 
ways. Thus, I open up the concept heteropathia for the study of other literary genres and visual 
culture, albeit with the qualification that, because of their distinguishing characteristics, non-
novelistic genres may require interpretive approaches different from the one outlined here. 
1.3.1 Narrative Situation 
When analyzing heteropathia in a novelistic prose text, it is important to consider three aspects: 
the narrative situation, the depiction of emotional styles, and the framing of the narrated events 
                                                 
20 Bakhtin privileged the novel over other genres because of its openness and future-oriented ‘unfinalizability’: 
“[The novel] is plasticity itself. It is a genre that is ever questing, ever examining itself and subjecting its established 
forms to review. Such, indeed is the only possibility open to a genre that structures itself in a zone of direct contact 
with developing reality” (“Epic and Novel” 39). Additionally, Bakhtin noted that the novel, because it “makes wide 
and substantial use” of other literary and non-literary forms, “often crosses the boundary of what we strictly call 
fictional literature” (33). 
 15 
through one or more theoretical models of emotion. Although examining the narrative situation 
has long been common practice in narratology and other areas of literary criticism, it is 
especially crucial when studying the literary representation of emotions. The narrative situation 
determines whose emotions are communicated to readers, how they are shared, and what level of 
familiarity the narrator has with the thoughts and feelings of the characters. The more traditional 
terms used to describe narrative point of view (first-person, third-person limited, third-person 
omniscient) blur the lines between what Gérard Genette called ‘narrative voice’ (“Who speaks?”) 
and ‘focalization’ (“Who sees?”) (189-194; 244-252). I prefer Genette’s terms because they are 
more precise and provide the language needed to account for the frequent shifts in perspective 
that may occur in a narrative. For my literary analysis in each chapter, I draw on Genette’s 
narrative theory and treat narrative voice and focalization as the two elements of narrative 
situation that are essential for discussing the representation of emotions in literature.  
Narrative voice concerns itself with the issue of who narrates, and from what position. In 
order to address the first question, Genette distinguished between three types: homodiegetic, 
heterodiegetic, and autodiegetic narrators (245). A homodiegetic narrator is also a character in 
the story being told, while a heterodiegetic narrator is not and exists somewhere above it. If a 
homodiegetic narrator is the protagonist of the story he or she tells, then the narrator is also 
autodiegetic. Intradiegetic and extradiegetic refer to narrative levels or the origin of the narration, 
that is, whether the narrative voice is located inside (intradiegetic) or outside (extradiegetic) the 
story being narrated (Genette 248). In other words, an intradiegetic narrator speaks on the same 
level as the characters, while an extradiegetic narrator tells a story at a higher level and brings 
together all embedded narratives and focalizers within a text (Genette 244-252). Both 
intradiegetic and extradiegetic narrators can be either homodiegetic or heterodiegetic. The four 
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paradigms Genette identifies are therefore: extradiegetic-heterodiegetic, extradiegetic-
homodiegetic, intradiegetic-heterodiegetic, and intradiegetic-homodiegetic (248). 
Following Genette, we can also identify three types of focalization: zero focalization, 
external focalization, and internal focalization (189-194). In the case of zero focalization, we are 
dealing with a non-focalized narrative with an omniscient narrator who knows more than the 
characters. External focalization means that a narrator mimics a camera lens; he or she knows 
less than the characters and cannot read their minds. Internal focalization implies that the 
narrator sees from the perspective of a focal character. Variations may occur with internal 
focalization; an event may be narrated from the perspective of one character alone or switch 
between perspectives (Genette 189-190). 
How do emotions fit into this discussion of narrative voice and focalization? Literary 
works that feature a homodiegetic-autodiegetic narrator typically provide limited information 
about the thoughts and feelings of characters other than the narrator. Albert Camus’s The 
Stranger (1942), for example, features the autodiegetic narrator Meursault, who gives an account 
of his own feelings and perceptions but makes little attempt to comprehend the thoughts or 
emotions of the other characters. Another work that features an autodiegetic narrator is Arthur 
Schnitzler’s Leutnant Gustl, which employs stream of consciousness narration to show how the 
protagonist perceives and emotionally responds to incidents as they happen. Heterodiegetic 
narrators of zero focalization typically describe the emotions of more than one character. In this 
type of narrative situation, a narrator may convey unspoken feelings of characters through 
thought report or free indirect speech. If a work features external or internal focalization, it is 
likely that the narrator can only report his or her own feelings or those of a select character 
directly. In this case, the narrator may describe facial expressions and other physical emotional 
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signs, which can allow readers to make inferences about the characters’ feelings. A homodiegetic 
narrator often proves to be more biased than a heterodiegetic narrator due to his or her own 
involvement in the narrated events, but even a heterodiegetic narrator can show signs of 
partiality to one character over another, depending on which type of focalization is used. These 
examples show that attending to the narrative situation can help determine whose emotions are 
revealed (and whose are not) in what manner and to what effect. A more thorough discussion of 
how narrative voice and focalization affect the representation of emotion will follow in each 
chapter. 
1.3.2 Differing Emotional Styles or Fühlweisen 
The second main feature to consider when examining heteropathia in novelistic prose is the 
representation of what I will call differing ‘emotional styles’ or ways of feeling [Fühlweisen]. At 
present, historians of emotion commonly use one or more of the following three terms to 
describe the characteristic patterns of feeling of a particular period: emotional regimes, 
emotional communities, and emotional styles. As proposed by William Reddy, an ‘emotional 
regime,’ a necessary part of a stable political regime, is a set of emotional norms and the official 
practices that express and inculcate them (Navigation of Feeling 129). The term ‘emotional 
regime’ implies that an elite group with political power dictates normative emotional practices of 
ordinary people in a society. This idea can lead one to overlook the range of diverse emotional 
subgroups that may have existed during a given period.  
Barbara Rosenwein introduced an alternate term, ‘emotional communities,’ which she 
defines as “groups in which people adhere to the same norms of expression and value – or 
devalue – the same or related emotions” (Emotional Communities 2). The emphasis on 
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communities reflects the view that emotions are social and relational. Compared to ‘emotional 
regime,’ ‘emotional communities’ are less monolithic and make more room for variation, yet the 
concept presents challenges of its own. It is unclear, for example, whether people can belong to 
several emotional communities simultaneously and whether emotional communities simply 
emerge from pre-established socio-cultural groups, as Rosenwein suggests (see “Worrying” 35). 
Despite their limitations, ‘emotional communities’ and ‘emotional regime’ are both useful 
concepts in the discipline of history; however, literary studies require a more accommodating 
term, namely, ‘emotional styles.’ 
The term ‘emotional style’ is most suitable for literary studies because the term’s 
plasticity enables one to consider not only the emotions of real, historical individuals or groups, 
but also modes of literary expression and fictional representations of emotion. In historical 
studies of emotion, the term ‘emotional style’ is commonly used, albeit in different ways. Some 
historians apply it diachronically21 to successions of characteristic patterns of feeling through 
history, while others call attention to the synchronic relations between diverging emotional 
subcultures at a given time. According to Benno Gammerl, ‘emotional styles’ involve “…the 
experience, fostering, and display of emotions, and oscillate between discursive patterns and 
embodied practices as well as between common scripts and specific appropriations” (163). 
Gammerl notes the similarity between this notion of ‘style’ and the sociological understanding of 
‘habitus’ but emphasizes that, unlike habitus, emotional styles maintain a greater degree of 
plasticity and can be more easily pluralized (163). Out of the three aforementioned terms, I 
prefer ‘emotional style’ due to the flexibility it affords. The polysemy of the word ‘style’ allows 
                                                 
21 For example, in American Cool: Constructing a Twentieth-Century Emotional Style (1994), historian Peter 
Stearns describes two differing emotional styles: a nineteenth-century Victorian emotional style based on passion 
and a twentieth-century emotional style that emphasizes informality and coolness in expression. 
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one to consider emotions in relation to hierarchical structures (i.e. dominant and marginal), 
socio-cultural groups, and individual experience as well. Moreover, ‘emotional style’ bridges the 
disciplinary boundary between history and literary studies because ‘style’ refers to literary forms 
and the manner of artistic expression characteristic of an author, literary group, or cultural period 
(“Style” def. 13a). 
In the discussions of heteropathia in the following chapters, I use ‘emotional styles’ and 
‘ways of feeling’ [Fühlweisen] synonymously. An emotional style represented in a literary text 
may be characterized by one dominant emotion (e.g. Baron Geert von Innstetten’s honor in Effi 
Briest) or a cluster of emotions (e.g. Hanno Buddenbrook’s decadent sensibility, fear, 
hopelessness, shame, and pity in Buddenbrooks). When put in dialogue, contrasting emotional 
styles may lead to conflict or misunderstandings between characters, as evident in the 
interactions between Max and Fenia in Fenitschka and the servants Johanna and Roswitha in Effi 
Briest. Narrative techniques such as internal monologue communicate the narrator’s 
acknowledgment of, if not alignment with certain affective perspectives, and narrative irony 
indicates critique, skepticism, or a deliberate attempt to create distance. Mann’s empathetic-
ironic narration in Buddenbrooks best demonstrates these techniques and reflects a multifaceted 
assessment of the figures’ emotional styles. Studying the interaction between emotional styles 
represented at the intradiegetic and extradiegetic levels of a text provides new insight into 
possible interpretations of that text and the social and cultural contexts that inspired it. During 
periods of transition and cultural transformation, such as the fin de siècle, it is common to see at 
least two conflicting emotional styles represented in a novel or novella. 
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1.3.3 Theoretical Models of Emotion 
Finally, the third component of heteropathia to consider when analyzing a novelistic prose text is 
the framing of the narrated events through one or more theoretical models of emotion. Numerous 
individuals from a variety of disciplines throughout history have contributed insights into 
emotional life, including Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, Aquinas, Spinoza, Hume, Lessing, Darwin, 
James, Nietzsche, Freud, Dewey, psychoanalysts, neuroscientists, evolutionary psychologists, 
and social constructivists. Thus, rather than include an exhaustive list of all known theoretical 
models of emotion here, I will provide examples of some recent and historical models.  
One theory that has permeated thinking about emotion in Western societies is the 
‘hydraulic’ model.22 This model of emotion postulates that if emotions remain suppressed for too 
long, they will demand to be released, often causing an individual to lose control. The hydraulic 
model is found as early as Descartes, and the perceived antagonism between feeling and reason, 
which has characterized much of Western thought since Plato and Aristotle, explains the ubiquity 
of this model. A hydraulic model of emotion is implicit in much of the thinking of Sigmund 
Freud and Norbert Elias, two early twentieth-century theorists of emotion who contributed 
influential master narratives based on this model. Contemporary emotion research questions the 
accuracy of the hydraulic model23; however, the ordinary language and metaphors (e.g. ‘bottling 
up anger,’ ‘venting frustrations,’ ‘fuming with rage’) that people often use to talk about feelings 
reflect the cultural embeddedness of this model even today.  
                                                 
22 The notion of a ‘hydraulic’ model of emotion can be traced back to the work of philosopher Richard C. Solomon 
(see The Passions 77-88). 
 
23 Solomon considered the hydraulic model of emotion a “misleading metaphor” and noted that it inspired Freud’s 
most frequently disputed psychoanalytic theories (True to Our Feelings 142). Barbara Rosenwein identified a 
hydraulic model of emotion behind the master narratives of Johan Huizinga and Norbert Elias and challenged the 
view that “the history of the West is the history of increasing emotional restraint” (“Worrying” 827).  
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The interdisciplinary field of emotion studies now recognizes a number of more recent 
theoretical models of emotion, including the cognitive appraisal, constructivist, and performative 
theories. The cognitive appraisal model challenges the notion that emotions are irrational and 
pre-cognitive (see Plamper 241-243; Reddy 14-15). Instead, this model contends that emotions 
are signs of cognitive judgments, that is, that specific emotional reactions occur in response to 
cognitive evaluations or appraisals of events. The constructivist model attempts to erode the 
binary of individual versus culture and claims that emotions are socially constructed products of 
education (see Plamper 116-128; Reddy 35-50). According to the constructivist model, what 
matters are not questions of emotional ‘authenticity,’ but the social meanings and functions of 
emotions, which are thought to vary across epochs and cultures. The performative model of 
emotions, a specific type of constructivist model, insists that emotions can be willed and 
performed (McNamer 11). No longer viewed as stable categories, emotions are treated as 
practices or performances that are always in flux, yet are often made to seem natural. This recent 
understanding of emotion as a ‘practice’ or ‘performance’ recalls a parallel shift in gender 
studies and emphasizes what one does rather than who one is (Shields 6). Although these 
theoretical models of emotion did not yet exist in name during the late nineteenth century, I 
nonetheless find precursors—to both the hydraulic model and more recent theories—in German 
literature around 1900.  
When studying the representation of emotion in literary works from an earlier cultural 
period, however, it is essential to take note of the theories of emotion that were influential at that 
time in history. Even if writers did not intentionally engage with a particular conception of 
emotion in their work, it is likely that they inadvertently took up or modified theoretical models 
of emotion that were then in circulation. Since vocabularies of feeling have changed over time in 
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many languages, it is also necessary to consider past indicators of what we now call ‘emotion’ 
(e.g. words like Empfindung, Leidenschaft, and Gemütsbewegung), as well as emotion metaphors 
no longer in use. Theoretical models of emotion can be found throughout history in a variety of 
discourses and fields of study, including but not limited to philosophy, theology, aesthetics, 
medicine, evolutionary theory, psychology, and psychoanalysis. For example, William James’s 
psychophysiological model of emotion was highly influential in the late nineteenth century. The 
influence of Arthur Schopenhauer and Friedrich Nietzsche was even more pervasive at the fin de 
siècle, and they are still well-known today for their writings on compassion (Schopenhauer) and 
pity, ressentiment, guilt, and bad conscience (Nietzsche). 
In a literary text, a single emotional model may dominate, as in Gerhart Hauptmann’s 
Bahnwärter Thiel (1888). Hauptmann’s novella operates on a hydraulic model of emotion. The 
characters occupy a deterministic diegetic world, and the protagonist, Flagman Thiel, becomes a 
victim of his own emotions after suppressing them for a prolonged period of time. Yet it is 
possible to find evidence for multiple, even contradictory models of emotion that structure a 
narrative, as I demonstrate in Chapter Three on Andreas-Salomé’s Fenitschka. The final scene of 
Fenitschka demonstrates a movement from an essentialist model of emotion to a performative 
one, a shift that coincides with the homodiegetic narrator’s acknowledgment of the title heroine’s 
agency. One can identify theoretical models of emotion in the organizational structure of a work, 
at the level of narration, or through the actions and speech of the characters themselves. 
In summary, heteropathia refers to the co-presence of and tension between differing 
emotional perspectives represented in novelistic prose. Its unique manifestation in a text 
becomes apparent if one examines the narrative situation (voice and focalization), representation 
of emotional styles, and theoretical models of emotion. An analysis using this concept shows 
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how methods of narrating and staging emotions in a diegetic world produce different outcomes. 
For example, a novel can support or challenge dominant cultural narratives, subvert previously 
unquestioned emotional codes, preserve or reimagine status and power hierarchies, or envision 
new orientations to emotion and patterns of social relationship, depending on how differing ways 
of feeling are represented in the text in question. 
1.4 CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
In the following chapters, I analyze the manifestation of heteropathia in three novelistic prose 
works written in the realist mode: Theodor Fontane’s Effi Briest (1895), Lou Andreas-Salomé’s 
Fenitschka (1898), and Thomas Mann’s Buddenbrooks: Verfall einer Familie (1901). My 
chapters are organized chronologically based on the publication date of the main literary work 
discussed in each. I made these selections from among other German novelistic prose works 
written during the 1890s based on two criteria: first, the impact of these authors and works at the 
fin de siècle and, second, the engagement with questions of emotions and social mores in the 
context of the late nineteenth-century Kulturwandel.  
In general, the impact of a literary work derives largely from its capacity to move readers 
affectively. Literature can offer readers models, outlets, and provocations for their emotions. Effi 
Briest, Fenitschka, and Buddenbrooks are noteworthy in this regard. As we know from Theodor 
Fontane’s letters, a majority of historical readers of Effi Briest sympathized with Effi but rejected 
Innstetten and his propriety.24 Effi Briest does indeed model compassion for its title heroine; 
                                                 
24 Fontane expressed his surprise and concern with his readers’ responses to Effi Briest in a letter to Clara Kühnast 
dated October 27, 1895: “Ja, Effi! Alle Leute sympathisieren mit ihr und Einige gehen so weit, im Gegensatze dazu, 
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however, Fontane was surprised to learn that his character Innstetten filled readers with loathing. 
Less is known about historical readers’ responses to Fenitschka; however, it is well documented 
that Lou Andreas-Salomé’s image of women in her writings incited criticism from some of her 
contemporaries, including German feminist Hedwig Dohm, who called “Frau Lou” an 
“Antifrauenrechtlerin” (Dohm 280).25 I take up an analysis of Fenitschka because, although 
Andreas-Salomé was a highly influential thinker and writer of her time, her literary works have 
largely been neglected in scholarship until recently. After its publication in 1901, Buddenbrooks 
outraged residents of Lübeck, including Thomas Mann’s family members. Some considered the 
novel a scandalous roman à clef because Mann used real-life models for many of his figures, and 
early twentieth-century critics accused Mann of being a “kalter Künstler” [cold artist] due to his 
ironic narrative style and social criticism (see Mann, Briefe an Otto Grautoff und Ida Boy-Ed 
150; Muth 614-616). Mann’s ‘double optic’ nonetheless contributed toward the novel’s broad 
appeal to both educated elites and the masses, and Buddenbrooks remains Mann’s bestselling 
novel.  
Regarding my second criterion, I find that Effi Briest, Fenitschka, and Buddenbrooks 
demonstrate a deep engagement with questions of emotions and social mores in the context of 
the social upheaval and rapid modernization that characterized the fin de siècle. Written during 
the 1890s and published within five years of each other, these works articulate the authors’ 
                                                                                                                                                             
den Mann als einen ‘alten Ekel’ zu bezeichnen.  Das amüsiert mich natürlich, giebt mir aber auch zu denken, weil es 
wieder beweist, wie wenig den Menschen an der sogenannten ‘Moral’ liegt und wie die liebenswürdigen Naturen 
dem Menschenherzen sympathischer sind. [...] Denn eigentlich ist er doch in jedem Anbetracht ein ganz 
ausgezeichnetes Menschenexemplar, dem es an dem, was man lieben muß, durchaus nicht fehlt. Aber sonderbar, 
alle korrekten Leute werden schon bloß um ihrer Korrektheiten willen mit Mißtrauen, oft mit Abneigung betrachtet” 
(Dichter über ihre Dichtungen 452). 
 
25 It is in response to Andreas-Salomé’s essay “Der Mensch als Weib” (1899) that Hedwig Dohm writes: “Und nun 
Frau Lou Andreas-Salomé? “Auch Du, mein Sohn Brutus!” dachte ich betrübt, als ich ihre Schrift “Der Mensch als 
Weib” gelesen hatte. Frau Lou (ihr voller, viel zu langer Name frißt zu viel Manuskript) Antifrauenrechtlerin!” 
(Dohm 280). Dohm still admired Andreas-Salomé even though she considered some of her views anti-feminist. 
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concerns with some of the most pressing issues of the time, including the women’s movement, 
decadence, morality, shifting social relations, and transformations in business and family life. 
Emotion is both an end itself and the means by which Fontane, Andreas-Salomé, and Mann 
represent and negotiate between differing perspectives on these social questions. Each work 
focuses on specific emotions and social contexts and resonates with distinct theoretical models of 
emotion. Yet all three point toward a strong correlation between broad cultural shifts and the 
emergence of new ways of feeling. Effi Briest, Fenitschka, and Buddenbrooks depict societies 
undergoing the structural changes of modernization and destabilize emotional practices 
associated with nineteenth-century social hierarchies, such as honor codes, imperatives of female 
shame, and notions of bourgeois pride. Through the depiction of alternate emotional styles, such 
as compassion, modern understandings of love and marriage, and decadent sensibility, these 
novels express an awareness that changing social relations necessitate shifts in emotions and 
social mores. This acknowledgment of other forms of feeling in these works parallels the social 
leveling and democratization that was taking place in late nineteenth-century Wilhelmine 
Germany. Yet these novels do not advocate the reliance only upon new paradigms. Their open 
endings and heteropathic representation of differing affective perspectives foster a sustained 
dialogic interaction between viewpoints. 
Chapter Two applies the concept heteropathia to the representation of emotion in 
Theodor Fontane’s social novel Effi Briest (1895). As a novel of adultery, Effi Briest proves to be 
especially conducive to examining the relevance and limitations of emotional practices that were 
debated in Wilhelmine Germany at the fin de siècle. My analysis demonstrates how the novel 
presents two of these emotional practices, Ehre [honor] and Mitleid [compassion], as emotional 
antipodes associated with different moral systems and views of society. On the one hand, we find 
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the nineteenth-century aristocratic and bourgeois emotional code of Ehre, which preserves social 
hierarchies and defends retributive justice, and on the other hand, we have Mitleid, which implies 
solidarity and the softening of social mores. The tension between these two ways of feeling, 
although most apparent in the servants’ responses to the news of Effi’s adultery, manifests itself 
throughout the entire novel. By critically examining and subverting the emotional imperatives of 
honor and shame, Effi Briest makes room for compassion in a society undergoing modernization. 
But this is not to say that Fontane’s novel envisions a society driven only by compassion. 
Fontane was influenced by Schopenhauer’s Mitleidsethik, the theoretical model of emotion that 
structures his novel; however, Fontane adapts the philosopher’s ethics of compassion to fit his 
own worldview. The novel’s open ending allows the dialogic negotiation between these differing 
ways of feeling to continue. Thus, while Effi Briest depicts Ehre as an emotional practice that has 
lost its relevance in late nineteenth-century society, it ultimately admits the need for both Mitleid 
and self-regulatory emotions.  
Chapter Three analyzes the co-presence of differing emotional styles represented in Lou 
Andreas-Salomé’s Fenitschka (1898). Through the interactions between the protagonists, Fenia 
and Max, the novella reveals the impact that large cultural shifts had on emotions and social 
mores in fin-de-siècle European society. Andreas-Salomé’s novella regards the women’s 
movement as the major force that transformed relations between the sexes and introduced new 
orientations to emotion. Written against this historical background, Fenitschka focuses on 
notions of nineteenth-century romantic love, masculine honor, and feminine shame, passivity, 
and sexual purity. The novella contributes to the fin-de-siècle emotion discourse by subverting 
these previously undisputed social mores and gendered emotional imperatives. At the same time, 
it also recognizes that the familiar narratives associated with them were difficult to abandon. A 
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sober acknowledgment of the confusion and frustration brought about by the destabilization of 
familiar cultural practices is articulated through Max, the novella’s co-protagonist and 
extradiegetic-homodiegetic narrator. Readers see from Max’s perspective and observe his 
thoughts and feelings in response to his encounters with Fenia, a New Woman-like figure who 
thwarts his attempts to categorize her. Narrative techniques convey Max’s struggles to come to 
term with shifts in emotional practices and the implications that these have for his own gender 
identity and relationships. Although it is difficult to escape the late nineteenth-century male 
bourgeois view embodied by Max, Fenitschka makes room for new emotional styles and a 
liberating definition of love. It does not call for the naïve acceptance of a single ideology; 
instead, it encourages mutual understanding through dialogue, exemplified by Fenia’s character. 
Fenitschka advocates freedom of self-realization through its validation of new emotional styles 
and opportunities for individuals in modern society, yet it remains sensitive to the difficulty of 
integrating new meanings and values into existing structures of feeling. 
Chapter Four examines the roles that emotions play in Thomas Mann’s Buddenbrooks: 
Verfall einer Familie (1901). The multigenerational family saga structure of Buddenbrooks sets 
the novel apart from Effi Briest and Fenitschka, both of which feature fewer characters and cover 
a much shorter span of narrated time. This chapter demonstrates how, by depicting the gradual 
deterioration of the Buddenbrooks’ ‘bourgeois’ emotional code and transition to other, 
‘unbourgeois’ ways of feeling [unbürgerliche Gefühle]26 in the course of four generations, 
Mann’s novel offers critical assessments of a range of emotional styles through its empathetic-
                                                 
26 ‘Unbourgeois’ is the translation I use to preserve the polysemy and ambiguity of the term ‘unbürgerlich’ reflected 
in the following passage: “War der verstorbene Konsul, mit seiner schwärmerischen Liebe zu Gott und dem 
Gekreuzigten, der erste seines Geschlechtes gewesen, der unalltägliche, unbürgerliche und differenzierte Gefühle 
gekannt und gepflegt hatte, so schienen seine beiden Söhne die ersten Buddenbrooks zu sein, die vor dem freien und 
naiven Hervortreten solcher Gefühle empfindlich zurückschreckten” (Buddenbrooks 283, emphasis added). 
 28 
ironic narration. In the diegetic world of Buddenbrooks, established emotional codes and social 
mores become increasingly difficult to preserve. With the social leveling and rise of the 
nouveaux riches depicted in the second half of the novel, the Buddenbrooks’ high bourgeois 
pride becomes increasingly ironic. Decadent sensibility emerges as an alternate form of feeling 
and escape from the ever-increasing work tempo in a rapidly modernizing world. I suggest that 
Mann draws on a Nietzschean genealogical approach in Buddenbrooks, but, rather than 
advancing a single ideological viewpoint, Mann uses genealogy to find a middle ground between 
the unwavering bourgeois pride and self-confidence stimulated by German programmatic realism 
and the decadent sensibility that became fashionable at the fin de siècle. Through its figure of the 
young writer Kai Graf Mölln, who exemplifies both life-affirming pride and artistic sensibility 
and acts as a structural metaphor for the mediation of emotions in the novel, Buddenbrooks self-
reflexively highlights the role of literature in renegotiating emotional codes and social mores. 
Taken together, the following chapters demonstrate that Fontane’s Effi Briest, Andreas-
Salomé’s Fenitschka, and Mann’s Buddenbrooks feature a heteropathic impulse that recalls the 
transitional status of the fin de siècle. These literary works acknowledge emotional alterity yet 
resist embracing any way of feeling uncritically. Instead, they negotiate between diverse 
affective perspectives and create spaces for critical analysis and dialogue. I suggest that Effi 
Briest, Fenitschka, and Buddenbrooks attend to a crisis in emotional practices and social mores 
that pervaded German culture around 1900. Each work expresses an awareness that established 
social codes were losing their value and effectiveness in modern society and that the needs, 
desires, and feelings of people were changing. Although overt references to the larger historical 
and structural changes (e.g. the decline of the aristocracy, the women’s movement, urbanization, 
industrialization) in fin-de-siècle Wilhelmine society remain somewhat in the background of 
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each work, these novelistic prose texts depict signs of social leveling and modernization as 
coinciding with or necessitating shifts in affective perspectives. As I show in the following 
chapters, Effi Briest, Fenitschka, and Buddenbrooks do not prescribe how to feel or what to 
think, but rather engage readers in critical reflection about their own emotions and values and 
create spaces for them to feel differently, which is why these works remain highly relevant today. 
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2.0  “DAS BESTE, WAS WIR HABEN, IST MITLEID”?: NEGOTIATING BETWEEN 
HONOR AND COMPASSION IN FONTANE’S EFFI BRIEST (1895) 
Since the publication of Theodor Fontane’s (1819-1898) Effi Briest in 1895, Effi’s fate has 
evoked strong affective responses in readers and incited criticism of late nineteenth-century 
Wilhelmine society.1 Fontane provides models for such affective responses through the narrator, 
who sympathizes with his ‘arme Effi,’ and the servant Roswitha, who also reacts with 
compassion after reading about Effi’s affair and Major Crampas’s death in the duel with Baron 
Geert von Innstetten: “‘Ja,’ sagte Roswitha. ‘Und das lesen nun die Menschen und 
verschimpfieren mir meine liebe, arme Frau. Und der arme Major. Nun ist er tot’” (Effi Briest 
291). Yet Fontane also gives expression to a contrasting style of social feeling through the 
servant Johanna, who vehemently rejects the idea of compassion for Crampas and upholds the 
nineteenth-century Prussian honor code: “Was heißt der arme Major! Der ganze arme Major 
taugte nichts…. Und wenn man immer in vornehmen Häusern gedient hat…dann weiß man 
auch, was sich paßt und schickt und was Ehre ist…” (Effi Briest 291-292). This argument 
between two of the novel’s important but less commonly studied figures reflects conflicting 
                                                 
1 The historical inspiration for Fontane’s Effi Briest was the Ardenne affair, a love affair between Elisabeth (Else) 
von Ardenne and Emil Hartwich, who died of severe injuries four days after a pistol duel with Armand von Ardenne 
in Berlin on November 27, 1886 (see appendix to Effi Briest 353-358). Although Fontane indicated in letters that he 
was aware that Else started a new life as a nurse after her divorce, he tells a different story in Effi Briest (see 
appendix to Effi Briest 358-362). The fate endured by Effi, whose physical and emotional decline and early death 
bear little resemblance to Else’s new opportunities and long life to age 99, inspires compassion and brings under 
scrutiny the gender double standards, practice of dueling, and cult of honor that persisted through the 1890s. 
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social responses to the misfortunes that occur after Effi’s adultery and Innstetten’s duel: a 
reaffirmation of the need for honor [Ehre] on the one hand (Johanna) and an appeal to 
compassion [Mitleid] on the other (Roswitha). Thus, heteropathia in Effi Briest manifests itself as 
the staging of tension between Mitleid and principles of Ehre and Sittlichkeit. Yet this tension is 
not a pure literary invention. In Effi Briest Fontane responds to greater social concerns and 
renegotiates the space between two important social feelings2 that were part of the emotional 
repertoire and occupied the forefront of cultural debates in late nineteenth-century Wilhelmine 
Germany. 
By taking this key scene between Johanna and Roswitha in Chapter 29 as its starting 
point, this chapter considers Fontane’s Effi Briest in its historical context and examines the way 
in which the novel represents changing social perspectives on the emotions Ehre and Mitleid 
around 1900. Psychophysiological theories of emotion3 predominated in the second half of the 
nineteenth century. But, rather than merely representing emotions as physiological responses to 
one’s environment or individual subjective experiences, Effi Briest reveals that emotions are also 
shaped by and acquire meaning through social relations. The processes of modernization, 
industrialization, and Kulturwandel transformed social relations at the turn of the century, and 
changes in emotions and their meanings coincided with these broad cultural shifts. Of course, 
this does not imply cultural uniformity or a smooth transition from one range of emotional styles 
                                                 
2 During this historical period characterized by rapid modernization, industrialization, and Kulturwandel, social 
feelings were of great value. Hermann Boeschenstein writes that the increasing demand for social feeling at this time 
“lag zum Teil in der Entwicklung der Gesellschaft begründet, in den dunklen Schatten, die das industrielle Zeitalter 
warf” (153). 
 
3 Two prominent examples of these theories include Charles Darwin’s The Expression of the Emotions in Man and 
Animals (1872) and William James’s “What is an Emotion?” (1884), both of which circulated widely in Germany in 
the last decades of the nineteenth century. For an overview of nineteenth-century affective psychology, see Harry 
Norman Gardiner, Ruth Clark Metcalf, and John G. Beebe-Center, Feeling and Emotion: A History of Theories, 
1937 (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1970) 276-335. 
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to another. Instead, as I argued in the introduction, emotions and social mores were renegotiated, 
and this happened in part through literary texts and other media. Debates about Ehre, for 
example, were tied to arguments for or against the practice of dueling from the nineteenth to the 
early twentieth century. The inclusion of the publication “Für oder wider das Duell?” (1896) as 
the first volume of a series called Brennende Tagesfragen attests to the significant role that Ehre 
played in public discourse of the time.4 Published a few years after Effi Briest, Arthur 
Schnitzler’s (1862-1931) Leutnant Gustl (1900) provides another literary examination of the 
code of Ehre and practice of dueling. Mitleid entered public discourse around 1900 through a 
variety of channels, including German Naturalist literature and theater, Arthur Schopenhauer’s 
and Friedrich Nietzsche’s writings on Mitleid, and social aid organizations, such as the 
Mädchen- und Frauengruppen für soziale Hilfsarbeit (1893) and the Deutscher Caritasverband 
(1897). During the women’s movement, suffragettes showed compassion for ‘fallen’ women and 
brought to light gender double standards, including the fragility of feminine virtue and the 
policing of female sexuality.5 Written against this historical background, Effi Briest depicts a 
society in which emotional styles are shifting. Fontane’s protagonists, Effi and Innstetten, face 
essentially the same psychological struggle: to confront and manage their guilt and other 
emotions in the face of emotional codes that no longer seem in tune with modern ways of life. 
Fontane portrays the figures’ inability to have “das richtige Gefühl,” or what late nineteenth-
century Prussian aristocratic society would consider the ‘proper emotions’ in their situations and 
thereby alludes to the declining relevance of the emotional imperatives of masculine honor and 
feminine shame and the need for different, more humane styles of social feeling (Effi Briest 259).  
                                                 
4 Arnold Fischer, “Für oder wider das Duell?” Brennende Tagesfragen, vol. 1 (Rostock: Volckmann, 1896). 
 
5 See Meyer-Renschhausen 116-119. 
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Effi Briest contributed to the turn-of-the-century emotion discourse by establishing 
Mitleid as the emotion that could provide stability and a new point of orientation during this time 
of rapid social and cultural transformation. Nevertheless, this brand of Mitleid is not the same as 
the eighteenth-century conception of Mitleid tied to Enlightenment optimism, ideals of Bildung, 
and the bourgeois theater. In Fontane’s novel, the emotion Mitleid is associated with cultural 
pessimism rather than Enlightenment optimism. It stands in opposition to Ehre, an influential 
emotional code in aristocratic and bourgeois circles that determined one’s place in the social 
hierarchy. By contrast, Mitleid in Effi Briest transcends social stratification and is even extended 
to those who transgress social and moral boundaries. The novel indicates that some may have 
perceived this emotion as a threat to the established social hierarchy and institutions due to the 
tolerance, social leveling, and softening of social mores that Mitleid implies. 
Ehre and Mitleid can both be considered social emotions,6 yet the novel presents them as 
emotional antipodes. Fontane’s symbolic association of Mitleid with nature and Ehre with 
society emphasizes the tension between these two social emotions. As in Arthur Schopenhauer’s 
ethics, in which Mitleid is conceived as the ‘wahre Grundlage der Moral,’ Mitleid in Effi Briest 
manifests itself as ‘natural’ social feeling or compassionate love. The narrator reveals that the 
figures who cling to Ehre often do so for self-seeking reasons, and, by comparison with Mitleid, 
Ehre represents a self-regarding ethical system devoid of “rechte Liebe” (Effi Briest 348). The 
association of the ‘Naturkind’ Effi with nature and Roswitha, who embodies Mitleid or what 
Schopenhauer calls reine Liebe, explains why readers since 1895 have tended to identify with 
                                                 
6 As clarified in the introduction, I consider all emotions always-already social. Although the term ‘social emotions’ 
might seem redundant given this understanding of emotion, the modifier ‘social’ stresses the important role that 
these particular emotions play in facilitating social interaction, i.e. in regulating power, status, and group cohesion or 
dissolution. 
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Effi rather than Innstetten. Yet, as Fontane’s letter to Clara Kühnast dated October 27, 1895, 
suggests, to call Innstetten an “Ekel,” as many of his contemporaries did, would be missing the 
point: 
Ja, Effi! Alle Leute sympathisieren mit ihr und Einige gehen so weit, im 
Gegensatze dazu, den Mann als einen ‘alten Ekel’ zu bezeichnen. Das amüsiert 
mich natürlich, giebt mir aber auch zu denken, weil es wieder beweist, wie wenig 
den Menschen an der sogenannten ‘Moral’ liegt und wie die liebenswürdigen 
Naturen dem Menschenherzen sympathischer sind. [...] Denn eigentlich ist er 
doch in jedem Anbetracht ein ganz ausgezeichnetes Menschenexemplar, dem es 
an dem, was man lieben muß, durchaus nicht fehlt. Aber sonderbar, alle korrekten 
Leute werden schon bloß um ihrer Korrektheiten willen mit Mißtrauen, oft mit 
Abneigung betrachtet. (Dichter über ihre Dichtungen 452) 
From these comments, it is evident that Fontane had intended his character Innstetten to be read 
more positively than most cared to see him. Fontane laments the devaluation of morality that he 
identifies in readers’ overwhelming sympathy for Effi and disgust with Innstetten, and he 
assumes that readers find Innstetten repulsive precisely because of his propriety. Before her 
death at the end of the novel, Effi insists that Innstetten acted appropriately but remarks that he 
lacked “rechte Liebe” (Effi Briest 348). Effi’s acknowledgment of Innstetten’s good character 
reflects Fontane’s own unwillingness to imagine living in a society that has relinquished all 
guiding moral principles evident in this letter. By validating ethical principles and social mores 
guided by rechte Liebe in Effi Briest, Fontane adapts Schopenhauer’s Mitleidsethik to fit his own 
worldview. Although Fontane’s narrator of Effi Briest is drawn more to Mitleid, especially for 
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the title heroine, the novel opens up a space for the co-existence of and dialogue between both 
styles of social feeling during a period of unprecedented social change. 
2.1 EMOTION AND SOCIAL CRITICISM IN FONTANE’S NOVELS 
Fontane’s critical examination of Ehre and Mitleid and appropriation of the nature-society motif 
constitute his style of social critique in Effi Briest.7 Most celebrated for his Berliner 
Gesellschaftsromane and their sharp criticism of German society during the Bismarckian and 
Wilhelmine eras, Fontane began his career as a Romancier late in life. Born in Neuruppin in 
1819, he collected a variety of experiences through his frequent travels to England and various 
positions as an apothecary, journalist, and theater critic. Fontane made Berlin his permanent 
residence in 1844 and became a member of the literary society ‘Tunnel über der Spree,’ in which 
he continued to develop his conversational tone and the attention to detail characteristic of his 
realist style. He was not immune to the influence of philosophical pessimism and the discourse 
of decadence and decline8 that left its mark on late nineteenth-century Europe. As a keen 
observer of society, Fontane viewed the changes he witnessed critically and grew increasingly 
                                                 
7 Helmuth Nürnberger wrote the following about Fontane’s literary works overall: “Fontanes Dichtung entlarvt die 
Unnatürlichkeit, die Herzlosigkeit, die Veräußerlichung der geltenden moralischen Konventionen mit jeder nur 
wünschenswerten Schärfe” (142). Although Fontane’s novels are certainly critical of late nineteenth-century 
Wilhelmine society, Nürnberger’s assessment essentializes nature and posits a binary in which social conventions 
are evil and nature is good. I find that Fontane’s contemplation of the social and ethical implications of Ehre and 
Mitleid in Effi Briest complicates a straightforward correspondence between good/evil and nature/society. 
 
8 Isabel Nottinger considers the potential influence that Arthur Schopenhauer, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Max Nordau 
might have had on Fontane and his work but rightly emphasizes his critical distance from their views. Fontane’s 
critical distance holds true especially in the case of Nordau, one of the staunchest critics of decadence at the turn of 
the century. While Nordau diagnosed degeneration as a widespread disease that needed to be overcome in order for 
society to progress, Fontane saw potential in decline, which he considered to be as much as a part of life as growth 
and development (see Nottinger 82-84). 
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pessimistic in the last two decades of his life. It is perhaps not surprising, then, that he was most 
prolific during this time. After Fontane turned toward the literary portrayal of late nineteenth-
century society and published his first Berlin social novel L´Adultera in 1882, his career as a 
novelist flourished, with novels appearing with regularity until his death in 1898. Among 
Fontane’s literary works published between 1882 and 1898 are four adultery novels—L’Adultera 
(1882), Graf Petöfy (1883), Unwiederbringlich (1891), and Effi Briest (1895)—works indicating 
that the topic of adultery occupied him for over a decade. A scandalous yet popular literary genre 
in late nineteenth-century Europe, the novel of female adultery was especially conducive to the 
examination and social critique of the state of culture and politics that so deeply concerned 
Fontane. The transgressive nature of adultery and the emotional codes associated with it enabled 
him to explore the social relevance and limits of Ehre, Scham, and Mitleid in Effi Briest in 
particular, where as in his other social novels, he responds to the notion common in the 
nineteenth century that modern society is antithetical to individual autonomy. Frequently 
drawing on the themes of conflict between the individual and society or nature and culture, 
Fontane’s works paved the way for the later development of genres known in German as 
Gesellschafts- and Zeitroman.  
Conflict between the individual and society is a recurring theme in Fontane’s oeuvre, yet 
emotions, mental phenomena in which individual biology and subjectivity and socio-cultural 
influences intersect, have received surprisingly little scholarly consideration. By no means does 
this only describe the state of research in Fontane studies. Critics have tended to read emotion in 
studies of late nineteenth-century German literature overall in terms of emotional restraint or 
repression with little elaboration. Russell Berman, for instance, describes the diegetic world in 
Effi Briest as “a world where emotions are as orderly as a well-tended garden, even if one’s only 
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child is buried in it” (339). Berman refers specifically to the novel’s final scene in the garden at 
Hohen-Cremmen after Effi’s gravestone is laid, but, by arguing that Effi Briest marks the end of 
literary realism, he implies that this ‘orderly’ depiction of emotions characterizes nineteenth-
century German realist fiction in general. Even if one were to agree with this assessment of 
nineteenth-century German realism, the perceived absence of strong emotions in literature should 
prompt inquiry rather than dismissal. Writers have drawn on emotions at every point in German 
cultural history, but the literary form that emotions take varies considerably, depending on how 
society viewed them at the time. Thus, even ‘unemotional’ works represent feelings and elicit 
affective responses in readers. 
One of the first Germanists to recognize the significance of emotions in Fontane’s work 
was Hermann Boeschenstein, who, due to the large scale of his project of tracing the German 
Gefühlskultur from 1770 to 1930, does not go into detail about Fontane’s novels. Because of the 
powerful way that Effi Briest portrays the maturation of its title figure, however, Boeschenstein 
calls it a “Bildungsroman der Gefühlskultur,” thereby acknowledging that Fontane’s novel 
represents an important contribution to the late nineteenth-century German emotion discourse 
(167). Uta Schürmann puts Fontane in dialogue with William James’s (1842-1910) nineteenth-
century peripheral psychophysiological theory9 of emotion and argues that the numerous 
indicators of temperature (i.e. Wärme and Kälte) in L’Adultera produce the characters’ emotional 
states and communicate these to readers (60). Although there is evidence to suggest that Fontane 
uses temperature and humidity metaphorically to hint at individual emotions and social climates 
                                                 
9 Schürmann presumes that Fontane was aware of William James’s theory of emotion because, in the second half of 
the nineteenth century, general public enthusiasm for popular psychology abounded outside the university (58). Carl 
Stumpf (1848-1936), a German philosopher and psychologist, helped make William James a household name in 
Germany, but the connection to Fontane is relatively weak because Stumpf did not join the philosophy faculty in 
Berlin until 1894, well over a decade after the publication of L’Adultera in 1882. 
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in Effi Briest10 as well, such metereological details appear much less frequently than in 
L’Adultera. It is the social negotiation of the emotions Ehre and Mitleid, I contend, that takes 
center stage in Effi Briest.  
Other scholarship on Effi Briest speculates about the extent of reader identification or 
sympathy with Effi and Innstetten, yet the representation of emotions does not emerge as a 
concern. Traditionally, the common critical reaction is to judge Innstetten’s character harshly 
(see Lukács 305; Müller-Seidel 370). This view echoes the initial critique of Innstetten’s 
character to which Fontane responded in 1895. Walter Müller-Seidel attributes Effi’s suffering to 
Innstetten’s “Leidenschaftslosigkeit,” thereby overlooking signs of his affection for her and 
interpreting “rechte Liebe” as passionate or romantic love rather than feeling for humanity 
(compare Müller-Seidel 370; Effi Briest 348). Taking their cue from Fontane’s bewilderment 
over his readers’ disgust with Innstetten, some critics foreground his suffering or show that he is 
able to love (see Krause; Miller; Schneider). Yet others reject the conclusion that Innstetten falls 
prey to the “uns tyrannisierende[s] Gesellschafts-Etwas” and argue that he maintains control11 of 
his actions (Effi Briest 278). Although critics generally agree that Effi’s story is presented in 
greater detail than Innstetten’s, Dieter Krohn attempts to fill in details about Innstetten’s inner 
life and assumes that his decision to duel is motivated not only by social norms, but by personal 
feelings, which he tries to deny (162). But critics who attempt a more even-handed interpretation 
                                                 
10 Two men from Berlin talk about Hofprediger Kögel after Effi and Innstetten’s wedding: “Freilich, ein Mann in 
seiner Stellung muß kalt sein. Woran scheitert man denn im Leben überhaupt?  Immer nur an der Wärme” (Effi 
Briest 40, emphasis added). In her letter to Innstetten, Effi mentions the temperature at Bad Ems immediately after 
describing her conversations with Frau Zwicker: “Dazu kommt noch, daß Ems in einem Kessel liegt. Wir leiden hier 
außerordentlich unter der Hitze” (Effi Briest 266). Wärme or Hitze implies impropriety and unconventionalism in 
both examples.  
 
11 Sabine Hotho-Jackson reminds us how “Fontane argues … that human beings are free agents and have to accept 
responsibility for their actions…” (274; see also Brinkmann 96). Birgit Stolt pushes the assertion that Innstetten 
maintains control over his actions even further and uses discourse analysis to show that he plays a role in driving 
Effi to commit adultery (244). 
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cannot help but notice the narrator’s disproportionate treatment of Effi’s and Innstetten’s 
predicaments. The narrator’s own alignment with his “arme Effi” facilitates greater reader 
identification with the novel’s title heroine (compare Effi Briest 79, 345; Hamann 431; Krohn 
157).  
A few key studies focus on the role of particular emotions in Effi Briest. Brian Tucker, 
for example, provides a brief historical account of the boredom and exclusion that aristocratic 
and bourgeois women experienced as a result of late nineteenth-century social change and relates 
Effi Briest to other adultery novels in which feelings of Langeweile play an important role. 
Tucker then shows how the novel’s performance of boredom by way of erzählte Zeit and 
Erzählzeit explains why readers typically side with Effi (194). Although Erwin Kobel primarily 
intends to clarify how Effi becomes an adulteress, which leads him to analyze the novel’s 
treatment of fear. Kobel refers to Søren Kierkegaard’s (1813-1855) writings on fear and 
trembling and claims that Major Crampas uses Effi’s Angst to attract her like a magnet (261). My 
approach has more in common with Waltraud Wende’s and Ute Frevert’s studies, which 
emphasize the meaning of emotional codes and social contexts. Wende thus identifies the 
intersection of old and new models of love and marriage in Effi Briest (148). Frevert’s discussion 
of a special case in the twentieth-century reception of Effi Briest argues that emotions change 
through history (Vergängliche Gefühle 18; Emotions in History 10, 82). Informed by recent 
historical studies of emotion, this chapter demonstrates how Fontane’s Effi Briest enacts the 
heteropathic representation of Ehre and Mitleid by analyzing the novel’s narrative situation, its 
presentation of different emotional styles, and its contextualization of a philosophical model of 
emotion. 
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2.2 “ARME EFFI”: FONTANE’S COMPASSIONATE NARRATOR 
The narrative situation of Effi Briest, which features an extradiegetic-heterodiegetic narrator, 
yields a complex, realistic picture of late nineteenth-century society and provides insight into the 
thoughts, emotions, and motivations of a wide array of figures. The narrator’s position outside of 
the diegetic world maintains a certain emotional distance from the figures and narrated events. 
Rather than seeing only from the perspective of one figure narrating his or her own story, readers 
are invited to observe the speech and actions of the characters from the privileged position of the 
narrator. They therefore gain information that no single figure possesses, including knowledge of 
the unspoken thoughts and feelings of the other characters. On first glance, it might seem that 
this largely non-focalized narrative would enable readers to judge the characters and uncover the 
impetus for the social crises depicted in the novel, but the novel resists such monocausal 
explanations, which scholars typically dismiss as “unfontanisch” (see Krohn 158). Fontane 
delivers social critique in Effi Briest. Yet, by depicting a society in all of its complexity, he 
contests the simple reduction of social problems and questions, which is often held to be a 
strength of his social novels (see Wende 157).  
Although Effi Briest conveys a wider variety of voices and perspectives than a 
homodiegetic narrator could communicate, the novel’s narrative situation does not generate an 
impartial, objective portrait or straightforward historical representation of Bismarckian society. 
Fontane frequently employs narrative irony as both a vehicle of social critique and an element of 
his realist strategy of Verklärung (see Nottinger 16-17; Preisendanz 292). Readers can easily 
recognize Fontane’s narrative irony in the characterization of Sidonie von Grasenabb, a member 
of the aristocracy who obliviously exhibits behaviors she finds detestable in others. In Chapter 
19, for example, Sidonie deplores the lack of discipline in society, considered by some to be a 
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sign of the times, and asks Pastor Lindequist to intervene in the education of youth: “‘Eingreifen, 
lieber Pastor, Zucht. Das Fleisch ist schwach, gewiß; aber…’ In diesem Augenblicke kam ein 
englisches Roastbeef, von dem Sidonie ziemlich ausgiebig nahm, ohne Lindequist’s Lächeln 
dabei zu bemerken” (Effi Briest 179). Pastor Lindequist’s smile, an expression of amusement, 
renders the social critique in this scene visible, lest readers miss the narrative rendering of 
Sidonie’s ‘weakness of the flesh’ or lack of restraint at the dinner table immediately after 
proclaiming the importance of discipline and mourning its decline. As demonstrated by Pastor’s 
smile, commonplace gestures and facial expressions often hold significance, provide insight into 
emotions and opinions of characters, and accentuate the social-critical impulse of the novel. This 
passage and others like it show that Effi Briest is not a direct reflection of an external social 
reality, but an artistic creation that skillfully uses focalization and narrative irony to render 
certain aspects of society visible for social critique and to encourage readers to engage with the 
text and reflect.  
Even though the narrator of Effi Briest preserves distance to the figures and narrated 
events, however, he is neither aloof nor unempathetic. An analysis of the narrative situation 
brings to light the narrator’s emotional attachment to Effi in particular. Narrative techniques give 
readers more intimate access to Effi’s thoughts and feelings than to those of any other figure in 
the text. These include non-focalized narration, the occasional use of internal focalization, and 
Effi’s letters to her mother, where she articulates feelings that she does not communicate to 
Innstetten. Shifts from zero focalization to internal focalization convey Effi’s private thoughts 
and feelings and allow readers to see through her eyes more directly, as in the following scene: 
“Das war die erste lange Trennung, fast auf zwölf Stunden. Arme Effi. Wie sollte sie den Abend 
verbringen? Früh zu Bett, das war gefährlich, dann wachte sie auf und konnte nicht wieder 
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einschlafen und horchte auf alles. Nein, erst recht müde werden und dann ein fester Schlaf, das 
war das Beste” (Effi Briest 79). Perhaps the clearest indication of the extradiegetic-heterodiegetic 
narrator’s own emotions is his expression of compassion, “Arme Effi,” which appears a second 
time in the final chapter of the novel (compare Effi Briest 79, 345). Following this first obvious 
moment of sympathetic identification with Effi, the narrator shifts to internal focalization, or, 
more precisely, to free indirect speech. Free indirect speech in the passage quoted above blurs 
the distinction between the perspectives of the narrator and the character and enables readers to 
comprehend Effi’s feelings of restlessness and boredom12 during Innstetten’s absence. The 
narrator’s repetition of “Arme Effi” at the end of the novel expresses compassion for her just 
before she dies:  
Arme Effi, Du hattest zu den Himmelswundern zu lange hinaufgesehen und 
darüber nachgedacht, und das Ende war, daß die Nachtluft und die Nebel, die vom 
Teich her aufstiegen, sie wieder aufs Krankenbett warfen, und als Wiesike 
gerufen wurde und sie gesehen hatte, nahm er Briest beiseite und sagte: “Wird 
nichts mehr; machen Sie sich auf ein baldiges Ende gefaßt.” (Effi Briest 345, 
emphasis added) 
Although the apostrophe “Arme Effi” in this passage occurs without any subsequent transition to 
free indirect speech or internal focalization, an interesting slippage occurs with the personal 
pronouns. Fontane makes his narrator’s presence known to readers here by employing the “Du” 
form, with which he addresses Effi directly. Through this familiar, direct form of address, the 
                                                 
12 Brian Tucker also cites this passage to emphasize Effi’s boredom here, but he does not claim that Fontane uses 
free indirect speech, just “a question posed in the third-person that nonetheless invites the reader to share in her 
predicament” (191). 
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narrator voices compassion for Effi and a desire to change her fate before shifting back to the 
more impersonal style of third-person narration.  
While the narrator follows Effi’s story closely through the entire novel, from her first 
meeting with Innstetten at Hohen-Cremmen to the grave, readers learn little about Innstetten’s 
private thoughts and feelings. This discrepancy in Effi Briest has fueled critical debates about the 
two characters’ guilt and motivations, as well as inquiries into the possibility of identifying with 
Innstetten (see Krohn 157). Because Effi’s emotions are shared more directly and in greater 
detail through the voice of the narrator, readers past and present may have found it easier to 
identify with her, in spite of her adultery.13 Additionally, the decline of Ehre and the honor code 
may have made it more difficult for readers since 1900 to understand the motivations behind 
Innstetten’s actions.14 Effi Briest undeniably raises ethical questions about the actions of its 
figures, some of whom verbally acknowledge their own guilt, but an examination of the narrative 
situation reveals that Mitleid is an important structural element of the novel and an emotion 
expressed directly by the narrator. 
As Fontane scholarship has long recognized, Fontane is a master of conversation and 
consistently employs it in his social novels (see Neumann; Nottinger 97-99; Stolt 231). In Effi 
                                                 
13 The Aristotelian definition of Mitleid requires that, in order to be an object of Mitleid, an individual must have 
done nothing wrong and have something in common with the sympathizer (Aristoteles Rhetorik 88; The Rhetoric of 
Aristotle 89-90). According to this logic, Effi would not have been a viable object of Mitleid because she committed 
adultery. The conceptualization of Mitleid in Effi Briest resonates more with eighteenth- and nineteenth-century 
interpretations of Mitleid, especially Schopenhauer’s Mitleidsethik, which locates Mitleid in the common bond of 
humanity rather than with superficial similarities or moral goodness (compare Hume 369; Rousseau, Social Contract 
& Discourses 198; Schopenhauer, WWV I §67). 
 
14 Frevert cites actress Hanna Schygulla’s response to the filming of Rainer Werner Fassbinder’s Effi Briest (1974), 
in which she stated that the emotions and conflicts depicted in the novel were foreign to her. Based on Schygulla’s 
response, Frevert concludes: “Was 1895 den Nerv der Zeitgenossen getroffen hatte, rief achtzig Jahre später 
Schulterzucken hervor” (Vergängliche Gefühle 18).  
 
 44 
Briest, emotions are a frequent subject of such conversations.15 The list of instances in which the 
figures scrutinize their own emotions or the emotions of others includes the Briests’ discussion 
of Effi’s ability to love (43-44), Effi’s conversation with Johanna about her longing and fear (85-
88), Wüllersdorf and Innstetten’s debate about the honor code (278-280), and Effi’s question to 
Roswitha about her past trauma and guilt (264-265). As a constant matter under discussion, then, 
emotions in Effi Briest are not merely individual expressions or physiological responses to the 
environment, as late nineteenth-century affective psychology claimed, but social practices that 
are related to other discourses. By drawing attention to the communicative function and dialogic 
negotiation of emotions, the novel shows that emotions organize and motivate actions in society 
and determine relationships between individuals and groups. Innstetten’s reference to 
“jenes…uns tyrannisierende Gesellschafts-Etwas” may be interpreted as a monolithic ‘social 
something’ that causes oppression and sets limits on individual autonomy (Effi Briest 278). But 
Fontane does not portray a homogenous society with one set of social and emotional codes. 
Instead he shows cultural codes in flux and renegotiates them through dialogue. The narrator 
facilitates the mediation of emotions by framing conversations in which the figures discuss their 
rights and duties to feel a certain way, and thereby draws particular attention to these passages, 
emphasizing the discursive construction of individual emotional experience. 
 
 
                                                 
15 Emotions are also common subjects of conversation in Fontane’s other social novels, for example, in Irrungen, 
Wirrungen (1888). Harald Tanzer has noticed this and argued that authentic feeling is only expressed when there is 
no direct speech about it (46). Speech about emotions in Effi Briest functions differently: even emotions that might 
seem more ‘natural’ (e.g. Mitleid and Mutterliebe) become topics of conversation and debate, thus suggesting that 
all emotions are socially negotiated and historically variable.  
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2.3 MASCULINE EHRE AND DUELING AT THE FIN DE SIÈCLE 
Tension between conflicting ethical systems based on the social emotions Ehre and Mitleid 
manifests itself throughout Effi Briest and provides a new way to interpret the novel. Although it 
might seem that Fontane’s novel takes up issues that had already been resolved before the fin de 
siècle, masculine Ehre and the practice of dueling fueled public debates into the 1890s and 
continued to do so in the early twentieth century.16 In the nineteenth century, masculine Ehre 
was determined by a man’s social roles and achievements. Feminine honor or virtue, by contrast, 
was upheld through a woman’s sexual purity. Yet masculine Ehre and feminine virtue were 
intimately connected. A husband had a duty to guard his wife’s virtue, for its loss would damage 
masculine honor and the good name of a family. Since masculine Ehre was not rooted in 
expectations of chastity or marital fidelity, the reputation of a family did not suffer if a man 
committed adultery. If a wife lost her virtue due to adultery, however, a husband had the right to 
take action and initiate a duel in order to restore his lost honor and masculinity (Frevert, “Mann 
und Weib” 218-219). Unlike masculine Ehre, feminine virtue could not be restored even after a 
duel. Women had no opportunity to recover their virtue after a misstep (Meyer-Renschhausen 
109). As we see in Effi Briest, female adultery simply provided an occasion to duel, but dueling 
to restore lost Ehre remained a predominantly male issue. 
The militarization of German society after the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871) 
popularized an ideology of heroic masculinity. In order to preserve his honor, a man had to 
                                                 
16 See, e.g., E. Balan, Duell und Ehre: Ein Beitrag zur praktischen Lösung der Duellfrage, unter besonderer 
Berücksichtigung der Verhältnisse des Deutschen Offizierkorps (Berlin: Walther & Apolant, 1890); Georg von 
Below, Das Duell und der germanische Ehrbegriff (Kassel: Max Brunnemann, 1896); Arnold Fischer, “Für oder 
wider das Duell?” Brennende Tagesfragen, vol. 1 (Rostock: Volckmann, 1896); M. Liepmann, Duell und Ehre: Ein 
Vortrag (Berlin: Otto Liebmann, 1904). Stenographische Berichte über die Verhandlungen des Reichstags. IX 
Legislaturperiode. IV Session. 1895/1897, vol. 5. (Berlin: Verlag der Norddeutschen Buchdruckerei und 
Verlagsanstalt, 1897) 3293-3317. 
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demonstrate bravery and strength; by showing signs of weakness or cowardice, he risked losing 
the respect of his fellow men (Frevert “Mann und Weib” 204). Thus, the value of masculine 
Ehre increased in the late nineteenth century, and this social emotion continued to motivate the 
practice of dueling for a variety of offenses, including but not limited to adultery. Dueling with 
deadly weapons was officially outlawed in §201-§210 of the 1871 Strafgesetzbuch für das 
Deutsche Reich [Criminal Code of the German Empire]. Prison sentences listed in §201-§210 
ranged from two months to a maximum of ten years, depending on the specific violations (e.g. 
dueling without seconds or killing one’s opponent) that occurred during a duel (Strafgesetzbuch 
45). Nevertheless, in certain social circles, particularly among the elites of the military in the 
Offizierskorps and the aristocracy, dueling still offered men an opportunity to defend their Ehre, 
often with little punishment. Writing at the beginning of the twentieth century, Georg Simmel 
(1858-1918) considered Ehre, with its deeply personal guise, a highly effective device for 
preserving the cohesion and status of social groups,17 which suggests why members of elite 
groups felt compelled to observe honor codes even at the fin de siècle. With the social leveling 
that accompanied modernization, the gradual individualization of definitions of honor and 
dignity, and the enforcement of stricter regulations on dueling in the early twentieth century, 
however, masculine Ehre ceased to play a significant role in society, and, along with the practice 
of dueling, honor codes gradually declined (see Frevert, “Mann und Weib” 221-22).  
At the time when Fontane was writing Effi Briest, the question of masculine Ehre and 
dueling united people as much as it divided them. For some, a strongly developed sense of Ehre 
was a sign of cultural advancement, while others considered the practice of dueling to defend  
                                                 
17 “So bildet die Ehre, nicht trotz, sondern wegen der rein personalen Form ihrer Erscheinung und ihres 
Bewusstseins, eine der wunderbarsten, instiktiv herausgebildeten Zweckmäßigkeiten zur Erhaltung der 
Gruppenexistenz” (Simmel, Soziologie 537). 
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Ehre a vestige from the Middle Ages that should be eliminated (see von Below 6). In 1902, two 
anti-dueling leagues were established: the Deutsche Anti-Duell-Liga and the Allgemeine Anti-
Duell-Liga für Österreich.18 A call for new members published by the Deutsche Anti-Duell-Liga 
welcomed all who opposed dueling, “einerlei ob sie aus religösen oder aus Gründen der Vernunft 
das Duell als Mittel zur Wiederherstellung verletzter Ehre verwerfen.”19 Liberals and socialists 
were among some of the strongest opponents of dueling, but others, including German Catholics, 
objected to dueling for religious reasons. Karl Bachem, Reichstag delegate of the German Center 
Party, referenced the Catholic Church’s intention to excommunicate any Catholic who provoked, 
accepted, or declined to prevent a challenge to duel in a report to the Reichstag on November 17, 
1896 (Stenographische Berichte 3303). Bachem, a Catholic himself, presented a case for tougher 
governmental sanctions against the practice by appealing to a common Christian (i.e. Protestant 
and Catholic) law and morality (Stenographische Berichte 3304). The influence that anti-dueling 
leagues and political or religious conscientious objectors had over the cult of Ehre was still 
rather limited at the fin de siècle, however. As Frevert has observed, the Deutsche Anti-Duell-
Liga did not force its members to decline a challenge to duel (“Mann und Weib” 178). Even 
some German liberal and socialist leaders who campaigned for a modern, egalitarian society 
reportedly participated in duels; thus, political leanings were not entirely reliable predictors of 
one’s position on honor codes and dueling (Frevert, “Bürgerlichkeit und Ehre” 162). The 
question of how to defend masculine Ehre was a complex political and ethical issue for which 
there was not yet a clear alternative to the duel. Fontane’s Effi Briest not only participates in 
                                                 
18 See Die Allgemeine Anti-Duell-Liga für Österreich: Ihre Mitglieder, Ihre Statuten, Ihr Ehrenrat, Ihre 
Zweigvereine, nach dem Stande vom 15. Mai 1908 (Wien: Selbstverlag der Allgemeinen Anti-Duell-Liga für 
Österreich, 1908). 
 
19 See Deutsche Anti-Duell-Liga, ed., German Anti-Dueling League Call for New Members (1919) n.p. 
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these late nineteenth-century debates about masculine Ehre and dueling, but also explores the 
possibility of feeling Mitleid. 
2.4 A BRIEF HISTORY OF MITLEID 
The importance given to Mitleid in the novel demands a discussion of the history of the 
Mitleidsdiskurs from its prominence in eighteenth-century ethics and aesthetics to its resurgence 
and reconceptualization around 1900. The turn to empiricism in philosophical anthropology 
initiated a shift from reason to nature, which resulted in a reexamination of the senses and the 
affective nature of humans in the mid-eighteenth century.20 Mitleid, which was considered a 
‘natural’ emotion, bridged the divide between ethics and aesthetics and became a much-debated 
topic in both discourses. In his Discours sur l'origine et les fondements de l'inégalité parmi les 
hommes [Discourse on the Origin and Basis of Inequality Among Mankind] (1755), more 
commonly known as his “Second Discourse,” Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) identifies 
pitié [compassion; Mitleid]21 as the only natural virtue [“la seule virtu Naturelle”] and the 
foundation of ethics (Discours 68). Rousseau attributes this instinctive emotion specifically to 
the human in the state of nature [l'état de Nature] and argues that it precedes any form of 
reflection, and, for that reason, even animals show signs of pitié/Mitleid22 (compare Discours 69; 
                                                 
20 See Riedel 18-21 for a concise discussion of the “anthropologische Wende” and its meaning for moral philosophy. 
 
21 In German editions of Rousseau’s Second Discourse, pitié is translated as Mitleid (see Rousseau, Abhandlung 
über die Ungleichheit 141-145). Although it is unclear whether Fontane had read Rousseau in French or in German 
translation, Fontane at least would have acquired a familiarity with Rousseau’s understanding of pitié/Mitleid 
through his studies of Schopenhauer. 
 
22 “Je parle de la Pitié…; vertu d'autant plus universelle et d'autant plus utile à l'homme, qu'elle précède en lui 
l'usage de toute réflexion & si Naturelle que les Bêtes mêmes en donnent quelquefois des signes sensibles” 
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Schings 21-33). What distinguishes humans from animals, Rousseau argues, is the faculty of 
perfectibilité [perfectibility], or the capacity of humans to improve themselves and adapt to their 
environment in order to survive (Discours 55; Social Contract & Discourses 180). Although life 
in civil society had contributed toward an increase in egoism and a weakened sense of 
pitié/Mitleid in humans, Rousseau attempts to rehabilitate the natural faculty of pitié/Mitleid 
found in the pure state of nature and posits it alongside the faculty of self-improvement (see 
Discours 69-76; Social Contract & Discourses 193-196).  
In aesthetics, the moral purpose of the genre of tragedy became the focal point of the 
Mitleidsdebatte initiated in the correspondence between Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729-1781), 
Moses Mendelssohn (1729-1786), and Friedrich Nicolai (1733-1811) in 1756.23 Influenced by 
Rousseau’s ethics of pitié, Lessing emphasizes the importance of Mitleid in the theater more than 
Nicolai or Mendelssohn, and, like Rousseau, he considers Mitleid to be the source of all 
morality. Lessing’s reinterpretation of the Aristotelian notion of catharsis attests to the value of 
Mitleid in moral education. He claims that a tragedy should inspire, not purge, the emotions of 
Mitleid and Furcht, if it is to contribute to the moral betterment of its spectators: “die 
Bestimmung der Tragödie ist diese: sie soll unsere Fähigkeit, Mitleid zu fühlen, erweitern. Sie 
soll uns nicht blos lehren, gegen diesen oder jenen Unglücklichen Mitleid zu fühlen, sondern sie 
soll uns so weit fühlbar machen, daß uns der Unglückliche zu allen Zeiten, und unter allen 
Gestalten, rühren und für sich einnehmen muß” (Lessing, Gesammelte Werke 42). Lessing’s 
theory concentrates on the subject, that is, on the virtues and moral education of the sympathizer: 
                                                                                                                                                             
(Rousseau, Discours 69).  [I am speaking of compassion…; by so much the more universal and useful to mankind, 
as it comes before any kind of reflection; and at the same time natural, that the very brutes themselves sometimes 
give evident proofs of it” (Social Contract & Discourses 193).] 
 
23 See Schings 35-47 for a more in-depth treatment of the eighteenth-century Mitleidsdebatte, specifically the 
dispute between Lessing and Mendelssohn. 
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“Der mitleidigste Mensch ist der beste Mensch, zu allen gesellschaftlichen Tugenden, zu allen 
Arten der Großmuth der aufgelegteste” (Gesammelte Werke 42, emphasis added). The use of the 
superlative in this assertion points to a moral hierarchy wherein the spectators who are most 
moved to sympathize with a sufferer are deemed the most virtuous. Yet this moral hierarchy is 
not static—it reflects a continuous process of Bildung. 
Two aspects of the mid-eighteenth-century conceptualization of Mitleid in aesthetic and 
ethical discourses stand in sharp contrast to the rekindling of Mitleid in the late nineteenth 
century. First, the emotion Mitleid was intertwined with eighteenth-century Enlightenment 
optimism and ideas of progress, as evident in Rousseau’s faculty of perfectibility and Lessing’s 
conviction that the theater becomes a vehicle for continuous moral betterment by making 
spectators feel [“fühlbar machen”] (Gesammelte Werke 42). Second, in the 1750s Mitleid became 
associated with the emerging bourgeois class in particular. In the bürgerliches Trauerspiel 
developed by Lessing, the sufferers or objects of sympathy among the dramatis personae were 
members of the bourgeoisie. Since bourgeois norms and values were propagated in the 
bürgerliches Trauerspiel, the theater became an institution associated specifically with bourgeois 
class-consciousness. 
An examination of Mitleid in the context of Fontane’s Effi Briest and Schopenhauer’s 
Mitleidsethik shows that the manner in which this emotion was theorized and practiced in the late 
nineteenth century differs in some ways from its conceptualization in eighteenth-century ethical 
and aesthetic discourses. Although Schopenhauer’s theoretical writings on Mitleid first appeared 
in §65-68 of Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung in 1819 and in §14-20 of “Über die Grundlage 
der Moral” in 1840, these works, which enjoyed their greatest impact in the late nineteenth 
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century,24 associated Mitleid with cultural pessimism. For Schopenhauer, who inextricably links 
suffering and the human condition, Mitleid is an everyday phenomenon.25 He defines it as the 
“ganz unmittelbare, ja, instinktartige Theilnahme am fremden Leiden” that moves a person to 
prevent or eliminate the suffering of another and lifts the boundary between ego and non-ego, the 
difference at the root of all egoism (Über das Mitleid 101). The origin of Mitleid, Schopenhauer 
claims, “beruht nicht auf Voraussetzungen, Begriffen, Religionen, Dogmen, Mythen, Erziehung 
und Bildung; sondern ist ursprünglich und unmittelbar, liegt in der menschlichen Natur selbst…” 
(Über das Mitleid 83). Grounding Mitleid in human nature rather than in culture permits him to 
conclude that Menschenliebe26 has always existed, even though it was first formally theorized as 
a virtue in Western Christianity. Because Schopenhauer considers Mitleid the basis of all 
morality, he sees little need for other social codes or ethical principles. According to this 
Mitleidsethik, egoism motivates all virtues that do not spring from Mitleid, and even politeness 
[Höflichkeit] only serves to conceal egoism.27 Thus, Schopenhauer equates Mitleid, the moral 
driving force and only counter to egoism and spite, with what he calls reine Liebe28 (caritas, 
                                                 
24 Schopenhauer, whom Rudolf Eisler called a “Modephilosophen” [fashionable philosopher] in 1895, reached the 
peak of his posthumous fame in Europe during the 1870s and 1880s (Eisler 287). During the 1890s, Nietzsche had 
the greatest impact on German society and achieved international influence because his philosophy was consistent 
with the global fin-de-siècle mentality (see Aschheim 17-22). 
 
25 In §16 of “Über die Grundlage der Moral,” Schopenhauer calls it “das alltägliche Phänomen des Mitleids” (Über 
das Mitleid 77). 
 
26 Schopenhauer distinguishes between two cardinal virtues, Gerechtigkeit and Menschenliebe, both of which are 
rooted in Mitleid. “Verletze niemanden” [harm no one] is the maxim of Gerechtigkeit, the more passive virtue, while 
“Hilf allen, soviel du kannst” [help everybody as much as you can] is the maxim of Menschenliebe, the higher, more 
active virtue (compare Über das Mitleid 84, 101). 
 
27 “Die Höflichkeit nämlich ist die konventionelle und systematische Verleugnung des Egoismus in den 
Kleinigkeiten des täglichen Verkehrs und ist freilich anerkannte Heuchelei: dennoch wird sie gefordert und gelobt; 
weil was sie verbirgt, der Egoismus, so garstig ist, daß man es nicht sehen will…” (Schopenhauer, Über das Mitleid 
63-64). 
 
28 In order to lend further support to his argument, Schopenhauer incidentally notes that the Italian word pietà means 
both Mitleid and reine Liebe (WWV I 512). 
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ἀγαπη): “alle wahre und reine Liebe ist Mitleid, und jede Liebe, die nicht Mitleid ist, ist 
Selbstsucht” (WWV I 511). 
2.5 ADAPTING SCHOPENHAUER’S MITLEIDSETHIK: THE THEORETICAL 
MODEL OF EMOTION IN EFFI BRIEST 
Fontane’s letter to his daughter Mete dated August 24, 1893, indicates that he had been 
contemplating Schopenhauer’s Mitleidsethik while writing Effi Briest, which in its first 
installment of the advance copy appeared in Deutsche Rundschau just over a year later in 
November 1894. In the following passage we see how Fontane’s own thoughts about Mitleid 
resonated with, yet diverged from, those of Schopenhauer:  
Schopenhauer hat ganz recht: “das Beste, was wir haben, ist Mitleid.” Mitleid ist 
auch vielfach ganz echt. Aber mit all den anderen Gefühlen sieht es windig aus. 
Trotzdem brauchen wir sie, brauchen den Glauben daran, wir dürfen sie nicht 
leugnen, einmal weil sich sonderbare Reste davon immer wieder vorfinden und 
selbst wo gar nichts ist, müssen wir dies Nichts nicht sehen wollen; wer sein Auge 
immer auf dies Nichts richtet, der versteinert. (Briefe IV 284) 
At first, Fontane follows Schopenhauer closely and grants Mitleid a position of utmost 
importance in relation to all other emotions,29 which he finds questionable. Although it is unclear 
whether Fontane accepted Schopenhauer’s claim that Mitleid has existed through time and space 
                                                 
29 While Fontane speaks directly about Mitleid and other emotions (Gefühle) here, Schopenhauer calls Mitleid a 
moral driving force and Gerechtigkeit and Menschenliebe, the two degrees of Mitleid, cardinal virtues rather than 
emotions. 
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because it is part of human nature, his use of the word ‘echt’ does imply that Mitleid has some 
‘natural’ or ‘genuine’ qualities. Yet, despite his partiality towards Mitleid, Fontane also admits 
that these other emotions and the belief in their validity are necessary, and it is here that he most 
clearly departs from Schopenhauer’s Mitleidsethik. 
While I do not claim that Fontane accepted Schopenhauer’s entire Mitleidsethik or 
worldview, I find sufficient textual evidence to suggest that Fontane’s concept of rechte Liebe in 
Effi Briest, reminiscent of Schopenhauer’s definition of reine Liebe, corresponds to the emotion 
Mitleid. Since the word Mitleid30 only appears twice in Effi Briest, the critical role that this 
emotion plays in the novel might be overlooked. The word itself first appears in Chapter 10, 
when Effi asks Instetten why they must remain at the house in Kessin and assures him that 
Alonzo Gieshübler would help them move: “Gieshübler würde uns gewiß dabei behilflich sein, 
wenn auch nur um meinetwegen, denn er wird Mitleid mit mir haben” (Effi Briest 91). The 
suggestion of Gieshübler’s Mitleid here contrasts with Innstetten’s unsympathetic refusal of 
Effi’s request on the grounds that moving because of the suspected Chinese ghost would damage 
his professional reputation. Mitleid appears a second time in Chapter 31. After reading the 
newspaper report about Effi’s affair and Innstetten’s duel with Crampas, Sophie Zwicker writes 
the following in a letter to her friend: “Übrigens bin ich voll Mitleid mit der jungen Baronin und 
finde, eitel wie man nun mal ist, meinen einzigen Trost darin, mich in der Sache selbst nicht 
getäuscht zu haben” (Effi Briest 305). Here, Sophie Zwicker’s compassion for Effi stands in 
direct contrast to the letter that Effi receives from her mother, who coldly informs her of the 
pending divorce and her banishment from both her Berlin apartment and parental house at 
Hohen-Cremmen. If one were to locate the numerous characters in Effi Briest on a spectrum 
                                                 
30 The word Mitleid appears twice, whereas Ehre appears 17 times, excluding adjectival forms and compounds. 
 
 54 
between Ehre/Sittlichkeit and Mitleid, these passages represent Alonzo Gieshübler and Sophie 
Zwicker, like Roswitha and the narrator, as more inclined to feel Mitleid than, for example, 
Innstetten or Luise von Briest. Aside from these two appearances, Mitleid is referenced indirectly 
(e.g. as rechte Liebe) or demonstrated in the speech or actions of the characters. It is enacted by 
the narrator through the expression “arme Effi,” an utterance also taken up by the Briests and 
Roswitha, and shifts to internal focalization that enable readers to see from Effi’s perspective and 
identify with her emotions. Significantly, Roswitha’s feelings of Mitleid are not discriminatory—
her compassion extends not only to “die arme Frau,” but also to “der arme Major” Crampas (Effi 
Briest 291). In contrast to Ehre, which the novel exposes as an egoistic emotion that drives a 
man to seek retributive justice and duel if his honor is lost or threatened, Effi Briest establishes 
Mitleid as an emotion that motivates one to respect the humanity of all individuals and prevent or 
alleviate the suffering of another, as in Schopenhauer’s Mitleidsethik. 
2.6 COMPETING EMOTIONAL STYLES: JOHANNA’S DEFENSE OF EHRE AND 
ROSWITHA’S MITLEID 
In Effi Briest, Ehre and Mitleid or rechte Liebe—two social emotions that were central to public 
and intellectual debates in turn-of-the-century Wilhelmine Germany—are pitted against each 
other. An analysis of the narrative situation and staging of these two contrasting emotional styles 
reveals that the narrator allies himself more with the practice of Mitleid than with the defense of 
Ehre. While the novel exposes Ehre as an emotion that has entered a state of decline, it 
naturalizes Mitleid and presents it as a type of social feeling that transcends forms of social 
stratification. In Effi Briest, the observance of Ehre and principles that are not moderated by 
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Mitleid or rechte Liebe may result in unnecessary cruelty and suffering. In the absence of this 
feeling for humanity, such principles can be misappropriated31 or used to further selfish interests. 
Although the novel asserts the impossibility of living in a state of nature32 removed from culture 
and society, Mitleid in Fontane’s Effi Briest functions as social glue, the last hope of social unity 
and stability in the face of changing social and emotional codes. This concept of Mitleid 
introduces a softening of social mores, which some may have perceived as a threat to existing 
values and social practices. Even though Fontane portrays Mitleid as a more ‘natural’ or 
‘genuine’ emotion free of the pretenses of class-based Ehre and Sittlichkeit, his novel exhibits a 
balance not found in Schopenhauer’s ethics. Effi Briest makes a strong argument for the 
introduction of Mitleid alongside self-regulatory emotions like honor and shame, thus enabling 
the heteropathic negotiation between these opposing social emotions to continue.  
By focusing primarily on the protagonists Effi and Innstetten, critics have failed to notice 
the important role played by Johanna and Roswitha, whose emotional styles and responses to the 
crises form the hidden crux of the novel. The suppression of details about Effi and Innstetten’s 
wedding and Effi’s affair with Major Crampas further suggests that Fontane himself wanted to 
direct the reader’s attention away from the protagonists and their romantic relationships in favor 
of attending to broader social concerns. An excerpt from Fontane’s letter to Friedrich Stephany 
dated July 2, 1894, supports this observation: “Liebesgeschichten … haben was Langweiliges –, 
                                                 
31 Nottinger cites Fontane’s correspondence  with Georg Friedlaender in which he diagnoses the decadence that 
pervades not only social classes like the bourgeoisie, but also moral institutions like the church to support her point 
that “Werte sind nicht mehr unabhängige Entitäten, sondern werden zunehmend utilisiert und willkürlich zu 
egoistischen Zwecken missbraucht” (65). 
 
32 The reference to Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s state of nature [l’état de nature] is deliberate. Rousseau posits a state of 
nature but admits that it is only a hypothesis, not an experience, and that it probably never existed and never will 
exist (see Hamburger 11-12). The conversation between Innstetten and Wüllersdorf in Chapter 35 expresses a 
similar conflict that became more prominent in the nineteenth century: the idea that modern society is antithetical to 
individual autonomy, but that it is not possible to live in an ideal state of nature (compare Zuberbühler 11). 
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aber der Gesellschaftszustand, das Sittenbildliche, das versteckt und gefährlich Politische, das 
diese Dinge haben, … das ist es, was mich so sehr daran interessiert” (Briefe IV 370). Here, 
Fontane explains that the social and political contexts of love stories intrigue him, not the 
romantic relationships themselves. Due to the public acknowledgment and social norms that 
accompany marriage, one can easily see why Fontane repeatedly takes up the motif of marital 
conflict and adultery in his novels as a way of analyzing and critiquing society and politics.   
Typically in Fontane’s social novels, the peripheral characters play critical roles, as the 
writer himself admitted in a letter to Maximilian Harden on August 20, 1890: “Es ist richtig, daß 
meine Nebenfiguren immer die Hauptsache sind” (Briefe IV 57-58). Until recently, however, 
Fontane scholarship had largely overlooked their importance in Effi Briest.33 In his insightful 
essay on Roswitha, however, Theo Buck reasoned that this character’s sense of humanity and 
defense of her “natürliches Wesen,” despite her traumatic past, deserve recognition (268). Rolf 
Zuberbühler likewise views Roswitha positively, and identifies in her character a natural ideal in 
his study of the dog Rollo as a representation of “das Natürliche” in Effi Briest (65). Zuberbühler 
maintains that Fontane’s figures exist in a state of constant tension between nature and culture 
and counts Rollo, Roswitha, Alonzo Gieshübler, and Briest as characters who, in contrast to 
others, embody some natural principle (Zuberbühler 10, 66). This method of classifying the 
minor characters as representatives of either nature or society risks overgeneralization, however. 
None of these figures is purely ‘natural’ or ‘social.’ All, in fact, inhabit social spaces within the 
German Empire during the Bismarck Era, exercise some degree of freedom, and face social 
norms or limitations depending on his or her position in society. If figures like Roswitha, 
                                                 
33 Müller-Seidel, for example, focuses only on the protagonists, Effi and Innstetten. 
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Gieshübler, and Briest seem more ‘natural,’ it is because they demonstrate an emotional style 
that the novel represents as more natural or ‘echt,’ i.e. Mitleid. 
Johanna and Roswitha are both servants at the Innstetten household and belong to the 
same social class, but they have been socialized differently. Readers learn through Innstetten’s 
introduction of the servants that Johanna is Effi’s compatriot from the Pasewalk region of the 
Mark Brandenburg (Effi Briest 56). Rumor has it that her beautiful blonde hair and attitude of 
superiority can be traced back to a prominent officer of the Pasewalk Garrison (Effi Briest 243). 
Johanna, in fact, prides herself in having served good families, which means that she likely 
associates more with the emotional practices and values of nineteenth-century bourgeois and 
aristocratic circles. Although it is not stated directly, we can reasonably assume that she is 
Protestant, like Effi and almost all the other figures in the novel. By contrast, Roswitha, who 
comes from Eichsfeld in Thüringen, is less tied to the Mark Brandenburg and Hinterpommern 
regions of the Bismarckian nation-state than is Johanna. Her connection to a region outside the 
primary setting of the novel, together with her Catholic socialization, thus conveys a sense of 
‘Otherness.’34 Although she calls herself a ‘lapsed’ or ‘bad’ Catholic, she still identifies with her 
faith to some extent and experiences hardships because of it: “Und das Kattolsche, das macht es 
einem immer noch schwerer und saurer. Viele wollen keine Kattolsche, weil sie so viel in die 
Kirche rennen” (Effi Briest 131). The narrator reveals that Roswitha’s association with 
Catholicism motivates Effi to take her into the house in Kessin: “Effi war fest protestantisch 
erzogen und würde sehr erschrocken gewesen sein, wenn man an und in ihr ’was Katholisches 
entdeckt hätte; trotzdem glaubte sie, daß der Katholizismus uns gegen solche Dinge ‘wie da 
                                                 
34 Even in the Baltic town Kessin, a culturally diverse liminal space, a Catholic church is a fairly new addition, as 
evident in Innstetten’s description to Effi: “Ja, Kessin nimmt sich auf. Es hat jetzt auch eine katholische Kirche” 
(Effi Briest 54). 
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oben’ besser schütze; ja, diese Betrachtung hatte bei dem Plane, Roswitha ins Haus zu nehmen, 
ganz erheblich mitgewirkt” (Effi Briest 134). Effi hopes that Roswitha’s Catholicism will offer 
more protection from the Chinese ghost than her own Protestantism, but what Roswitha really 
offers Effi is companionship, nonjudgmental understanding, and, through Mitleid, relief from 
fear and other negative emotions. The historical background of the Kulturkampf clarifies why 
Fontane’s narrator gives special attention to Roswitha’s religious socialization. Her association 
with Catholicism indicates not her ‘naturalness’ but ‘Otherness’ in a mostly Protestant Prussian 
society. In the novel’s dramatization of social emotions, Johanna upholds the tradition of Ehre 
and Roswitha demonstrates Mitleid, which, despite its roots in eighteenth-century philosophical 
anthropology and aesthetics, introduces an ethics removed from Enlightenment ideals and 
optimism.  
In Chapter 26, the narrator sets the stage for the dispute over the emotions Ehre and 
Mitleid that later takes place between Johanna and Roswitha in Chapter 29. Just before Innstetten 
discovers Crampas and Effi’s correspondence, the narrator goes to great lengths to show how 
well Johanna and Roswitha get along, despite their different socializations. He informs readers 
that the rapport between the two women was a favorite topic of conversation among houseguests: 
“Diese Freundschaft der beiden Mädchen war ein Lieblingsgespräch zwischen den 
verschiedenen Freunden des Hauses…” (Effi Briest 266). The narrator also assures that Johanna 
and Roswitha both love Annie equally and share the responsibility for her upbringing, which 
“ganz besonders für Frieden und gutes Einvernehmen sorgte…” (Effi Briest 267). What 
facilitates this cooperation and prevents conflict, the narrator adds, is that the division of 
household labor is “fest gewurzelt” in their individual competencies and personalities: “Roswitha 
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hatte das poetische Departement, die Märchen- und Geschichtenerzählung, Johanna dagegen das 
des Anstands…” (Effi Briest 267).  
Yet the narrator’s knowledge of Johanna’s thoughts and emotions communicated through 
internal focalization also points to a latent conflict. Johanna, who wears an expression of victory 
[“Siegermiene”] on her face and carries herself with poise and propriety [“Haltung und 
Anstand”], lives “ganz in dem Hochgefühl, die Dienerin eines guten Hauses zu sein…” (Effi 
Briest 267).35 Her familiarity with aristocratic values and social practices, along with her history 
of having served good families, gives her a strong sense of superiority over Roswitha. Johanna’s 
firm belief in her superiority allows her to smile even at times when she notices that Roswitha 
receives preferential treatment from Effi. The reference to Effi’s fondness for Roswitha, 
dismissed as “eine kleine liebenswürdige Sonderbarkeit der gnädigen Frau,” however, suggests 
restrained jealousy and a lack of understanding for Effi’s attachment to the “halb bäuerisch 
gebliebene Roswitha” (Effi Briest 267). After reporting Johanna’s reflections through thought 
report, the narrator shifts out of internal focalization and, in reference to the preceding 
statements, notes: “Das alles dachte sie, sprach’s aber nicht aus. Es war eben ein freundliches 
Miteinanderleben” (Effi Briest 267). By emphasizing Johanna and Roswitha’s peaceful 
coexistence at the Innstetten house, while at the same time pointing out their differences and 
disclosing Johanna’s private thoughts and feelings, the narrator foreshadows and draws the 
reader’s attention to the impending conflict between the two women.  
                                                 
35 The characterization of Johanna with descriptions of her ‘Haltung und Anstand’ here and throughout the novel 
recalls the Knigge or etiquette manuals that were continuously written, revised, and reprinted by various authors in 
the late nineteenth century. Fontane’s ironic portrayal of Johanna, who exudes the kind of propriety taught in these 
etiquette manuals, reveals that often very little exists behind such surface displays of good manners. Compare, e.g., 
Berger, Der gute Ton: Buch des Anstandes und der guten Sitten (1886); Rocco, Der Umgang in und mit der 
Gesellschaft (1898). 
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In Chapter 29, Innstetten returns to the Berlin apartment after fatally wounding Crampas 
in the duel and notifies Johanna that Effi will not return. Johanna and Roswitha then learn 
exactly what had just happened by reading an article in the paper, which reports the news of the 
affair, the duel, and Crampas’s death. The differences between Johanna and Roswitha and the 
tension between two ethical systems based on Ehre and Mitleid then become evident in their 
initial responses to the news and the debate that follows.  
The word Mitleid never appears directly in this scene, but Roswitha’s immediate 
response to the news undeniably demonstrates compassion: “‘Ja,’ sagte Roswitha. ‘Und das lesen 
nun die Menschen und verschimpfieren mir meine liebe, arme Frau. Und der arme Major. Nun 
ist er tot’” (Effi Briest 291). Roswitha’s utterances in this passage echo the narrator’s “arme 
Effi,” which also signals understanding, compassion, and fondness for Effi. Roswitha expresses 
sympathy for both Crampas and Effi, despite reading the news, “daß Beziehungen zwischen ihm 
und der Rätin, einer schönen und noch sehr jungen Frau, bestanden haben sollen” (Effi Briest 
290). For Roswitha, Crampas and Effi’s violation of social and marital mores does not make 
them undeserving of compassion. Even though they chose to commit adultery, each endures 
great suffering: Crampas dies in the duel with Innstetten and Roswitha senses that Effi will have 
to endure taunting and exclusion from society. Just because Roswitha sympathizes with Effi and 
Crampas, however, does not mean that she lacks feeling for Innstetten or thinks that he should 
have died in Crampas’s place, as she responds to Johanna: “Nein, Johanna, unser gnäd’ger Herr, 
der soll auch leben, alles soll leben. Ich bin nicht für totschießen und kann nicht mal das Knallen 
hören” (Effi Briest 291). Roswitha’s powerful statement of nonviolence (“alles soll leben”) also 
communicates the view that all people are connected through the common bond of humanity and 
that no lives are worth more or less than all others.  
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As we can easily see from Johanna’s own emotional response to the ethical question at 
the heart of this debate, Roswitha’s expression of Mitleid and rejection of the practice of dueling 
are not accepted as self-evident. Johanna first tries to blame Roswitha for the discovery of the 
letters, but, after she takes back that accusation, her own assessment of the situation becomes 
evident: “Nun, ich will es nicht gesagt haben, Roswitha. Nur Sie sollen mir nicht kommen und 
sagen: der arme Major. Was heißt der arme Major! Der ganze arme Major taugte nichts; wer 
solchen rotblonden Schnurrbart hat und immer wribbelt, der taugt nie ’was und richtet bloß 
Schaden an” (Effi Briest 291). Interestingly, Johanna never directly addresses the possibility of 
Mitleid for Effi in this scene, but she clearly rejects the idea of sympathizing with Crampas. To 
be sure, Fontane presents Major Crampas as a figure of dubious reputation who is constructed to 
provoke an emotional response, as evident in the resemblance of the name ‘Crampas’ to that of 
St. Nicholas’s legendary demonic companion, ‘Krampus.’ Johanna’s statement about Crampas’s 
red hair and mustache twirling in the aforementioned passage casts him as a villainous character 
by invoking widespread cultural myths that redheads are exceptionally libidinous, morally 
degenerate, and soulless. On the one hand, this passage reminds readers of the damage incurred 
because of Crampas’s disregard for social codes. But, at the same time, Johanna’s argument is 
fallacious because she appeals to fear of moral degeneration and conflates myth and reality in 
order to ground her position. Through her mimicking of Roswitha’s expression “der arme 
Major,” Johanna scoffs at Roswitha’s view and maintains that people like Crampas are good for 
nothing, and, therefore not worthy of compassion. Instead of supporting an ethical system driven 
by Mitleid, as Roswitha does, Johanna refers to the social practices with which she is familiar 
and upholds the code of Ehre.  
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Assuming that Roswitha knows nothing of the practice of dueling and the importance of 
Ehre in nineteenth-century aristocratic and bourgeois circles, Johanna proceeds to lecture her: 
“Und wenn man immer in vornehmen Häusern gedient hat… aber das haben Sie nicht, Roswitha, 
das fehlt Ihnen eben…dann weiß man auch, was sich paßt und schickt und was Ehre ist, und 
weiß auch, daß, wenn so ’was vorkommt, dann geht es nicht anders, und dann kommt das, was 
mann eine Forderung nennt, und dann wird einer totgeschossen” (Effi Briest 291-292). As in 
Chapter 26, Johanna’s comments demonstrate a sense of superiority that she believes to hold 
over Roswitha. She identifies ‘vornehme Häuser’ as spaces of propriety in which certain social 
and emotional practices are adhered to and understood by all members and counts herself among 
those who observe these social mores of polite society. Rather than acknowledging Mitleid as an 
acceptable emotional response, Johanna assumes that Roswitha’s different background means 
that she does not properly comprehend the ritual of dueling or the valuation of Ehre, which for 
Johanna symbolizes cultural advancement and distinction. Johanna’s language (“dann geht es 
nicht anders”) insists on a lack of alternatives to the current emotional codes. While Johanna 
appeals to the emotion of fear in the case of adultery, she describes the practice of dueling to the 
death matter-of-factly, as if it were a routine occurrence, and uses the passive voice, which 
further depersonalizes the practice (“und dann wird einer totgeschossen”). In response to 
Roswitha’s protest that the affair happened a long time ago (“so lange her”), Johanna claims that 
“wenn der gnäd’ge Herr nichts getan hätte, dann hätten ihn die vornehmen Leute ‘geschnitten.’ 
Aber das Wort kennen Sie gar nicht, Roswitha, davon wissen Sie nichts” (Effi Briest 292-293). 
Here Johanna asserts that Innstetten would have been cut off from polite society had he not 
conformed to tradition and dueled with Crampas, and, once again, uses this knowledge to 
distinguish herself from Roswitha. 
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Characteristic of a work of Fontane that uses heteropathia as a literary technique, Effi 
Briest portrays neither Johanna’s justification of Ehre and dueling nor Roswitha’s argument in 
favor of Mitleid as completely unproblematic. It is logical to find this type of ambiguity in the 
novel because Fontane does not construct his figures as stereotypes or ideal types. Instead, his 
concept of art aims to depict ‘average’ humans or “Durchschnittsmenschen” who are neither 
entirely good nor entirely evil (see Nottinger 18). In this scene in Chapter 29, the positions of 
both Johanna and Roswitha are subverted to some extent, whether through the figures’ own 
speech or that of the other character or narrator. Roswitha rejects the honor code and practice of 
dueling in part because the affair between Effi and Crampas “ist ja nun schon eine halbe 
Ewigkeit her” (Effi Briest 291). Johanna tries to dismiss this argument by noting that Roswitha 
always tells everyone the old story of her father who threatened to kill her with a red-hot iron 
bar, an event that also happened ‘long ago.’ Even though the adulterous act in question occurred 
six years ago, the news and emotional wounds are still fresh for Innstetten, and, as Johanna 
remarks, it is unfair to expect him to take such news quietly. Moreover, Johanna’s objection 
reflects a historical truth, namely, that a husband who tolerated his wife’s adultery lost all 
respect, especially since the value placed on masculine Ehre increased with the militarization of 
late nineteenth-century German society.36 While Johanna points out the inconsistency of 
Roswitha’s response to two different events that happened ‘so lange her,’ she does not fully 
succeed in subverting Roswitha’s position. Roswitha’s constant repetition of her story becomes 
tiresome for some of the other figures,37 and, as a result, readers may gain the impression that 
                                                 
36 For a detailed discussion of the expectation that a man must take action to restore his lost honor, as well as the 
connection between adultery and honor, see Frevert, “Mann und Weib” 181-222. 
 
37 Even Effi interrupts Roswitha and replies “Ich weiß schon, Roswitha…” when she begins to retell the story of her 
trauma in Chapter 32: “Als mein Vater damals mit der glühenden Stange auf mich loskam...” (Effi Briest 313). 
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she is indeed a “komische Figur” (Effi Briest 135). Yet the reliance upon humor in these 
passages shows that the narration of Roswitha’s past trauma is an important example of the 
realist technique of Verklärung.  Fontane’s Verklärung in the form of humor renders Roswitha’s 
trauma narratable and urges readers to reflect upon social problems and see the violence behind 
the humor. 
While Johanna’s speech undermines Roswitha’s plea for Mitleid in this scene, the 
subversion of Johanna’s position occurs through the narrator’s involvement, which again 
suggests that Fontane’s narrator is more drawn to Mitleid. The narrator provides details about 
Johanna’s unexpressed thoughts and emotions that prompt readers to question her unconditional 
acceptance of Ehre and the cultural practices associated with it. When Innstetten returns home 
after the duel, he gives Johanna the following instructions regarding Annie: “Das arme Kind. Sie 
müssen es ihr allmählich beibringen, daß sie keine Mutter mehr hat. Ich kann es nicht. Aber 
machen Sie’s gescheidt. Und daß Roswitha nicht alles verdirbt” (Effi Briest 289). These words 
fill Johanna with pride: she stands before Innstetten “ganz wie benommen” and kisses his hand 
(Effi Briest 289). Typically, the narrator reports Effi’s thoughts and feelings through internal 
focalization or thought report in order to reveal her boredom, fear, and guilt and inspire 
sympathetic identification with her. In this scene, however, the reporting of Johanna’s thoughts 
and emotions through internal focalization has a subversive rather than identificatory effect. 
Upon leaving Innstetten, Johanna is “von Stolz und Überlegenheit ganz erfüllt, ja beinahe von 
Glück” (Effi Briest 289). Johanna’s emotions contrast sharply with those of Innstetten, who is 
described as “ganz erschüttert” just moments before (Effi Briest 289). The narrator continues: 
“ohne daß es ihr an gutem Herzen und selbst an Teilnahme mit der Frau gefehlt hätte, 
beschäftigte sie doch, über jedes andere hinaus, der Triumph einer gewissen Intimitätsstellung 
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zum gnädigen Herrn” (Effi Briest 289). Although the narrator does not venture to say that 
Johanna lacks goodness of heart, he reveals that she attends most to her own feelings of triumph 
and delights in her newly acquired level of intimacy with Innstetten. If she feels concern for Effi, 
it remains unexpressed, because the narrator does not mention Johanna’s compassion. With this 
knowledge of Johanna’s feelings and motivations and Fontane’s choice of the word 
“Intimitätsstellung” in this passage, one can conclude that Johanna’s defense of Ehre and 
Innstetten’s actions results less from a firm ethical conviction and more from her possible 
romantic attraction to Innstetten, as Roswitha insinuates. This suggestion of intimacy between 
master and servant renders Johanna’s speech and actions suspect because, by virtue of the honor 
code and propriety that she professes to uphold, she is precisely the one who should reject such a 
relationship. 
As evident in Johanna and Roswitha’s debate, Ehre and Mitleid, presented here as 
opposite social emotions, are associated with different views of society and moral systems. Ehre 
in Effi Briest implies a type of superiority that must be defended. If the honor code is broken, 
then it is common practice to duel in order to reestablish lost honor. By contrast, Mitleid in Effi 
Briest does not generate any social hierarchy. Those who feel Mitleid do not seek to punish or 
compensate for wrongs, but, by recognizing the common suffering of humanity, are inclined 
toward compassion regardless of other factors. Roswitha most clearly sees the barbarism in 
traditional nineteenth-century practices associated with Ehre and advocates Mitleid as an 
alternative. Yet this type of Mitleid also represents a more tolerant attitude toward the softening 
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of social mores, something that Johanna and other characters38 in the novel are unwilling to 
accept. 
2.7 SENSING THE DECLINE OF DUELING AND THE CULT OF EHRE 
Already in Chapter 27, where Innstetten asks Wüllersdorf for advice after learning about 
Crampas and Effi’s affair, doubt is cast on the appropriateness of dueling to restore Innstetten’s 
lost Ehre. In this scene, too, emotions become the primary topic of discussion. Instetten describes 
his current emotional state to Wüllersdorf as follows: “Es steht so, daß ich unendlich unglücklich 
bin; ich bin gekränkt, schändlich hintergangen, aber trotzdem, ich bin ohne jedes Gefühl von 
Haß oder gar von Durst nach Rache” (Effi Briest 277, emphasis added). Innstetten’s inventory of 
his own feelings in this passage indicates that he does not feel hatred toward Effi or Crampas. 
Although he says that he is deeply unhappy and hurt, he feels inclined to forgive Effi out of love: 
“ich liebe meine Frau, … ich bin so sehr im Bann ihrer Liebenswürdigkeit, eines ihr eignen 
heiteren Charmes, daß ich mich, mir selbst zum Trotz, in meinem letzten Herzenswinkel zum 
Verzeihen geneigt fühle” (Effi Briest 277, emphasis added). Yet Innstetten’s phrases “aber 
trotzdem” and “mir selbst zum Trotz” express some degree of surprise over the absence of 
feelings of anger and the need for revenge, as if loving and forgiving Effi in spite of everything 
defies reason and his own will. Innstetten attributes his lack of anger to the passage of time, 
which proves to affect human emotions more powerfully than he ever could have imagined: “Ich 
hätte nie geglaubt, daß die Zeit, rein als Zeit, so wirken könne” (Effi Briest 277).  
                                                 
38 Other characters who fall into this category include, for example, Baron von Güldenklee and Sidonie von 
Grasenabb, whose intolerant attitudes are nonetheless exposed and subverted by the narrator through narrative irony 
(see Effi Briest 179-182). 
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Innstetten convinces himself and Wüllersdorf of the necessity of upholding the honor 
code even though he lacks the anger and the thirst for vengeance that typically motivate the 
practice of dueling. He first justifies his view by emphasizing his lack of choice in the matter: 
“Man ist nicht bloß ein einzelner Mensch, man gehört einem Ganzen an, und auf das Ganze 
haben wir beständig Rücksicht zu nehmen, wir sind durchaus abhängig von ihm. … jenes, wenn 
Sie wollen, uns tyrannisierende Gesellschafts-Etwas, das fragt nicht nach Charme und nicht nach 
Liebe und nicht nach Verjährung. Ich habe keine Wahl. Ich muß” (Effi Briest 278). With these 
words, Innstetten disregards his love for Effi and the impact of the passage of time (Verjährung) 
and concedes power to a ‘social something,’ a normalizing force that limits human autonomy by 
determining how individuals should feel and act. As if to compensate for the reliance upon 
hyperbole used to express the extent of the power of social norms over his actions, Innstetten 
further justifies the need to duel by pointing out that he has already suffered a serious blow to his 
honor by seeking a confidant, a fact that Wüllersdorf cannot deny. Wüllersdorf reluctantly yields 
authority to the nineteenth-century Prussian honor code in his response to Innstetten, but he 
simultaneously undermines it through metaphor: “die Dinge verlaufen nicht wie wir wollen, 
sondern wie die andern wollen. … unser Ehrenkultus ist ein Götzendienst, aber wir müssen uns 
ihm unterwerfen, so lange der Götze gilt” (Effi Briest 280). Like Innstetten, Wüllersdorf 
recognizes that individual wishes often conflict with social mandates or collective interests. By 
dismissing Ehre as a cult, a form of idolatry, Wüllersdorf exposes its status as a ritual, if not 
archaic, social practice and thus destabilizes it through metaphor. Although Wüllersdorf sees the 
problems with the Ehrenkultus he describes, he does not venture to defy it, because it is still in 
effect and he sees no alternative that could take its place in society. This conversation between 
Innstetten and Wüllersdorf renders the code of Ehre suspect even before Johanna defends it in 
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her argument with Roswitha. If we take these two scenes together, Mitleid manifests itself as a 
possible alternative to the practice of dueling to restore Ehre, not to mention as the emotional 
code that lines up more with what Innstetten reports that he really feels: love for Effi and an 
inclination to forgive her. 
Innstetten first convinces himself and Wüllersdorf that, because the individual is not 
autonomous, but dependent on the society as a whole, social mores must be observed. At the 
beginning of  Chapter 29, after shooting Crampas to death in the duel and seeing his resigned yet 
friendly facial expression, Innstetten’s perspective changes: “Wenn ich mir seinen letzten Blick 
vergegenwärtige, resigniert und in seinem Elend doch noch ein Lächeln, so hieß der Blick: 
‘Innstetten, Prinzipienreiterei…Sie konnten es mir ersparen und sich selber auch.’ Und er hatte 
vielleicht recht. Mir klingt so ’was in der Seele” (Effi Briest 287). The phrase “Mir klingt so ’was 
in der Seele” applies to the knowledge that Innstetten could have spared both Crampas and 
himself, had he not been such a stickler for principles, and suggests that he experiences a change 
of heart. While Innstetten pursued Ehre as a matter of principle and because he believed that he 
had no other choice, he now doubts that he made the right decision: “So aber war alles einer 
Vorstellung, einem Begriff zu Liebe, war eine gemachte Geschichte, halbe Komödie. Und diese 
Komödie muß ich nun fortsetzen und muß Effi wegschicken und sie ruinieren, und mich mit...” 
(Effi Briest 287). In this monologue, Innstetten questions Ehre, the abstract concept that guided 
his decision. He regrets that his actions were not motivated by actual rage or vengeance but by 
this abstract idea, and he thus considers everything contrived or artificial, akin to play-acting. 
Aside from the scenes in which Innstetten confides in and discusses Ehre with Wüllersdorf, this 
is one of the rare moments in the novel in which readers are informed of Innstetten’s otherwise 
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unspoken thoughts and emotions. Unlike Innstetten’s first debate with Wüllersdorf, this 
monologue ends without reestablishing the need to uphold Ehre or, more generally, Sittlichkeit.  
Innstetten’s speech resembles Effi’s monologue in Chapter 24, in which she bemoans her 
inability to have the ‘proper feelings.’ The two emotions that torment Effi are fear (“Angst, 
Todesangst und die ewige Furcht”) and shame for her lies (Effi Briest 258). She does not deny 
that she is guilty; however, her lack of shame for her guilt worries her: “Ja, Angst quält mich und 
dazu Scham über mein Lügenspiel. Aber Scham über meine Schuld, die hab’ ich nicht oder doch 
nicht so recht oder doch nicht genug, und das bringt mich um, daß ich sie nicht habe” (Effi Briest 
258). In other words, Effi is troubled because she senses that she does not feel the right type or 
appropriate amount of shame expected of her for committing adultery. The ethical-emotional 
imperative that haunts her is Pastor Niemeyer’s warning that she remembers hearing as a child at 
Hohen-Cremmen: “auf ein richtiges Gefühl, darauf käme es an, und wenn man das habe, dann 
könne einem das schlimmste nicht passieren, und wenn man es nicht habe, dann sei man in einer 
ewigen Gefahr, und das, was man den Teufel nenne, das habe dann eine sichere Macht über uns” 
(Effi Briest 259). According to Pastor Niemeyer’s counsel, the right emotions can protect one 
from harm, but, in the absence of such feelings, one becomes susceptible to evil. Although what 
“ein richtiges Gefühl” denotes is never fully clarified, in this context, the reader can take it to 
mean shame, guilt, honor, i.e. self-regulatory emotions that moderate social behaviors. 
The narrator reports Effi’s private thoughts and feelings more directly and more 
frequently than those of Innstetten. Occasional shift from zero focalization to internal 
focalization and the narrator’s utterance “arme Effi” also demonstrate sympathetic understanding 
with Effi, despite the otherwise distant, reserved quality of the narrative voice. If we compare the 
representation of emotions in Effi’s monologue in Chapter 24 and Innstetten’s monologue in 
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Chapter 29, however, we notice some common features. In both passages, the narrator provides 
few descriptions and instead allows the figures to verbalize their own thoughts and feelings. 
Readers hear Effi and Innstetten speak through direct quotation and see from a non-focalized 
narrative point of view. The absence of narrative irony and the minimal involvement of the 
narrator in both monologue scenes imply that readers should take Effi’s and Innstetten’s words 
seriously. Additionally, the parallel narrative organization of these scenes demonstrates the 
unwillingness of Fontane’s narrator to sympathize with the situation of one figure over another. 
Although their respective situations differ—Innstetten senses that his principles have 
caused others and himself unnecessary pain, and Effi agonizes over her inability to feel the 
‘proper’ emotions—these monologue scenes show how both figures endure similar 
psychological conflicts. The novel depicts Effi and Innstetten as they contemplate ethical 
questions and emotional codes, as well as how they struggle to bring their own feelings in 
alignment with these. Contrary to Pastor Niemeyer’s warning about “ein richtiges Gefühl,” the 
outcome of Effi Briest indicates that ‘proper’ self-regulatory emotions alone cannot prevent bad 
things from happening. When read together, these two monologue scenes actually suggest that 
the nineteenth-century social imperatives dictating that a man should defend his Ehre and a 
woman should feel Scham could actually result in their further suffering. Frevert notes the 
importance of Schamhaftigkeit as a nineteenth-century feminine virtue, especially for women 
from bourgeois and petty bourgeois families: “Junge Mädchen wurden ihrerseits auf 
Schamhaftigkeit getrimmt, nach dem Motto: Eine Frau ohne Schamgefühl sei eine Frau ohne 
Ehre” (Vergängliche Gefühle 20). This historical background elucidates why Effi Briest features 
two monologue scenes in which Innstetten struggles with Ehre and Effi with the wrong kind of 
Scham. These passages offer a critique of the emotional codes that require men to defend their 
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Ehre and women to feel Scham and depict these codes in a state of decline in the modern society 
portrayed in Fontane’s novel. 
In the scenes featuring Innstetten’s conversation with Wüllersdorf and Effi’s and 
Innstetten’s monologues, the self-evidence of traditional nineteenth-century bourgeois and 
aristocratic social mores and emotional codes, represented by Ehre and Scham, is challenged. 
Johanna upholds the necessity of Ehre and Sittlichkeit in her argument with Roswitha in Chapter 
29, and, until Innstetten duels with Crampas, he perceives no alternative to allowing the 
Ehrenkultus to determine his choices and emotions. Initially, Innstetten praises Johanna and 
snubs Roswitha, whom he considers less intelligent than the former: “Sie wissen schon alles; 
Roswitha ist dumm, aber Johanna ist eine kluge Person” (Effi Briest 288). Innstetten entrusts 
Johanna with privileged information after the duel and the task of telling Annie that she no 
longer has a mother. As time progresses after the duel with Crampas, however, Innstetten’s 
dissociation from his original estimation of the honor code corresponds with a shift in his former 
alliance with Johanna, as evident in this passage:  
Wenn die Johanna eintritt, ein sogenanntes Juwel, so wird mir angst und bang. 
Dieses Sich-in-Szene-setzen (und Innstetten ahmte Johanna’s Haltung nach), 
diese halb komische Büstenplastik, die wie mit einem Spezialanspruch auftritt, ich 
weiß nicht, ob an die Menschheit oder an mich – ich finde das alles so trist und 
elend, und es wäre zum Totschießen, wenn es nicht so lächerlich wäre. (Effi Briest 
238-239) 
The more Innstetten questions the cult of Ehre and the rectitude of his actions, the more he 
becomes disgusted with Johanna’s posturing. Like Johanna’s “Sich-in-Szene-setzen,” which 
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Innstetten imitates disparagingly, the ethics of Ehre that Johanna advocates is represented here as 
phony. 
2.8 ACKNOWLEDGING A NEED FOR COMPASSION AND SELF-REGULATORY 
EMOTIONS 
During Innstetten’s final conversation with Wüllersdorf in Chapter 35, the two figures come to a 
realization that resembles Fontane’s own insight, “Schopenhauer hat ganz recht: ‘Das Beste, was 
wir haben, ist Mitleid’” (Briefe IV 284). Innstetten receives two letters in this scene: the first is a 
bureaucratic letter from the Minister congratulating him on his promotion, and the second letter 
displays “eine glückliche Unvertrautheit mit den landesüblichen Titulaturen” and is written in a 
“Schriftzüge von sehr primitivem Charakter” (Effi Briest 337). These initial descriptions of the 
second letter serve to differentiate it from the Minister’s letter even before the narrator reveals its 
writer, Roswitha, or its contents. In her letter, Roswitha requests that Innstetten send Rollo to 
Hohen-Cremmen so that he can accompany Effi on walks and ease her fears. Wüllersdorf’s 
reaction appears in quotes after the reproduction of the letter on the page and influences the 
reader’s evaluation of Roswitha’s character and the emotional style that she embodies. He judges 
Roswitha to be a cut above himself and Innstetten with his candid statement, “die ist uns über,” a 
sentiment that Innstetten echoes (Effi Briest 339). While Roswitha’s letter appears inferior on a 
superficial level, because she is unfamiliar with writing conventions and titles, her request 
demonstrates compassion, selflessness, and a disregard for what society might think of her for 
remaining loyal to her mistress. Innstetten’s and Wüllersdorf’s response to Roswitha’s “schlichte 
Worte” shows that they recognize her compassion and integrity, which once again drives 
 73 
Innstetten to reevaluate his own practice of abiding by his principles and the honor code (Effi 
Briest 339).  
If we consider the previously discussed passages of the novel to be a continuation of the 
Ehre-Mitleid debate between Johanna and Roswitha, it might seem that the novel completely 
invalidates Ehre and Scham. Despite the critique of nineteenth-century notions of Ehre and 
Sittlichkeit evident in Effi Briest, the novel takes a more moderate position and admits the need 
for self-regulatory emotions (e.g. shame, honor, guilt), not an ethics based solely on compassion. 
At the end of Chapter 35, Innstetten continues to question his actions and blames culture and the 
social emotion Ehre for everything:  
weg von hier, weg und hin unter lauter pechschwarze Kerle, die von Kultur und 
Ehre nichts wissen. Diese Glücklichen! Denn gerade das, dieser ganze 
Krimskrams ist doch an allem schuld. Aus Passion, was am Ende gehen möchte, 
thut man dergleichen nicht. Also bloßen Vorstellungen zuliebe…Vorstellungen! 
… Und da klappt denn einer zusammen, und man klappt selber nach. (Effi Briest 
340-341) 
Innstetten envisions Africa as an ideal sanctuary, a kind of Rousseauian state of nature, in which 
the natives are happy and unbound by social and emotional codes. Instead of rejecting the code 
of Ehre and adopting another emotional style, Innstetten believes that he must become one of the 
‘pechschwarze Kerle,’ an exotic, foreign ‘Other,’ in order to escape the emotional imperatives of 
Prussian society, because the concepts of culture and Ehre would be unfamiliar to them. He 
assumes that the passions that move people in this natural state are both less dangerous and more 
justified than the abstract concept, Ehre, that motivated his actions and that he now dismisses as 
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‘Krimskrams’39 and holds responsible for his unhappiness. Wüllersdorf, who discourages 
running away from culture and society, dismisses this fantasy. With his rhetorical question “Wer 
ist denn unbedrückt?” he assures Innstetten that he is not the only one who feels this way or has a 
psychological burden to carry (Effi Briest 341). Referring to the wise saying of a master builder, 
Wüllersdorf suggests that, rather than abandoning the culture he blames for his situation, 
Innstetten must look for “Hülfskonstruktionen” (Effi Briest 342). The precise meaning of 
‘Hülfskonstruktionen’ is not stated directly, but the context implies anything that helps make the 
burdens and sorrow of daily life more tolerable. Since this conversation occurs immediately after 
Roswitha’s intervention on behalf of Effi, one possible interpretation could be support and 
compassion from others. Rather than locating this form of social feeling in an ideal state of 
nature, Effi Briest uses Roswitha to show that compassion can be practiced in modern society 
without abandoning culture because “es geht überhaupt nicht ohne ‘Hülfskonstruktionen’” (Effi 
Briest 342). 
This balanced viewpoint becomes especially clear if we pay attention to Effi’s change of 
heart and last words at the end of the novel. At first, Effi expresses her contempt for Innstetten’s 
principles after her distressing reunion with her daughter, Annie:  
O, Du Gott im Himmel, vergieb mir, was ich gethan;…ich will meine Schuld 
nicht kleiner machen, … aber das ist zuviel. Denn das hier, mit dem Kind, das 
bist nicht Du, Gott, der mich strafen will, das ist er, bloß er! Ich habe geglaubt, 
daß er ein edles Herz habe und habe mich immer klein neben ihm gefühlt; aber 
                                                 
39 The word ‘Krimskrams’ appears twice in Effi Briest. In Chapter 19, the antisemitic and patriotic Prussian Baron 
von Güldenklee dismisses Lessing’s Ringparabel and its message of tolerance as ‘liberaler Krimskrams,’ but 
Fontane’s use of narrative irony undermines Güldenklee’s view. Innstetten’s use of the word ‘Krimskrams’ in 
Chapter 35 recalls the earlier passage; however, here the emotional code of Ehre, not progressive politics, is called 
rubbish (compare Effi Briest 181, 340). 
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jetzt weiß ich, daß er es ist, er ist klein. … Ein Streber war er, weiter nichts. – 
Ehre, Ehre, Ehre … und dann hat er den armen Kerl totgeschossen, den ich nicht 
einmal liebte .... Mich ekelt, was ich gethan; aber was mich noch mehr ekelt, das 
ist Eure Tugend. (Effi Briest 325-326)40  
Effi’s monologue begins as a prayer for forgiveness (“O, Du Gott in Himmel, vergieb mir…”) 
and admission of guilt (“…ich will meine Schuld nicht kleiner Machen…”), but it ends as an 
accusation and expression of disgust for Innstetten and Annie’s empty virtue (“Eure Tugend”). 
The repetitions of ‘Ehre’ and ‘er’ convey the extent of Effi’s distress after her visit with Annie. 
She holds Innstetten’s loyalty to his principles and Ehre responsible for her estrangement from 
her daughter and for Crampas’s death. Ehre is shown here as an object of contempt, not a social 
emotion or virtue worthy of admiration. Effi’s final words, spoken just before her death in 
Chapter 36, express more understanding for Innstetten’s actions and principles, however. She 
admits to her mother “daß er in allem recht gehandelt. In der Geschichte mit dem armen 
Crampas – ja, was sollt’ er am Ende anders thun? ... er hatte viel Gutes in seiner Natur und war 
so edel, wie jemand sein kann, der ohne rechte Liebe ist” (Effi Briest 348). Effi no longer 
condemns Ehre or denies that Innstetten possesses noble qualities. She takes responsibility for 
her own guilt, affirms that Innstetten had acted correctly, and hopes that her conviction of his 
righteousness will comfort him. Yet her words retain an important element of critique, namely, 
that Innstetten lacks “rechte Liebe” (Effi Briest 348). As with Pastor Niemeyer’s insistence upon 
a vague “richtiges Gefühl,” the meaning of “rechte Liebe” opens itself up for debate. While 
                                                 
40 My examination of Fontane’s original handwritten manuscript of Effi Briest has alerted me to significant and 
telling revisions that Fontane made to passages that allude to the emotions Ehre and Mitleid, including the passage 
cited here. A separate essay analyzing Fontane’s deletions and insertions in key passages of the manuscript is 
currently in preparation. Fontane’s changes to the manuscript provide further support for my argument that the novel 
negotiates between Ehre and Mitleid and that the representation of these social emotions was of great concern to 
Fontane at the time. 
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critics have taken this to mean that Innstetten lacks Zärtlichkeit41 or feelings of romantic love, 
the critical thrust of the novel goes beyond the telling of a story of an ill-fated marriage and 
adultery as the consequence of an absence of romantic love between spouses. Instead, I interpret 
“rechte Liebe” as a more inclusive fellow feeling for humanity,42 i.e. compassion or Mitleid. 
With this closing assessment of Innstetten’s character, the novel as a whole does not call for the 
relinquishment of nineteenth-century bourgeois and aristocratic social mores or self-regulatory 
emotions. It does however articulate the need for an accompanying style of social feeling based 
on rechte Liebe or Mitleid. The novel represents this emotion as able to provide stability in a 
modernizing world at a time when other emotions and values are declining in relevance. 
2.9 EMOTIONS AND THE NATURE-SOCIETY BINARY 
Fontane’s staging of Ehre and Mitleid as opposing social emotions in Effi Briest raises important 
questions about the perception of these emotions and the nature of emotional experience in 
general at the turn of the century. The binary of nature versus society, which scholars find in Effi 
Briest and other works of Fontane’s oeuvre, brings up the nature-nurture question at the heart of 
many debates related to the study of emotions. Does the novel’s association of Ehre with society 
and Mitleid with nature imply that Germans around 1900 viewed Ehre and Scham as culturally 
determined emotions and Mitleid as inherently natural? Because there is evidence indicating that 
the emotions that societies consider ‘natural’ or ‘basic’ change over time, this is not an 
unreasonable question. Additionally, following Schopenhauer, Fontane admitted that “Mitleid ist 
                                                 
41 Compare Müller-Seidel 370; Stolt 242-244. 
 
42 Compare Wende, who considers “Humanitas” the only possible meaning of rechte Liebe (157). 
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auch vielfach ganz echt,” a statement that ascribes to the emotion a sense of genuineness or 
realness (Briefe IV 284). Yet emotions as represented in Effi Briest, just like Fontane’s figures, 
exist in a constant state of tension between two poles. Furthermore, the manner in which the 
novel stages debates between its figures on the topic of Ehre and Mitleid already implies that 
both emotions are subject to social negotiation and, therefore, that each emotion has a unique 
history.  
Instead, I read Fontane’s alignment of Ehre with society and Mitleid with nature in Effi 
Briest more as a literary device that enacts the tension between these two emotional styles than 
as an explicit statement about their origins or historical variability. Fontane’s use of the nature-
society binary to bring to light this tension enables readers to make two observations. Firstly, by 
aligning Ehre and Sittlichkeit with society, the novel shows how strict social codes regulating the 
practice of emotions could inhibit certain ‘natural’ feelings and have a negative impact on human 
relationships. When Effi visits the Ministerin and requests permission to see her daughter, the 
Ministerin responds with compassion because, as a mother, she identifies with Effi’s situation 
and can summarize the reason for Effi’s request in terms of emotions: “Sie finden sich selbst in 
der Haltung Ihres Herrn Gemahls zurecht und verlangen nur, daß einem natürlichen Gefühle, 
wohl dem schönsten unserer Gefühle (wenigstens wir Frauen werden uns darin finden), sein 
Recht werde” (Effi Briest 320, emphasis added). In this passage, the Ministerin refers to 
Mutterliebe [motherly love] as something natural and beautiful. Since she values this emotion 
herself, she does not deny Effi’s request but promises to do everything she can to convince 
Innstetten to grant her visitation rights. Even though Innstetten reluctantly consents, the 
Ministerin knows that he is “ein Mann, der nicht nach Stimmungen und Laune, sondern nach 
Grundsätzen handelt” and that what he judges to be right may be hard for Effi’s heart (Effi Briest 
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320). Although the narrator never reveals whether Innstetten or Johanna is responsible for 
training Annie to respond to Effi’s questions with “O gewiß, wenn ich darf” during her visit, it is 
clear that Annie, whose best subject in school is religion, is constrained by a rigid Sittlichkeit that 
leaves Effi’s desire to be reunited with her daughter and experience the natural feeling of 
Mutterliebe unfulfilled (Effi Briest 324). Similarly, Luise von Briest, who feels bound by social 
conventions and fears being cut off from society, experiences temporary estrangement from her 
daughter until Dr. Rummschüttel intervenes by invoking the Briests’ feelings of parental love: 
“was Ihrer Frau Tochter Genesung bringen kann, ist nicht Luft allein; sie siecht hin, weil sie 
nichts hat als Roswitha. Dienertreue ist schön aber Elternliebe ist besser” (Effi Briest 327, 
emphasis added). With two simple words, “Effi komm,” the Briests invite Effi back home to 
Hohen-Cremmen and reestablish their emotional and familial bond (Effi Briest 328). By 
replacing an unforgiving Sittlichkeit with compassion, familial love is restored in the case of the 
Briests. 
Additionally, by invoking the nature-society binary and associating Mitleid with nature, 
the novel acknowledges that some Germans around 1900 may have perceived an ethics of 
Mitleid as a threat to established values and institutions. The novel gives particular expression to 
the fear of what would happen to religious and moral institutions if compassion were extended to 
those who, like Effi and Crampas, commit adultery or violate other social mores. On the evening 
of Effi’s engagement to Innstetten, Briest analogizes his ‘Naturkind’ Effi and Geert, a ‘Mann von 
Prinzipien,’ using the following image: “Geert, wenn er nicht irre, habe die Bedeutung von 
einem schlank aufgeschossenen Stamm, und Effi sei dann also der Epheu, der sich darum zu 
ranken habe” (Effi Briest 19-20). This powerful image at the beginning of Effi Briest associates 
Effi with nature and Innstetten with culture, an idea that guides the reader’s interpretation of the 
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novel and its protagonists. Ivy reappears later in the novel, and, most notably, twice in Chapter 
33, where it is found growing on the church across from Effi’s Berlin apartment on 
Königgrätzerstraße. The narrator reports how Effi and Roswitha imagine the plant’s growth: 
“nächstes Jahr würden die Fenster wohl ganz zugewachsen sein,” and Effi subsequently explains 
to Annie during her visit that the process has aleady begun: “die Fenster sind schon halb von 
Epheu überwachsen, als ob es eine alte Kirche wäre” (Effi Briest 322, 324). Ivy, a symbol of 
wild and free nature, contrasts with the image of the church, a religious and moral institution, 
and Annie’s trained obedience. Mitleid, represented as a ‘natural’ emotion in the novel, can also 
be associated symbolically with the ivy that threatens to overtake the church. Effi’s remark that 
the wildly growing ivy partially covers the windows and makes the church look old suggests the 
declining relevance of the particular social and emotional codes that the church represents in 
modern society. Additionally, the first statement by the narrator (“nächstes Jahr würden die 
Fenster wohl ganz zugewachsen sein”) could be read as a prediction that Mitleid will continue to 
compete with Ehre and Sittlichkeit until it is integrated into the social codes and values 
represented by the church. 
Another passage invokes the nature-society binary in order to examine the political 
implications of and possible resistance to an ethics based on tolerance and Mitleid. In Chapter 
19, Baron von Güldenklee gives a toast to Oberförster Ring: “viele Ringe giebt es, und es giebt 
sogar eine Geschichte, die wir alle kennen, die die Geschichte von den ‘drei Ringen’ heißt, eine 
Judengeschichte, die, wie der ganze liberale Krimskrams, nichts wie Verwirrung und Unheil 
gestiftet hat und noch stiftet. Gott bessere es” (Effi Briest 181). Although the “Parable of the 
Three Rings” to which Güldenklee refers dates back at least as far as the Middle Ages, Lessing 
retold it and gave it a place of importance at the center of his drama Nathan der Weise (1779). 
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The Ringparabel, which evokes the Enlightenment Toleranzdiskurs, is known for its message of 
religious tolerance, equality, and familial love. German readers of the time would have surely 
associated it with Lessing, whose name also calls to mind the eighteenth-century Mitleidsdiskurs. 
As we see from Johanna’s rejection of Roswitha’s compassion for Crampas in their debate about 
Ehre and Mitleid, feelings that the novel presents as ‘natural’ are not accepted by all. Like 
Johanna, Güldenklee thus rejects this other type of social feeling and dismisses the Ringparabel 
and everything it represents as liberal ‘Krimskrams,’ blaming it for causing confusion and misery 
in society. ‘Natural’ human feeling and the social progress it implies are perceived as a threat to 
Prussia in this scene, and the guests in attendance express their patriotism by collectively singing 
the “Preußenlied” following the toast. The narrator undermines this view, however, by revealing 
that Innstetten, “der von solchem Patriotismus nicht viel hielt,” does not get swept up in the 
collective singing. While the narrator does not reveal whether Innstetten shares Güldenklee’s 
disdain for progressive politics, this comment sets Innstetten apart from the other characters in 
the scene. It shows that he remains devoted to his principles and does not act in response to 
emotional appeals, whether for Mitleid or for patriotism, as we see here. Nonetheless, by 
conveying the sense that ‘natural’ social feeling could be perceived as a threat to the established 
order, the novel indicates potential obstacles involved in promoting tolerance and Mitleid. 
2.10 CONCLUSION 
Effi Briest contributes to the turn-of-the-century emotion discourse by putting nineteenth-century 
aristocratic and bourgeois ideals of Ehre and Sittlichkeit in dialogue with a different type of 
social feeling based on Mitleid. By associating Mitleid with nature and Ehre with society in a 
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rhetorical gesture rather than as a statement about the origins of these emotions, Fontane’s novel 
dramatizes the tension between these competing systems of social feeling and attempts to 
reconcile them. It does not, however, locate Mitleid outside of society in an imaginary state of 
nature or advocate exclusive reliance upon ‘natural’ feelings. Instead, it critically examines and 
subverts the emotional imperatives of Ehre and Scham in order to make room for more 
compassionate emotional codes in a society undergoing modernization. The novel’s open ending, 
which makes a compelling case for both abstract guiding principles and human compassion, 
takes a cautiously progressive approach that enables the dialogic negotiation between the two 
viewpoints to continue. The recognition of different emotional styles and, moreover, the 
invitation to continue the dialogue do not just inform Fontane’s Effi Briest, as I demonstrate in 
the next chapter on Lou Andreas-Salomé’s Fenitschka (1898). That is to say, by staging Ehre 
and Mitleid as opposing social emotions in Effi Briest, Fontane invites us to connect his novel to 
other literary works that engage with issues of emotions and ethics around 1900.  
If Effi Briest voices awareness for the impact that social codes can have on an 
individual’s life and emotions, it also admits the necessity of such regulations. The problem lies 
in how such social and emotional codes are imagined and internalized. In the novel, Effi is 
conscious of her fears, shame, and guilt, but not of herself as the subject of those emotions. The 
protagonists are oppressed because they let society dictate their emotional practices, not realizing 
their own ability to shape them, and, therefore, their feelings. Fontane proposed his own vision 
of how a society might achieve this balance: “So gewiß die Gesellschaft das Recht hat, diesen 
Ich-Standpunkt zu korrigieren, so gewiß hat das Ich ein Recht, den Gesellschaftsstandpunkt zu 
korrigieren” (Aufzeichnungen zur Literatur 359). His Effi Briest accomplishes precisely this. By 
questioning the self-evidence of emotional practices and social mores, validating alternative 
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emotional styles, and using the affective power of narrative fiction to move readers, Effi Briest 
made a key contribution to the emotion discourse of its time. 
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3.0  “DANN SIEGTE EIN ANDRES GEFÜHL”: SUBVERTING FEMININE SHAME 
AND LIBERATING LOVE IN ANDREAS-SALOMÉ’S FENITSCHKA (1898) 
Lou Andreas-Salomé’s (1861-1937) novella Fenitschka (1898), published three years after 
Theodor Fontane’s Effi Briest, takes a different approach to addressing the crisis in emotional 
norms and the rapid cultural change of fin-de-siècle Europe. On the one hand, Fenitschka, like 
Effi Briest, is reserved in its approach, using realist narrative techniques to expose and critique 
the constraints placed on individuals by nineteenth-century social and emotional codes. Yet 
while Fontane inspires compassion through the narration of the social isolation, physical decline, 
and death of his passive title heroine, Andreas-Salomé constructs an active heroine who rejects 
the social mores of her class and gender and defines her own emotional style. Heteropathia in 
Fenitschka manifests itself as the tension between differing orientations to the emotions of 
feminine shame and love, which the novella puts in dialogue through its title heroine, Fenia, and 
extradiegetic-homodiegetic narrator, Max. Although Fenitschka admits the challenges involved 
in assimilating new models and redefining the self in the face of modernity’s changes, its 
subversive power derives from its gradual revealing of the failure of conventional narratives to 
account for the diversity of individuals and relationships in a modernizing society. It does not 
promote uncritical acceptance of old or new cultural paradigms, but urges readers to look beyond 
their preconceptions and aim for critical thinking and dialogue, which in turn will lead to 
progress, greater understanding, and acceptance. 
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This chapter brings together two contrasting trends in interpretations of Fenitschka. 
Scholarship has yielded different insights into the novella’s meaning and actual object of 
narration since about 1990, when Andreas-Salomé’s novellas finally began to receive the 
scholarly attention they deserve. A majority of critics has treated Fenia, the title heroine, as the 
novella’s central figure of interest (see Eigler; Deiulio; Haines; Martin). More recently, however, 
others have examined the narrative situation and argued that Fenitschka reveals more about its 
co-protagonist and narrator,1 Max Werner (see Cormican; Whitinger). While readers can 
profitably approach Andreas-Salomé’s Fenitschka from either point of view, the concept 
heteropathia provides a new interpretative approach that reconciles the two ways of reading the 
novella and more precisely illuminates how Andreas-Salomé portrays differing affective 
perspectives at the fin de siècle.  
One glance at the novella’s title suggests that its primary purpose is to tell the story of its 
heroine, the young Russian doctoral student, Fiona Iwánowna Betjagin, who more commonly 
goes by the nickname Fenia or the diminutive Fénitschka. Fenia, who resembles other New 
Woman figures commonly found in fin-de-siècle European literature, certainly proves to be a 
fascinating object of narration. Like them, she resists simple categorization and does not conform 
to the nineteenth-century social mores of her class or gender. She earns a doctorate in philosophy 
at the University of Zürich, the first European university to accept female students, and speaks in 
support of women’s education. Her beliefs about love and marriage, which she shares during her 
debates with her co-protagonist, Max, are unconventional and challenge the cultural narratives 
                                                 
1 Critics have not explicitly argued that the character Max is identical to the narrator, but they have suggested that 
the narrative events are told from his perspective. Since there is strong textual evidence to suggest that the narrator is 
actually Max reflecting on his encounters with Fenia, I refer to Max the narrator and Max the character in this 
chapter using the following shorthand forms: Mⁿ and Mᶜ. 
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with which he is familiar and comfortable. Recalling the inner struggles faced by the heroines of 
Henrik Ibsen’s (1828-1906) dramas,2 Fenia must either choose to marry her lover and give up 
her professional goals or reject his proposal and preserve her freedom. Fenia ultimately leaves 
her Russian lover and ends her friendship with Max in the final pages of the novella. The veiling 
of her facial expressions and emotions after these separations creates an open ending that leads 
readers to wonder whether she made the right decision and what her emotional response, if 
revealed, would say about the challenges and opportunities facing the New Woman at the turn of 
the century. 
Another way to read Fenitschka requires shifting attention to the co-protagonist, Max 
Werner, and the process of narration. Max, an Austrian doctoral graduate in psychology, first 
meets Fenia at a Parisian café and encounters her a second time in St. Petersburg, where they 
begin to establish a friendship and engage in conversations about love, marriage, religion, 
gender, and women’s education. Thought report and free indirect speech convey Max’s feelings 
of irritation and anxiety in response to his interactions with Fenia. His inability to categorize this 
New Woman frustrates him greatly, and her rejection of gendered social mores threatens his 
masculinity. Readers become aware of his insecurity and futile attempts to secure a position of 
authority for himself because Fenia destabilizes the dominant cultural narratives that grant him a 
privileged status as an educated bourgeois male. After Max leaves Fenia’s hotel room in St. 
Petersburg, the narration concludes, and the question of Max’s overall development remains 
open for debate. 
                                                 
2 As Andreas-Salomé’s analysis in Henrik Ibsens Frauen-Gestalten: nach seinen sechs Familiendramen (1892) 
demonstrates, Ibsen’s protagonists, such as Hedda in Hedda Gabler (1890) and Nora Helmer in A Doll’s House 
(1879), are forced to choose either love and family duties or freedom. Out of all of Ibsen’s heroines, Ellida Wangel 
in The Lady from the Sea (1888) exemplifies an ideal because she achieves this balance between duty and freedom 
(Andreas-Salomé, Henrik Ibsens Frauen-Gestalten 12-14). 
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Focusing on the heteropathic representation of emotion in Andreas-Salomé’s Fenitschka, 
I demonstrate in this chapter that the novella shifts its reader’s attention between the two objects 
of narration, Fenia and Max (i.e. both Max the character [Mᶜ] and Max the narrator [Mⁿ]). 
Fenitschka sets up dialogues at the intradiegetic and extradiegetic levels and subverts Max’s (Mᶜ) 
perspective, while at the same time underscoring the instability and uncertainty that accompanied 
modernization at the turn of the century. The novella’s open ending raises more questions than it 
answers when read from either of the two viewpoints (Fenia as object of narration vs. Max as 
object of narration). When read in terms of heteropathia, however, its final scene indicates that 
Max (Mᶜ) no longer tries to categorize Fenia according to the nineteenth-century emotional codes 
and social mores of her class and gender. Instead, the narrator (Mⁿ) shows that he (Mᶜ) has grown 
to accept Fenia’s unconventional, highly individual emotional style and acknowledge her 
agency. 
Situated against the background of European society around 1900, Fenitschka provides 
insight into fin-de-siècle emotional life and makes room for new emotional styles during this 
period of swift cultural change. The novella’s co-protagonists, Fenia and Max, are more than just 
representatives of their respective genders—they embody differing orientations to emotion. Max 
assumes that all bourgeois ladies feel the same: they desire sensation, pursue love that leads to 
marriage, and feel shame if their virtue is threatened. Fenia questions the ‘naturalness’ and 
universality of these emotions, however. Rather than conform to these emotional scripts, she 
defines her own emotional style, in which love means freedom and gratitude, and feminine 
shame is unnecessary. Critics have reached different conclusions about Andreas-Salomé’s 
feminism and support for the women’s movement, and, while I do not consider Fenitschka a 
first-wave feminist text, its narration from a male perspective functions subversively and 
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undermines the nineteenth-century gendered social and emotional codes to which Max 
unreflectively subscribes. With the women’s movement and better opportunities for women’s 
education and employment, established gender roles and social mores were gradually becoming 
passé in modern society. Max’s (Mᶜ) skepticism toward women’s education, unconventional 
gender roles, and alternative understandings of love and marriage suggest that the familiar 
narratives associated with these social mores were difficult to abandon, however. The novella 
questions the nineteenth-century bourgeois male worldview represented by Max (Mᶜ), but, more 
generally, it asks readers to think critically before accepting any cultural narrative or ideology 
that aims for simplicity in categorizing others. Through both its title heroine and extradiegetic-
homodiegetic narrator, Fenitschka ultimately champions self-realization and validates alternate 
ways of feeling. Moreover, the novella’s dialogues and open ending facilitate a sustained 
negotiation between viewpoints, thereby drawing readers into its debates about emotions and 
social change. 
3.1 EMANCIPATION OR SELF-REALIZATION? ANDREAS-SALOMÉ AND THE 
WOMAN QUESTION 
Already during her lifetime Russian-born German writer, thinker, and psychoanalyst Lou 
Andreas-Salomé acquired various names and identities. Sigmund Freud famously dubbed her the 
“Dichterin der Psychoanalyse” and told other colleagues that she was a “Frauenzimmer von 
gefährlicher Intelligenz” (“Freud/Lou Andreas-Salomé” 147; Decker 272). Her friendships and 
intellectual exchanges with figures like Nietzsche, Rée, Rilke, and Freud earned her the 
reputation as a philosopher’s muse. Some biographers have also construed Andreas-Salomé as a 
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femme fatale, the real-life counterpart to figures like Frank Wedekind’s (1864-1918) Lulu and 
the biblical figures of Judith and Salomé, who dominated the artistic and literary imagination at 
the fin de siècle (Martin, Woman and Modernity 21). Andreas-Salomé has fascinated biographers 
and scholars and even inspired novelists and filmmakers to explore her unconventional life.3 
Like her heroine in Fenitschka, Andreas-Salomé herself became an indicator of the possibilities 
of other forms of social expression available to women in a modern world. 
Louise (Lou) von Salomé was born into a wealthy family of Huguenot-German descent 
in a German-speaking colony in St. Petersburg in 1861. She was the youngest and only daughter 
of six children, and growing up with five brothers shaped her interactions with men during her 
adult life. Much to her mother’s disappointment, Lou did not conform to the social mores of her 
gender. Instead, she traveled to Switzerland to study art history and the psychology of religion at 
the University of Zürich in 1880 (Salber 25). Lou contracted hemoptysis, which forced her to 
end her studies in Zürich not even a year later. For the rest of her life, she would remain an 
autodidact, who became a central contributor to the intellectual discussions of her time. She 
developed close connections to Paul Rée (1849-1901) and Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) after 
leaving Zürich for Rome in 1882. Salomé declined the marriage proposals of both Rée and 
Nietzsche but in 1887 married the Orientalist Friedrich Carl Andreas (1846-1930). She mingled 
with the circle of Naturalist writers in Berlin and began publishing essays, stories, and reviews in 
Die Freie Bühne and other influential journals of the time in 1890. Although Andreas-Salomé 
continued to write and publish well into the last decades of her life, the 1890s remained the most 
prolific period of her career. Her first novel Im Kampf um Gott appeared in 1885, but it was her 
                                                 
3 Andreas-Salomé is featured in a number of recent films and novels, including Cordula Kablitz-Post’s biographical 
film Lou Andreas-Salomé - Wie ich dich liebe, Rätselleben (2016), Liliana Cavani’s drama film Al di là del bene e 
del male [Beyond Good and Evil] (1977), Irvin Yalom’s novel When Nietzsche Wept (1992), and William Bayer’s 
novel The Luzern Photograph: A Noir Thriller (2016).  
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thoughtful analysis of the female protagonists in Henrik Ibsen’s dramas that launched her 
successful writing career in 1892. Andreas-Salomé’s travels during these years took her to Paris, 
Russia, Munich, and Vienna. She developed an intense friendship with Rainer Maria Rilke 
(1875-1926) in 1897 after meeting him in Munich and became a source of support and literary 
inspiration for the rest of his life, even after their separation in 1900. In Vienna, where 
psychology and literature became central topics of the Jahrhundertwende, Andreas-Salomé 
conversed with Arthur Schnitzler (1862-1931) and other writers of the Wiener Moderne. A later 
trip to Vienna in 1911 enabled her to meet Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) and develop a close 
friendship with his daughter, Anna, marking the period of her active involvement in the field of 
psychoanalysis. Andreas-Salomé remained engaged in the writing of psychoanalytic essays and 
in her practice as a lay analyst until shortly before her death in Göttingen in 1937. 
Understandably, Lou Andreas-Salomé’s biography has interested scholars for a variety of 
reasons, not least of all for her interactions with Nietzsche, Rilke, and Freud. Biographies of 
Andreas-Salomé continue to appear, but the past three decades have witnessed an increase in 
critical attention given to her theoretical essays and literary works as well. Despite the growing 
scholarly interest in her works, however, references to the writer’s contributions to the German 
literary and cultural landscape of the late nineteenth-century have remained curiously absent 
from German literary histories, which are predominantly male-centered. Such neglect 
notwithstanding, Andreas-Salomé’s works were very popular during her lifetime. Her first novel, 
Im Kampf um Gott (1885), explores the human psyche, the status of women in society, the 
meaning of religion, and the complications of love, all themes that she continued to develop in 
her later essays and literary works (Salber 37). Henrik Ibsens Frauen-Gestalten: nach seinen 
sechs Familiendramen (1892), which analyzes six heroines from Ibsen’s late nineteenth-century 
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dramas (including Ghosts [1881] and Hedda Gabler [1891]) demonstrates a serious engagement 
with the Woman Question, particularly the issues of marriage, freedom, and gendered emotional 
codes.  
Despite her concern with the Woman Question, which occupied the center of social and 
aesthetic discourses around 1880, some early feminists, including Hedwig Dohm (1831-1919), 
accused Andreas-Salomé of being a privileged anti-feminist because they found her theoretical 
writings on gender and women essentialist (Martin, Woman and Modernity 16, 21; Whitinger 
465). In the essay “Reaktion in der Frauenbewegung” (1899), for example, Dohm questions 
Lou’s loyalty to the feminist cause and even calls her an anti-suffragette [Antifrauenrechtlerin]: 
“Und nun Frau Lou Andreas-Salomé? ‘Auch Du, mein Sohn Brutus!’ dachte ich betrübt, als ich 
ihre Schrift ‘Der Mensch als Weib’ gelesen hatte. Frau Lou (ihr voller, viel zu langer Name frißt 
zu viel Manuskript) Antifrauenrechtlerin!” (Dohm 280). According to Andreas-Salomé’s 
construction of femininity, which diverged from Dohm’s, woman was complete in herself; she 
did need to imitate man or become dependent on a man or child in order to be a whole person 
(Martin, Woman and Modernity 6). She never became politically engaged, however, or let 
herself be confined to one belief system but thought that feminists’ attempt to negate differences 
between the sexes was misguided. Instead of demanding women’s emancipation, she emphasized 
the importance of their self-realization (Salber 97-98). 
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3.2 FENITSCHKA THROUGH DIFFERENT LENSES: GENDER, FEMINIST, 
BAKHTINIAN, AND EMOTION STUDIES 
Scholarship has tended to focus on constructions of gender in Andreas-Salomé’s literary works 
and essays, but a more general awareness of the crisis in nineteenth-century emotional codes and 
social mores at the fin de siècle is also evident in her work. Established social structures and 
institutions had begun to show signs of instability in the last decades of the nineteenth century. 
Cultural mores like clearly defined gender roles and the belief in God’s existence, which were 
assumed to be self-evident, were now being questioned. There arose the need to create spaces for 
different lifestyles and ways of feeling for people in modern society. Andreas-Salomé’s novellas, 
especially those written in the 1890s, depict the structural changes that European societies 
underwent at the fin de siècle and look forward to a future with new possibilities, including the 
freedom of self-realization. 
Out of all of Andreas-Salomé’s novellas, Fenitschka continues to be the best-known and 
most commonly discussed in the critical literature. David Midgley describes two features that 
make it an exemplary text:  
One is the clarity with which it presents the problems faced by a young woman 
who would like to be as free … in her relationships as men are able to be, but who 
experiences the constraints imposed upon that ideal by social convention and the 
attitudes of men themselves. The other is the way it uses a male observer as the 
medium through which the woman’s situation and experiences are reflected…. 
(116) 
Here, Midgley indirectly suggests that the novella includes two objects of narration, the co-
protagonists Max and Fenia, each with his or her own story to tell. Some readings of Fenitschka 
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have analyzed Fenia’s story more closely (Eigler; Deiulio; Haines; Martin). Friederike Eigler, for 
example, argues that Fenitschka is about “…a young woman who, because of social norms and 
gender specific mores in a patriarchal society, attempts unsuccessfully to combine her private 
and professional lives…” (198). Other, more recent, scholarship maintains that Fenitschka 
actually focuses primarily on Max (Cormican; Whitinger). Cormican, for instance, shifts 
emphasis away from Fenia’s predicament, arguing that Max is a more central character than has 
typically been recognized by other critics (136).  
Whether critics focus more on Fenia or Max as the object of narration depends on their 
theoretical approach. Biddy Martin views the plot and details of Fenitschka as highly (auto)-
biographical (Woman and Modernity 176-190). Unwilling to suppress the writer’s biography in 
her interpretations, she argues that Fenitschka is “...all the richer for its resonance with the 
stories of her encounters with Frank Wedekind and Friedrich Nietzsche” (Woman and Modernity 
178). Even though Andreas-Salomé recognized her own tendency to blur the lines between life 
and literature,4 however, biographical readings of Fenitschka are by no means the only 
possibility. In fact, a number of critics have distanced themselves from biographical approaches 
to Andreas-Salomé’s fiction, almost certainly in resistance to what Muriel Cormican calls the 
“cult of biography” that came to surround the author and her work (2). 
Feminist and Bakhtinian readings of the novellas, including Fenitschka, have been the 
two most common approaches up to this point (see Allen; Eigler; Haines). In her feminist 
reading, Brigid Haines explores the contradictions and anti-feminist ideas that early critics such 
as Dohm attributed to Andreas-Salomé’s writing. While Haines acknowledges that contemporary 
feminists did not approve of Andreas-Salomé’s understanding of gender identity as innate rather 
                                                 
4 Andreas-Salomé admitted that all of her works, including her literary texts, theoretical essays, and memoirs, are 
both autobiographical and fictional (Martin, Femininity Played Straight 208). 
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than socially constructed, her close reading of Fenitschka demonstrates how the novella reaches 
beyond essentialism and depicts a radical social reality in which gender is a product of 
competing forms of subjectivity (417). Friederike Eigler makes a more direct connection 
between feminist theory and Bakhtinian analysis. Using Eine Ausschweifung (1898) as her case 
study, she expands upon Haines’ method and proposes that Bakhtin’s concept of a “multi-voiced 
narrative” can help critics who want to connect feminist theory with the close reading of literary 
texts (198). Although an understanding of the dialogic aspect of Fenitschka and other novellas is 
implicit in Haines’s and Eigler’s reference to Bakhtin’s heteroglossia, Julie Doll Allen further 
examines the dialogues between Max and Fenia and situates these conversations in their 
historical and cultural contexts. Allen reads Fenitschka as symptomatic of the debates 
surrounding the women’s movement and the struggle to develop a feminine identity independent 
of men at the fin de siècle (479). 
Two other recent interpretations of Fenitschka shift attention from Fenia toward Max and 
the act of narration. Raleigh Whitinger, for example, shows how Fenitschka, which uses Max’s 
perspective to invoke the Bildungsroman and Liebesroman, actually subverts their conventions 
to become a forerunner to the twentieth-century “female Bildungsroman” (464, 469). Muriel 
Cormican agrees with such feminist readings, which analyze the novella as subverting the late 
nineteenth-century anti-feminist position. But she also finds evidence for the negotiation of male 
identity in Andreas-Salomé’s works and argues that Fenitschka exposes the inadequacy of social 
discourses imposed on men as well as on women (137, 10). 
My approach to the novella is indebted to the scholarly work done during the past three 
decades. I echo critics who consider Fenitschka an example of what Catherine Belsey called an 
“interrogative text,” one that raises more questions than it intends to answer and seeks to engage 
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readers in its debates (Haines 419; Midgley 120). While previous scholarship has largely focused 
on gender relations and feminist discourse, however, this chapter offers an analysis of the literary 
representation of emotion as it relates to the women’s movement and the larger social context of 
cultural change at the fin de siècle.  
3.3 THE HETEROPATHIC REPRESENTATION OF EMOTION IN FENITSCHKA 
The fin de siècle in European society is typically described as a period of rapid Kulturwandel and 
modernization during which old and new structures and value systems overlapped. Through its 
innovative narrative techniques and depiction of differing emotional styles, Fenitschka places 
readers at the center of debates about emotions and social change around 1900. Wilhelmine 
German society witnessed major cultural shifts and the emergence of differing emotional styles 
at this time, and, despite her reliance upon a single extradiegetic-homodiegetic narrator, 
Andreas-Salomé succeeds in putting different affective perspectives into dialogue in Fenitschka. 
Internal focalization permits readers to see from Max’s (Mᶜ) nineteenth-century bourgeois male 
worldview, but Fenia’s character and the narrative structure as a whole question the ‘naturalness’ 
of his perspective and undermine it. The embodiment of differing emotional styles in the 
novella’s two co-protagonists suggests one way of viewing the Jahrhundertwende: as a 
transitional period characterized by tension between shifting ways of feeling. My interpretation 
highlights such heteropathic representation and validation of ways of feeling in Fenitschka, 
which, as summarized in its pithy statement, “Dann siegte ein andres Gefühl,” is the novella’s 
most compelling contribution (Fenitschka 18). 
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3.3.1 Max as Narrator of Fenitschka 
Generally speaking, the narrative situation of a novelistic prose work determines whose emotions 
are reported and from which perspective. Critics have identified a third-person narrator in 
Fenitschka and noted that the narrative events are recounted primarily through the eyes of co-
protagonist Max Werner (see e.g. Allen 483; Haines 419-420). There is room, however, to use 
narrative theory in order to analyze the narrative voice and focalization more precisely. While we 
are dealing with an extradiegetic narrator in Fenitschka, it is not immediately clear whether he is 
homodiegetic or heterodiegetic. In spite of this, I find evidence that the novella features an 
extradiegetic-homodiegetic narrator, i.e. a narrator in the first degree who tells his own story 
(Genette 248). Without yet discussing focalization to support this claim, I simply turn to the 
novella’s conclusion: “Stumm schritt er durch das Wohnzimmer und ging hinweg, wie sie es 
gewünscht hatte, ohne sie zu beachten oder anzureden. Zwei Tage später reiste er aus Rußland 
fort, ohne Fenitschka wiedergesehen zu haben” (Fenitschka 67). These two sentences link Max’s 
final departure from Fenia and St. Petersburg at the end of the novella with the narrator’s 
inability to continue narrating the life of its title heroine. This suggests that the narrator is 
actually the co-protagonist Max because he has no more knowledge about Fenia and her future 
than Max does at this point. 
This chapter identifies the narrator (Mⁿ) of Fenitschka as the figure Max (Mᶜ), who later 
recounts the story of his friendship and conversations with Fenia. In other words, the novella 
features an extradiegetic-homodiegetic narrator who disguises himself as an extradiegetic-
heterodiegetic narrator. The grammatical third person is used to refer to both Max and Fenia 
throughout the novella, and, thus, the narrator’s identity and relationship to the two co-
protagonists becomes obscured. This uncertainty about the person (homodiegetic or 
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heterodiegetic) behind the narrative voice affects the reader’s experience of the text as a whole in 
two key ways. First, this type of narration conveys a sense of objectivity and authority; we might 
conclude that the narrator tells a story from which he is detached and not an account of his 
personal experiences. Since he neither uses the first-person pronoun nor identifies himself with 
Max, readers may even incorrectly assume that Fenitschka features an omniscient narrator. 
Second, this ambiguous narrative voice results in two central objects of narration: Max and 
Fenia.  
Comparing the narration of Max’s thoughts and emotions with Fenia’s makes a striking 
disparity apparent. At no point in the novella do readers gain access to Fenia’s ‘inner’ feelings. 
Instead, they must deduce her emotions, worldview, convictions, and motivations for her 
behavior from her direct speech and the narrator’s descriptions of her gestures and facial 
expressions. Readers may be tempted to see such narrative assessments of Fenia’s feelings as 
authoritative, but the frequent use of “schien,” “wie,” and “als ob” [appeared, like/as, and as if] 
in descriptive passages points to a subjective, limited viewpoint. After two paragraphs of 
uninterrupted dialogue between Max and Fenia in which they discuss women’s emancipation and 
education rights, the narrator suggests a discrepancy between Fenia’s actions and her desires: 
“Obwohl Fenia gegen ihn stritt, so sah sie ihn doch ganz unverkennbar so an, als ob sie sich ganz 
gern widerlegt sähe” (Fenitschka 39, emphasis added). The word unverkennbar [unmistakable] 
attempts to eliminate all other possible interpretations of Fenia’s behavior and disguise the 
subjective viewpoint presented here, but readers must not ignore the presence of the subjunctive 
mood followed by the als ob construction. This and similar passages that employ internal 
focalization or thought report do not reveal Fenia’s true personality or desires, but expose Max’s 
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(Mᶜ) determination to remain in a position of power and authority throughout the novella by 
seeing her as a weak, feminine ‘Other.’  
It is evident that Fenitschka features external focalization with respect to Fenia because 
the narrator has no direct access to her thoughts and feelings. Max (Mᶜ) is the focalizer of all 
perceptions. As Genette explains, however, “External focalization with respect to one character 
could sometimes just as well be defined as internal focalization through another” (191). This 
means that the ability to reveal the emotions of one character (i.e. Fenia) is limited if the text 
employs focalization through another character (i.e. Max). Consequently, external focalization 
with respect to Fenia is equivalent to internal focalization through Max. Readers only learn what 
Fenia seems to be feeling in response to her interactions with Max, but the narrative voice (Mⁿ) 
effortlessly articulates Max’s (Mᶜ) own observations, thoughts, and feelings about Fenia. In the 
following sentence, for instance, the narrator reveals a discrepancy between Max’s speech and 
his unuttered thoughts: “Während er so schön sprach, dachte er an etwas ganz andres: ‘Wer 
möchte dieser Mann sein? Ob er sie schon lange liebte?’” (Fenitschka 39-40). Despite Max’s 
(Mᶜ) apparently active engagement in his conversation with Fenia in this scene, his mind 
wanders as he becomes consumed with nagging questions about Fenia’s romantic relationship 
with her secret Russian lover. With Max as the focal character in Fenitschka, readers are invited 
to adopt his point of view and share in his struggles to understand Fenia. This greater access to 
Max’s inner life through internal focalization, direct thought report, and free indirect speech 
allows readers to ‘read’ his emotions that arise in response to his interactions with Fenia as their 
friendship progresses. 
Why would a novella that features a female title heroine named Fenia invite readers to 
adopt the perspective of its male co-protagonist? The tendency to narrate from a male viewpoint 
 98 
and convey the essence of woman as a sphinx or femme fatale was not unusual in fin-de-siècle 
literary works.5 Lou Andreas-Salomé, who wrote in her memoirs that she actually disliked her 
literary texts, criticized her own tendency to narrate from a male perspective. Biddy Martin 
notes, however, that it is precisely due to this male viewpoint that her works “succeed in 
exploring and even diagnosing masculine projections of femininity” (Woman and Modernity 
176-177). In Fenitschka, internal focalization limits the scope of narration through the figure 
Max (Mᶜ).  Through descriptions of Fenia’s physical appearance and stereotypical assessments of 
her emotions and desires, readers see Fenia through Max’s eyes. But that is not to say that the 
novella invites readers to identify uncritically with Max. The same narrative technique also 
prompts readers to question his views. Readers follow the development of Max’s thoughts and 
feelings about Fenia and become aware of his failure to understand or categorize her according 
to nineteenth-century gendered emotional codes and social mores. A discrepancy between what 
Max (Mᶜ) tells Fenia and what the narrator (Mⁿ) discloses to readers becomes apparent, as 
demonstrated above. In Fenitschka, the narration of Max’s fears, insecurities, and anger through 
internal focalization subverts his claim to authority. Consequently, the novella validates a 
plurality of affective perspectives, including the emotional style that Fenia embodies.  
3.3.2 The Co-Presence of Differing Emotional Styles 
The characterization of the novella’s co-protagonists and their perspectives on topics such as the 
women’s movement, love and marriage, and feminine shame allow us to view each figure not 
                                                 
5 Some examples of literary works that engage with this practice include: “The Sphinx Without a Secret” (1891) and 
Salomé (1893) by Oscar Wilde, “Die Fremde” (1902) by Arthur Schnitzler, and Erdgeist (1895) and Die Büchse der 
Pandora (1904) by Frank Wedekind. 
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just as a representative of his or her gender, but of different emotional styles. Max Werner and 
Fiona (Fenia) Iwánowa Betjagin have enough in common to suggest that the novella constructs 
them as parallel figures. As evident in the opening café scene in Paris, where Max and Fenia 
share the company of other “Herren und Damen,” both are members of the bourgeois 
intelligentsia (Fenitschka 7). They both earn doctorates in their respective fields, Max in 
psychology and Fenia in philosophy at the University of Zürich, and in Paris, both are outsiders. 
Max is Austrian, and Fenia hails from Moscow but has relatives living in St. Petersburg. Finally, 
Max and Fenia each has a secret romantic relationship: Max is engaged to a young woman of 
Northern German descent, and Fenia has a Russian lover who remains nameless in the novella. 
Although Fenitschka evokes the conventions of the Liebesroman at its opening, it subverts these 
expectations as the narration progresses (see Whitinger 464). Contrary to expectations, both 
romantic relationships remain only of marginal importance to the narrated events, and Max and 
Fenia’s platonic friendship and conversations increasingly become the focal point. 
The similarities and parallels between Max and Fenia also highlight their different 
orientations to late nineteenth-century bourgeois emotional codes. Numerous passages indicate 
that Max embodies late nineteenth-century bourgeois values and lives in accordance with the 
emotional codes and social mores of his gender and class. As an educated bourgeois man, he is 
comfortable in the roles of guardian and protector of feminine virtue. The thought of acting as 
Fenia’s male savior by defending her reputation, for instance, puts him in a “heitere Stimmung,” 
and he stands up and asks Fenia’s uncle with interest, “da könnte ich am Ende noch hier für 
Fenia gegen irgendeinen sibirischen Drachen zu Felde ziehen?” (Fenitschka 31). Max’s 
reference to an imagined fight with a mythical Siberian dragon points to a disconnect between 
his thoughts and reality. Typical for his scholarly training in psychology at the fin de siècle, he 
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diagnoses Fenia’s feelings of horror [Grausen], anger, and sadness as nervous overstimulation 
[“Nervenüberreizung”], thereby placing her into the role of the hysterical woman that became an 
obsession during this period (Fenitschka 44). Yet Max (Mᶜ) also responds with negative 
emotions when he feels that his masculinity or honor is threatened, as becomes evident when 
Fenia rejects his awkward attempt to seduce her in a Paris hotel: “Dann schwoll eine plötzliche 
Raserei in ihm auf, — ein blinder wütender Drang…” (Fenitschka 17). Max’s notion of love 
corresponds to the nineteenth-century bourgeois norm; he believes that it has “sozusagen die 
Tendenz zur Ehe,” an idea with which Fenia disagrees (Fenitschka 56). By contrast, Fenia’s 
definition of love is based on her own experience, but when she asks Max to explain his 
conviction that love is not true unless it leads to marriage, he can only reply sheepishly 
[kleinlaut]: “…ich hab es von andern gehört” (Fenitschka 57). In other discussions, Max tries to 
tell Fenia what she and other women should think and feel, but he again fails in his attempt to 
become an authority figure and make her conform. In summary, Max’s emotional style is based 
on a strong sense of conformity to late nineteenth-century social mores and emotional codes for 
an individual of his gender and class.  
As indicated by Max’s failed attempts to categorize her, then, Fenia does not practice the 
emotions that he expects of nineteenth-century bourgeois ladies. In fact, she rejects feminine 
shame and marital love—the emotional codes deemed appropriate for her gender and class—
because they impede her quest for self-realization. Fenia sees the experience of marital love for 
women in late nineteenth-century bourgeois society as confining and antithetical to her personal 
goals: “Nein! Ich kann es mir einfach nicht als Lebensziel vorstellen, — Heim, Familie, 
Hausfrau, Kinder, — es ist mir fremd, fremd, fremd! Vielleicht nur jetzt, — vielleicht nur in 
dieser Lebensperiode. Weiß ich’s? — Vielleicht bin ich überhaupt untauglich grade dazu. — — 
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Liebe und Ehe ist eben nicht dasselbe” (Fenitschka 56). For Fenia, love is synonymous with 
freedom and gratitude, not marriage. Unlike her cousin Nadeschda and Max’s fiancée, Irmgard, 
who both defer to the nineteenth-century emotional imperative of feminine shame, Fenia does 
not believe that she should feel ashamed or guilty on account of her clandestine relationship with 
her Russian lover. Nadeschda reacts with horror when she learns that a rumor threatens to 
damage Fenia’s reputation: “‘Mein Gott! daß du das so ruhig nehmen kannst!’ murmelte 
Nadeschda, die neben Fenia saß, und langsam ihren Kaffee schlürfte, ‘ich war ganz außer mir, 
wie ich davon erfuhr’” (Fenitschka 32). When Max (Mᶜ) imagines how Irmgard would feel if a 
rumor threatened to sully her reputation, he confirms that just the thought of such a situation 
would cause her great suffering: “Unwillkürlich versetzten Max Werners Gedanken Irmgard in 
die gleiche Lage, und er sah, wie sie schon bei der bloßen Vorstellung um vernichteten 
Mädchenruf litt und blutete” (Fenitschka 33). These passages suggest that both Nadeschda and 
Irmgard share an emotional style that is distinguished by compliance with the emotional 
imperatives of feminine shame and fear for one’s reputation. Unconcerned about how others 
judge her, Fenia, by contrast, despises the fact that social mores require her to hide her love for 
the person who makes her happiest: “Ja, es mag notwendig sein, so wie die Welt nun einmal ist, 
aber es ist das Erniedrigendste, was ich noch je gehört habe. Etwas verleugnen und verstecken 
müssen, was man aus tiefstem Herzen tut! Sich schämen, wo man jubeln sollte!” (Fenitschka 
38). Fenia objects to the double standard regulating female sexual behavior and aspires to 
express her love and happiness in her relationship as openly as men are able to do. She 
recognizes, but does not conform to, the emotional style expected of her gender and class. 
Instead, she presents an alternative to the categories and cultural narratives with which Max has 
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grown familiar by challenging the emotional imperative of feminine shame and proposing a new 
understanding of love.  
3.3.3 Max’s Bildung: From an Essentialist to a Performative Model of Emotion 
A different theoretical model of emotion corresponds to each object of narration in Fenitschka. 
Max (Mᶜ) subscribes to an essentialist model of emotion. In other words, for Max, emotions are 
natural and personal, i.e. they reflect an individual’s essence. This model ascribes certain 
characteristic emotions to a single person or an entire group of people (e.g. men, women, an 
ethnic group, a social class), and thus, it constructs a passive individual. Since it relies on fixed 
emotional attributes and implies that a person cannot act or feel contrary to their ‘essence,’ it sets 
limits on individual agency, self-realization, and social reorganization.    
The essentialist model of emotion fails to help Max (Mᶜ) understand Fenia because she 
does not display the emotional style deemed ‘natural’ for a woman of her class. He assumes, 
incorrectly, that all women desire sensation and that refined ladies must find love in marriage, 
worry about their reputations, and be capable of feeling shame. Fenia, who questions the self-
evidence of these emotional codes, represents other ways of feeling, with which Max must 
eventually come to terms.  
The narrator (Mⁿ), by contrast, does not attempt to place Fenia into fixed categories, but 
rather distances himself from Max’s (Mᶜ) essentialist view. Since the novella provides no direct  
insight into Fenia’s unuttered thoughts or feelings, readers have no reliable indication of her 
interiority. Except when she talks to Max about her dream in the fifth section of the novella (see 
Fenitschka 61-62), her identity is revealed only through her speech and behavior. By denying 
Fenia the type of interiority given to Max, the novella declines to establish a fixed identity for its 
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title heroine, who is constructed according to a performative model of emotion and whose 
emotions are, therefore, always in process. Unlike Max’s (Mᶜ) essentialist view, the performative 
model at the level of narration (Mⁿ) validates alternative ways of feeling and facilitates self-
realization. The influence of Nietzsche’s Lebensphilosophie, with its emphasis on self-creation 
and ‘becoming who you are,’6 is unmistakable in this regard. Furthermore, this shift from an 
essentialist model to a performative model that acknowledges emotional alterity constitutes 
Max’s (Mᶜ) Bildung through the course of the novella, and it is Fenia who plays the critical role 
in this development. 
3.4 THE LIMITS OF MAX’S EMOTIONAL ESSENTIALISM 
From the opening scene of Fenitschka, readers are invited to see from Max’s (Mᶜ) perspective. 
Yet already in the first section of the novella it becomes clear that this narrative gesture functions 
subversively and renders Max’s emotional essentialism suspect. After a brief description of Paris 
in September, the narrator (Mⁿ) directs the reader’s attention to Max Werner, the first character 
mentioned in the novella: “Max Werner flanierte nach Mitternacht über den Boulevard St. 
Michel, als er in eine kleine Gesellschaft ihm bekannter Familien hineingeriet” (Fenitschka 7). 
At this point in the text, the narrator does not yet reveal Max’s (Mᶜ) thoughts or feelings; instead, 
narration with external focalization traces his promenade from a theater to Café Darcourt in the 
Latin Quarter. The choice of the verb flanieren [to stroll around] associates Max with the image 
of the nineteenth-century flâneur, typically characterized as an educated idler of considerable 
                                                 
6 I refer here to §270 in Book 3 of Nietzsche’s Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft: “Was sagt dein Gewissen? – ‘Du sollst 
der werden, der du bist.’” 
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wealth and leisure.7 In addition to providing information about Max’s social status, the verb 
flanieren indicates that Max (Mᶜ) plays the role of observer in Fenitschka because, when 
employed as a literary device, the figure of the flâneur emerges as a chronicler who observes and 
comments on the sights around him. Setting up Max as the flâneur-chronicler from the outset 
allows the narrator (Mⁿ) to shift freely to internal focalization, thereby restricting what Genette 
calls the ‘field’ and compelling readers to see from Max’s (Mᶜ) perspective, not only in this 
opening scene, but also through the rest of the novella.  
After Max is established as the flâneur-chronicler, readers immediately encounter groups 
of figures who are distinguished by their social class, nationality, and, later in the scene, 
emotional expressions. French working-class men and grisettes occupy the inside of Café 
Darcourt in the Latin Quarter, while foreigners, as well as men and women of the bourgeois 
intelligentsia, including Max and Fenia, are seated outside. Max, Fenia, and their entourage 
observe the mistreatment of a grisette by working-class men and women inside the café. A 
window, an important motif that reappears later in the novella, separates the two groups. The 
narrator recounts the escalation of the situation from Max’s (Mᶜ) perspective outside the café and 
describes how the young grisette becomes the object of abuse and ridicule as “brutale[s] 
Gelächter” spreads to the other tables of working-class men and women (Fenitschka 8). Inside 
the café “schallten die rohen Stimmen laut bis zu dem Tisch draußen hinüber, an dem es ganz 
still geworden war” (Fenitschka 8). The narrator (Mⁿ) characterizes the crowds on each side of 
the café window not only based on their very different levels of noise and inebriation, but also by 
their emotional responses. In contrast to the other grisettes, who taunt their competitor “mit 
lärmender Schadenfreude,” the bourgeois ladies sitting outside react differently: “Auf den 
                                                 
7 See Walter Benjamin’s discussion of the flâneur in “Baudelaire oder die Straßen von Paris,” the sixth section of his 
essay “Paris, die Hauptstadt des XIX. Jahrhunderts” (170-184). 
 105 
Gesichtern der Damen prägten sich deutlich Mitleid, Ekel, Entrüstung und eine gewisse 
Verlegenheit darüber aus, einer solchen Situation beizuwohnen; eine von ihnen knüpfte 
furchtsam ihren Schleier fester” (Fenitschka 8, emphasis added). Here, Max ‘reads’ the emotions 
of the Damen by way of their facial expressions and gestures. The bourgeois ladies sitting 
outside the café show signs of pity for the grisette, but they are not driven to active participation. 
They simply observe the situation with a combination of disgust, embarrassment, and fear.  
Fenia, on the other hand, is filled with an intense sense of participation and empathy for 
the young woman in her state of suffering: “Jetzt aber wurde sie ganz sichtlich von einer so 
intensiven Anteilnahme erfüllt, daß sie zuletzt,—offenbar ganz unwillkürlich, wie außerstande 
länger passiv zu verharren,—sich langsam erhob und die eine Hand gegen die Lärmenden 
ausstreckte, als müsse sie eingreifen oder Halt gebieten” (Fenitschka 8-9). Fenia’s emotions, 
unlike those of the other ladies, move her to take action. The phrases “ganz sichtlich,” 
“offenbar,” “wie,” and “als müsse sie” show that Fenia’s feelings are not conveyed directly, but 
interpreted by the narrator (Mⁿ) via the character-focalizer, Max (Mᶜ). This becomes especially 
evident in the next sentence: “Im selben Augenblick ward sie sich ihrer spontanen Bewegung 
bewußt, hielt sich zurück, und errötete stark, wodurch sie plötzlich ganz lieb und kindlich, und 
ein wenig hilflos aussah” (Fenitschka 9). According to the description in the independent clause, 
Fenia’s instinctive gesture makes her blush. Given Fenia’s lack of concern for what others might 
think about her association with a grisette, I do not interpret her blushing as a sign of shame or 
embarrassment, but rather as an indication of her coming-to-consciousness of her capacity to act. 
In the relative clause beginning with wodurch, however, it becomes evident that Max (Mᶜ) 
prefers to see Fenia in a certain light: he finds her more endearing while blushing because she 
looks almost childlike, helpless, and therefore more feminine and less threatening. The character-
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focalizer (Mᶜ) is unable to preserve the image of a childlike, helpless Fenia, for the narrator goes 
on to describe the grisette’s “Stimmungswechsel,” which occurs when she catches sight of 
Fenia’s eyes, as “eine Hilfe, eine Liebkosung” (Fenitschka 9). After using internal focalization 
through Max (Mᶜ) to establish a social boundary, emphasized by the physical barrier of the 
window, the narrator (Mⁿ) describes the spontaneous gestures, smiles, and facial expressions of 
Fenia and the grisette once their gazes meet and they shake hands while standing together 
outside the café: “Einige Augenblicke lang standen sie da und lächelten einander an wie 
Schwestern, während alle verblüfft, interessiert, amüsiert um die beiden herum saßen” 
(Fenitschka 10). Fenia and the grisette are described “as sisters,” thus creating an emotional 
bond that transcends the divisions of nationality, social class, and space previously established 
through Max’s (Mᶜ) gaze. The adverbs verblüfft, interessiert, and amüsiert describe the reaction 
of the others in the crowd outside and suggest that Fenia’s intervention and this type of sisterly 
interaction between women of different social classes was unexpected and unusual.  
Fenia’s emotional response to the treatment of the grisette contrasts with that of the 
Damen, but it resonates with the concerns of some late nineteenth-century feminists, who also 
demonstrated solidarity with and compassion for prostitutes and ‘fallen’ women.8 At the fin de 
siècle, issues like Sittlichkeit, sexuality, and prostitution divided many feminists, however. While 
some railed against the sexual double standard and advocated solidarity with prostitutes and 
‘fallen’ women and girls, others associated with the Social Purity Movement and 
Sittlichkeitsvereine advanced a repressive sexual morality and campaigned for the abolition of 
prostitution.  
                                                 
8 “Frauenrechtlerinnen […] ergriffen Partei für jene ‘gefallenen’ Mädchen, die in den Augen der bürgerlichen 
Gesellschaft ihre Ehre verloren hatten, während ihre männlichen Liebhaber und Freier ungeschoren blieben” 
(Frevert, “Mann und Weib” 200). Compare Meyer-Renschhausen 116-119. 
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Inspired by the immediate social context of the nineteenth-century women’s movement 
and Social Purity Movement, Fenitschka represents dissenting views and puts them in dialogue 
through the direct speech of Max, Fenia, and the minor characters in the discussion that follows 
the encounter with the grisette. Instead of focusing on the positive outcome of Fenia’s gesture of 
friendship and solidarity, one of the ladies in the group focuses on the possible ramifications of 
her action: “Ja, chérie, eine ziemlich unerbetene und unbequeme Freundschaft! Sie könnte Ihnen 
eines schönen Tages recht peinlich werden, wenn dies Wesen Sie irgendwo auf der Straße 
wiederfindet und Sie auf das intimste begrüßt, -- zur Überraschung derer, die vielleicht mit Ihnen 
gehen” (Fenitschka 10). With this statement, the lady suggests that Fenia’s association with a 
grisette could cause her humiliation and even damage her reputation in the future. Fenia, 
however, remains unconcerned about her association with the grisette and how it could affect her 
reputation or image in her social circles. Max counters the lady’s concern, asserting instead, “die 
Französin würde es für eine schlechte Dankbarkeit halten, Sie eventuell dadurch zu 
kompromittieren. Das ist der französische Takt, -- der Takt einer alten Kultur, die allmählich bis 
in alle Schichten eines Volkes durchdringt und ihm seine fast instinktive Intelligenz gibt” 
(Fenitschka 10). According to Max, the French, even the working-class grisettes, possess a kind 
of innate sensitivity in dealing with others, a trait that he considers to be rooted deeply in the 
French people. He therefore dismisses the need for Fenia to worry about her feminine virtue, but 
he does this by referring to fixed emotional attributes. It is here that his emotional essentialism 
becomes more apparent. 
Max’s emotional essentialism is evident in his discussion of class and nationality (French 
grisettes vs. ladies of rank), in which he emphasizes distinctions in the emotional attributes of 
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these groups. From this perspective, the grisettes and the French working-class men have no 
choice but to communicate in their usual manner, i.e. sensually:  
denn Sie dürfen nicht vergessen, daß es sich dabei nur um eine diesen Wesen
 ganz geläufige Verkehrsform handelt , -- um eine so gewohnte und geläufige, daß
 sie in ihr unwillkürlich alles und jedes zum Ausdruck bringen, auch
 Seelenregungen der Freundschaft, Dankbarkeit oder Sympathie, die in die
 sinnliche Äußerungsform nicht genau hineinpassen. Es ist eben ihre Art von
 Sprache geworden. (Fenitschka 11, emphasis added) 
Through the expressions “Verkehrsform” and “ihre Art von Sprache” Max (Mᶜ) emphasizes the 
communicative function of emotions. Because these forms of social interaction have become so 
common for the French working-class people, Max argues, they should not be questioned. 
Verkehrsform, which appears twice in Max’s direct speech, brings to light his reductive, 
essentialist understanding of emotions and focus on eroticism: he assumes that the French 
grisettes express all emotions [Seelenregungen] with their sensuality, even feelings as different 
as friendship, gratitude, and sympathy. Additionally, the repetition of Verkehrsform draws 
readers’ attention to Max’s later claims to knowledge about women’s desires, sexual or 
otherwise. Max argues that it is rarer for refined ladies of his own class to show the ‘emotions of 
their gender.’ That is, he maintains that bourgeois and aristocratic women tend to hide their 
sensuality and real desires behind a mask: “Unsre Mädchen und Frauen werden so daran 
gewöhnt, mit den Männern ihrer Umgebung eine rein konventionelle, ganz unsinnliche 
Verkehrsform zu üben, daß sie in dieser Sprache auch das noch ausdrücken, was ganz und gar 
nicht so abstrakt gemeint ist” (Fenitschka 12). Max (Mᶜ) assumes that all women feel the same 
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and that these emotions cannot be changed, only expressed or repressed. According to this 
essentialist view, the individual remains passive vis-à-vis his or her emotions.  
This opening scene of the novella highlights two shortcomings of the essentialist model 
of emotion represented by Max. First, his view permits injustices to continue because it considers 
certain social practices, like the ridicule and shaming of the grisette in the café, normative and 
characteristic of certain sociocultural groups. Like Max, Fenia recognizes the communicative 
value of emotions as social signifiers, yet she firmly disagrees with Max’s belief that the 
grisettes express everything in the form of their sensuality or eroticism when she stresses the 
following: “wenn es auch ihnen die gewohnteste Sprache ist, worin sie alles und jedes 
ausdrücken,—alle Menschen haben verschiedene Bezeichnungen für total verschiedene Dinge” 
(Fenitschka 12). Unlike Max’s judgment about emotions, Fenia’s view resists 
oversimplifications and generalizations. She sees beyond the grisette’s surface expression of 
sensuality in her communication patterns and senses that she longs for something more: “O ich 
denke mir, ein solches armes Ding muß nach einer freundlichen, einfach menschlichen 
Berührung lechzen” (Fenitschka 11). Both in speech and in action, Fenia’s character challenges 
Max’s emotional essentialism and the practice of blindly adhering to the social and emotional 
codes deemed normative for certain sociocultural groups. Her empathetic gesture in the Paris 
café overcomes the rigid construction of spatial and social boundaries. This is not to say that the 
novella proposes compassion or solidarity as a solution to all social problems, but by exposing 
double standards and declining to conform to nineteenth-century gendered emotional codes and 
social mores, its title heroine opens new lines of communication and possibilities for alternate 
ways of feeling.   
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The second shortcoming of Max’s (Mᶜ) essentialist view is that his explanations fail him 
whenever he attempts to categorize Fenia based on the emotional style of women like Irmgard, 
Nadeschda, and the Damen. Fenia’s social class places her into Max’s second category, with the 
ladies of rank, who supposedly conceal their true feelings and sensuality as if wearing masks. 
But Fenia puzzles Max because she communicates her thoughts and feelings openly without fear 
or shame: “Dieser Grad von Unbefangenheit, womit sie über so heikle Dinge mit einem ihr ganz 
fremden Manne sprach, hier, in Paris, in der Nacht, in diesem Café, -- und dabei ein Ausdruck in 
ihren Mienen, als unterhielten sie sich über fremdländische Käfer. Waren Grisetten, junge 
Männer, Nachtcafés und Liebesabenteuer ihr wirklich dermaßen fremdländische Käfer?” 
(Fenitschka 11). Thought report in this passage reveals Max’s (Mᶜ) surprise and unease that 
Fenia can speak so freely with him about such sensitive subjects and with a serene expression on 
her face. After analyzing her black, nun-like clothing and comparing her with pre-Raphaelite 
figures, whose seductive surroundings in paintings betray their virtuous appearance, Max 
assumes that Fenia is wearing “eine höchst kluge und gelungene Maske,” and, like the ladies of 
rank, wants to hide her feminine sensuality (Fenitschka 13).  
 Max’s (Mᶜ) essentialist model of emotion cannot account for complexity and diversity, 
only the status quo. Max is drawn to Fenia, yet he cannot understand or categorize her. His 
simultaneous attraction to and uncertainty about her serve to express how late nineteenth-century 
European bourgeois society perceived ‘Others’ who rejected bourgeois ideals and values. Figures 
such as the New Woman, femme fatale, decadent, and dandy were viewed with both interest and 
suspicion (compare Ledger 22-25). They exemplified values and ways of feeling that challenged 
late nineteenth-century bourgeois emotional codes and social mores. Despite some of the 
apprehension they released, however, these figures also became objects of fascination and were 
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commonly depicted in fin-de-siècle art and literature. As a New Woman-like figure, then, Fenia 
introduces an emotional style that contrasts with the women in her social circles. Her new 
emotional style, which understands emotions as performative or in process, in fact allows her to 
move more freely between sociocultural groups, as already evident here in her interactions with 
the Damen, Max, and the French grisette. 
3.5 CREATING SPACE FOR DIFFERENT EMOTIONS 
If the novella subverts Max’s (Mᶜ) perspective and emotional essentialism, it does not, therefore, 
simply suggest that men have it all wrong and women have it all right. Andreas-Salomé 
recognized that the genders do not understand each other, and the Paris hotel scene, an early 
turning point in the novella, reflects this by depicting the misunderstanding between Fenia and 
Max. Instead, Fenitschka subverts Max’s male gaze and emotional essentialism in order to 
destabilize widely held cultural narratives of the day and open the door for self-realization and a 
plurality of emotional styles.  
After leaving Café Darcourt, the Herren und Damen stop at the restaurant “Chien qui 
fume,” where Max learns about Fenia’s background and education from a Russian reporter 
acquainted with her family. The gentlemen escort the ladies back home after dinner, and Max 
becomes responsible for accompanying Fenia back to her hotel. During their early morning 
promenade, Max and Fenia discuss women’s education, an issue of central importance in public 
discourse of the time. Max, who has just completed his doctoral studies, cannot imagine why a 
woman would want to study and subject herself to such misery. Fenia, by contrast, considers 
education liberating: “wenn irgendetwas in der Welt einer Befreiung gleicht, so ist es das 
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Geistesstudium” (Fenitschka 14). According to Max, if a woman truly experiences education as 
something emancipating that she can pursue with her whole self [“mit dem ganzen Willen, dem 
ganzen Menschen”] and passionately [“voll von Gemütsbewegungen”] as Fenia claims, it is only 
because women lag centuries behind men: “‘Ja, wissen Sie denn, was das beweisen würde, wenn 
es wirklich so ist?’ fragte er ärgerlich und studierte dabei mit verliebtem Wohlgefallen den 
Ansatz des braunen Haares an ihren Schläfen, der eine reizende kleine Linie bildete; ‘es beweist 
einfach, daß Ihr Geschlecht zurück ist, daß es da lebt, wo wir vor Jahrhunderten standen’” 
(Fenitschka 15, emphasis added). Fenia’s support for women’s education and her positive 
assessment of her own experience as doctoral student anger Max because this challenges the 
gender roles with which he is familiar. He responds by making a distinction between men [wir] 
and women [Ihr Geschlecht] who study and uses this rupture to declare male dominance and 
superiority, while minimizing the enthusiasm and efforts of Fenia and women in general. Even if 
historical readers were inclined to sympathize with Max’s position and oppose the fin-de-siècle 
women’s education movement, Max’s (Mᶜ) own emotional response is impossible to ignore. The 
narrative techniques of internal focalization, free indirect speech, and thought report expose his 
anger, attraction to Fenia, and insecurities, all of which contribute to the subversion of his claims 
to authority.  
Anxious to comprehend Fenia, Max takes a detour that leads further away from her hotel 
in order to extend their time together. Fenia would like a cup of coffee, but since the cafés are 
not yet ready to serve customers, Max proposes that they stop by the dining room at his hotel, 
which is conveniently nearby. Fenia’s willingness to join him “…irritierte ihn beinahe. Die mit 
ihr durchwachte Nacht hatte seine verliebte Neugier bis zu nervöser Erregung aufgereizt [...] 
Eine Art von stiller Wut kam über ihn, seine Unklarheit über dieses Mädchen quälte ihn” 
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(Fenitschka 16, emphasis added). Free indirect style again reveals Max’s private thoughts and 
feelings in this passage, in which his amorous curiosity turns into nervous agitation, then silent 
rage and torment. A hydraulic model of emotion informs the narration of Max’s emotions in 
these sentences. His building anger and nervous irritation give the impression that he is about to 
explode. He is depicted as having relatively little control over his feelings, and the sentence 
structure in the passage reflects this. The sleepless night [“Die mit ihr durchwachte Nacht”], as 
the subject of the sentence, is held responsible for transforming Max’s simple curiosity about 
Fenia into nervous excitation. Furthermore, he does not become angry, but rage sweeps over him 
[“stiller Wut kam über ihn”] (Fenitschka 16). Emotions happen to Max. They are not phenomena 
that he can control because, as the Paris café scene suggests, he views emotions as natural and 
unchangeable. This effect of the narration actually shifts responsibility away from Max and 
draws attention to the instinctive appearance of emotions. Because Fenitschka constructs Max 
(Mᶜ) as passive in relation to his emotions, I argue that the text does not simply criticize him as a 
representative of men in general. Instead, it exposes the deep-rooted cultural narratives that many 
in late nineteenth-century bourgeois society perceived as natural and enduring.  
Yet neither does Max (Mᶜ) escape criticism—the narrator (Mⁿ) playfully subverts his 
view on numerous occasions. After two paragraphs report Max’s (Mᶜ) thoughts and emotions as 
they arise using free indirect style, the narrator (Mⁿ) adopts a stance that highlights the 
dissimilarity between his perspective and Max’s (Mᶜ): “Ach, er war noch sehr jung damals! Die 
Weiber taxierte er ganz besonders noch ziemlich falsch, weil er Angst hatte, für einen 
leichtgläubigen Dummkopf gehalten zu werden” (Fenitschka 16-17). Here, the narrator effects a 
transition out of internal focalization and thought report in order to inform readers that the 
narrated events occurred in Max’s distant past, when he was young and foolish. These statements 
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are subversive because they draw readers’ attention to Max’s (Mᶜ) fear and insecurity and admit 
that he had judged women, especially intellectual women like Fenia, harshly and incorrectly. At 
the same time, however, the narrator shows some understanding for Max because the comments 
attribute his emotions and behavior to youthful folly. These statements, which again raise the 
question of the narrator’s identity, confirm the presence of a narrator who retrospectively 
narrates with knowledge of Max’s unexpressed thoughts and emotions, but with critical distance 
from his way of seeing. This suggests that the narrator of Fenitschka is Max himself, but a 
matured Max who has left behind his essentializing gaze so that he can now reflect more fairly 
on his encounters with Fenia. 
Despite its surface understanding of Max, this scene also successfully undermines 
nineteenth-century bourgeois emotional codes and dominant cultural narratives in order to make 
room for new emotional styles. Genre markers that appear in earlier scenes (e.g. conversations 
about feminine sensuality, signs of Max’s attraction to Fenia, and Fenia’s agreement to follow 
Max to his hotel), give the impression that Fenitschka will turn out to be a typical Liebesroman 
(compare Whitinger 467-468). At the hotel, Max nervously tries to seduce Fenia, to which she 
responds “Wie schade!” (Fenitschka 17). Fenia’s reaction, which immediately halts the 
possibility of any romance narrative developing between the two, sends Max into a rage. A 
“blinder wütender Drang” overcomes him and, only half conscious of his actions, he locks the 
door and puts the key in his pocket so that Fenia cannot escape (Fenitschka 17). At first, she does 
not know how to extricate herself from this threatening situation, and, in her moment of 
hesitation, the narrator reports that she appears helpless and childlike: “Einen Augenblick lang 
war etwas Hilfloses und Hilfeheischendes über ihrer ganzen Gestalt, wie über einem im Wald 
verirrten Kind” (Fenitschka 18). The narration of Max’s violent emotions [“eine plötzliche 
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Raserei,” “ein blinder wütender Drang”] and Fenia’s defenselessness in this scene, which 
functions as an early highpoint of the novella, may lead readers to expect that the subverted 
Liebesroman will turn into a story of rape. The narrator’s (Mⁿ) repetition of “einen Augenblick” 
(“for a moment”), however, emphasizes the transitory nature of Fenia’s helplessness: “Nur einen 
Augenblick. Dann siegte ein andres Gefühl. Ihr Blick lief an ihm hinab, und ihre Lippen wölbten 
sich in einem unaussprechlich beredten Ausdruck des Ekels – der Verachtung –” (Fenitschka 18, 
emphasis added). Here, the verb siegen already points toward a different outcome. It indicates 
that a new, active emotion [“ein andres Gefühl”] helps Fenia overcome her passivity and 
transforms her expression of vulnerability into one of disgust [“Ausdruck des Ekels – der 
Verachtung –”]. For Fenia, the transition from a passive to an active emotion is empowering. She 
does not resort to violence or aggression after witnessing Max’s alarming behavior, yet her 
unexpected emotional response of disgust and contempt rather than fear changes the direction of 
the narrative, renders Max powerless, and leads him to hand over the key.9   
 Internal focalization through Max is incomplete at the end of the Paris hotel scene. Here, 
readers encounter the only detailed description of Max’s physical appearance in the entire 
novella, just as Fenia leaves the hotel in a carriage, with Max remaining behind: “Max Werner 
stand auf dem Straßendamm und fuhr mechanisch, mit düsterem Gesicht, nach seinem Kopf, um 
den Hut zu lüften – der nicht darauf saß” (Fenitschka 20). The sudden shift of focus to Max’s 
external appearance does not correspond to a reversal of Max’s gaze in this passage, as one critic 
                                                 
9 A similar misunderstanding transpired between Lou Andreas-Salomé and Frank Wedekind in Paris and provided 
the inspiration for this episode of Fenitschka. Andreas-Salomé reflects briefly upon the encounter in her 
autobiography: “Fast am meisten bin ich in Paris mit Frank Wedekind zusammen gewesen. Späterhin. Denn 
zunächst, nachdem wir uns bei der ungarischen Gräfin Nemethy kennengelernt und erst mit den andern vor 
Morgengrauen im Zwiebelsuppen-Restaurant gegenüber ‘Les Halles’ unsere eifrigen Gespräche geendet, kam es 
hinterher zwischen uns zu einem Wedekindschen Mißverständnis, das er mit rührender Offenheit, ohne geringste 
Selbstbeschönigung, andern weitererzählte (und das ich gelegentlich als Novellenfüllung literarisch ebenfalls 
verarbeitet habe)” (Lebensrückblick 100). 
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has suggested (compare Allen 483). As Genette acknowledged, “internal focalization is rarely 
applied in a totally rigorous way. Indeed, the very principle of this narrative mode implies in all 
strictness that the focal character never be described or even referred to from the outside, and 
that his thoughts or perceptions never be analyzed objectively by the narrator” (192). This scene 
in Fenitschka serves as an example of what Genette describes. Although the novella features 
internal focalization through Max, like most other narratives in this mode, it does not employ 
internal focalization in any strict sense. Max (Mᶜ) is referred to by name throughout the novella, 
and the narrator (Mⁿ) interrupts strict internal focalization by commenting on Max’s emotions 
and behavior. The last two paragraphs of Section One of the novella feature external focalization, 
which means that the narrator provides no insight into Max’s or Fenia’s private thoughts or 
feelings. Here, a higher-level narrator (Mⁿ), the same one who intervened earlier to attribute 
Max’s behavior to the errors of his youth, describes only the physical appearance and 
expressions of the two characters as they part.  
The question that I find more interesting to ask about this scene is who speaks in the 
following passage:  
Aber konnte sie den Garçon herbeiläuten und sich von ihm zu dieser 
Stunde in dieser Stube mit dem Fremden finden lassen? – Und in den Hof 
hinunterspringen konnte sie ja doch auch nicht. –  
      Sie richtete ihre Augen, tief erschrocken, groß und fragend, auf ihn, grade 
  als frage sie ihn danach, was nun zu tun sei. Einen Augenblick lang war etwas 
  Hilfloses und Hilfeheischendes über ihrer ganzen Gestalt, wie über einem im 
  Wald verirrten Kind. – Aber nur einen Augenblick. Dann siegte ein andres  
  Gefühl. (Fenitschka 18) 
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One could argue that the first paragraph uses free indirect style to narrate Fenia’s thoughts, but 
the general nature of these reflections about Fenia’s options makes it more likely that these 
comments originate from the extradiegetic-homodiegetic narrative voice of Max (Mⁿ). In the 
second paragraph, the narration of Fenia’s emotions is limited to comments made by an outside 
observer with no immediate access to her interiority. The narrator interprets her emotions based 
on external cues, as demonstrated by the subjunctive [“als frage sie ihn danach, was nun zu tun 
sei”] and the use of simile [“wie über einem im Wald verirrten Kind”]. If we compare this 
passage to the one in which Max (Mᶜ) perceives Fenia as passive and childlike in Café Darcourt, 
it becomes apparent that he does not function as a character-focalizer here. “Dann siegte ein 
andres Gefühl” shows that the narrator (Mⁿ) sympathizes with Fenia, not Max. The verb siegen 
denotes a triumph and applies to Fenia’s changing emotions and capacity to act. At that moment, 
the character-focalizer Max (Mᶜ) would hardly use the verb siegen because, for him, Fenia’s 
rejection leads to embarrassment and defeat.  
A comparison of the narration of Max’s and Fenia’s emotions reveals the two different 
emotional models that construct the figures: an essentialist model (Max) and a performative 
model (Fenia). The narration of Max’s emotions through internal focalization, free indirect 
speech, and thought report makes his interiority accessible to readers. By revealing his 
frustration, rage, and insecurities at key moments, the novella subverts his views and claims to 
knowledge and experience. Max (Mᶜ) is portrayed as largely passive vis-à-vis his emotions. In 
his Paris hotel room, for example, his emotions build up until they demand release, at which 
point he loses control and stands “zitternd vor Erregung über sie [Fenia] geneigt, ganz nahe über 
ihrem Gesicht, und im Begriff, sie mit beiden Armen zu umfassen” (Fenitschka 17, emphasis 
added). The verb umfassen used here is significant. It refers not only to Max’s attempt to 
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embrace Fenia but also to his efforts to fully comprehend or contain her, both alternative 
meanings of the polysemous verb fassen. Indeed, Fenia cannot be pinned down, because she 
lacks the interiority given to Max; the narrator (Mⁿ) only tells how her emotions appear. Fenia is 
not constructed according to an essentialist model. Her emotions, like her identity, are always in 
flux, and, for this reason, she embodies a performative model of emotion. Rather than 
conforming to the nineteenth-century emotional style of other women of her class, Fenia’s 
character problematizes these and makes room for new emotional styles, both in speech and in 
her narrated actions. 
3.6 CONFLICTING CULTURAL NARRATIVES OF LOVE 
Fenitschka exposes the fact that widely circulated cultural narratives and images reinforced 
certain nineteenth-century emotional practices, particularly those related to romantic love, 
masculine honor, and feminine shame, and made them seem self-evident. This holds especially 
true for popular nineteenth-century bourgeois cultural narratives of love. Walking through the 
streets of St. Petersburg, Fenia and Max stop to admire an illustration of Mikhail Lermontov’s 
famous poem “Demon” (1829-1839) on display in a shop window. Fenia smiles as she 
contemplates the illustration and performs an improvised German translation of the lines from 
the Russian poem, which describes Tamara’s temptation by the demon:  
  Zur Höhe des Himmels will ich mich heben,  
  Zur Tiefe des Meeres senke ich mich,  
  Alles Irdische will ich dir geben!  
  Nur liebe mich! liebe mich! (Fenitschka 28) 
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After Fenia’s recitation, a tension between two opposing views of love emerges: love as demonic 
versus love as the expression of freedom and gratitude. For Max, the painting depicts the reality 
of love as demonic, and he assumes that Fenia imagines love in this manner: “‘Rechte Bilder für 
ein junges Mädchen,’ bemerkte er, ‘haben Sie sich nicht auch die Liebe sehr dämonisch 
vorgestellt?’” (Fenitschka 28). He assumes that all Russian girls who have encountered such 
cultural images must view love as romantic and demonic. He then uses the third-person plural 
pronoun ihr [you] to group women together as one indistinguishable whole and insists that 
women all want the same thing in a romantic relationship, i.e. sensation: “Aber doch wohl noch 
etwas andres erwartet ihr davon: die große Sensation des Lebens, glauben Sie nicht?” 
(Fenitschka 29). As in the Paris café, Max (Mᶜ) makes generalizations about women’s emotions 
and desires based on gender stereotypes, which impede any true understanding.  
In contrast to Max, Fenia sees beyond this widely promoted cultural narrative about love 
and sexuality. She recognizes the popularity of such Russian cultural icons, which she 
remembers from her childhood: “Diese Bilder treffen Sie hier in allen Häusern, — 
Photographien, Gipsstatuetten. — Ich entsinne mich ihrer so gut aus meiner Kindheit, auch wir 
besaßen sie zu Hause. Est ist traulich, sie wiederzusehen” (Fenitschka 28). Although the word 
“traulich” suggests that seeing the Lermontov illustrations again is a welcome reminder of 
Fenia’s native culture and childhood in Russia, they also remain a distant memory for her, and 
her idea of love no longer derives from them. She instead sees love as that which sustains life 
and compares it to other basic human needs: “Ich würde sie [Liebe] dann sicher mit den Dingen 
vergleichen, die am allerwenigsten dämonisch und romantisch sind. Mit dem guten gesegneten 
Brot [...] mit dem frischen erhaltenden Luftstrom...” (Fenitschka 29). Love is neither scandalous 
nor threatening according to Fenia’s view. This fluid experience of love (Luftstrom) allows her to 
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achieve a greater sense of peace and freedom. Fenia’s concept and practice of the emotion 
contrasts with Max’s assumption that she and all Russian girls regard love as romantic and 
demonic. Romantic love, when imagined as demonic, invites distinctions between vice and 
virtue and thus perpetuates sexual double standards and the virtuous-fallen woman trope. As an 
educated woman of Russian aristocratic descent, Fenia is not unaware of gendered emotional 
codes and sexual mores, but she calls these and popular cultural images into question and insists 
that an individual should have the freedom to determine his or her own emotions, views of love, 
and ways of being. The novella, which juxtaposes Fenia’s and Max’s cultural perceptions and 
personal experiences of feelings of love, ultimately normalizes the emotion by offering Fenia’s 
view as an alternative to the interpretation of romantic love and sexuality popularized in cultural 
narratives. 
3.7 SUBVERTING THE MALE GAZE AND FEMININE SHAME 
Although Fenitschka critiques sexual double standards and the virtuous-fallen woman trope in its 
consideration of the emotion love, it does so even more persuasively through its treatment of 
feminine shame. Shame was the emotion that aristocratic and bourgeois women were expected to 
feel in the nineteenth century and was regarded as the counterpart to the cult of masculine honor 
(see Frevert, Vergängliche Gefühle 17-27). Aristocratic and bourgeois women were obliged to 
feel fear in response to anything that could damage their feminine virtue, which was based solely 
on sexual purity, and to feel shame in the event of a misstep or impropriety. In Fenitschka, the 
subversion of Max’s (Mᶜ) essentializing gaze in particular calls into question this nineteenth-
century emotional imperative of feminine shame. Internal focalization allows readers to see from 
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his perspective, but thought report reveals just how strongly gendered emotional codes affect his 
assessment of Fenia and himself. 
At the family’s Russian estate, Uncle Mischa warns Fenia about a rumor alleging that 
people spotted her in St. Petersburg with an unknown man late one evening. The uncle, Fenia’s 
cousins, and Max all express deep concern for her reputation. At this point, Max is still unaware 
that Fenia has a Russian lover. After comparing her with his fiancée, Irmgard, Max (Mᶜ) realizes 
that Fenia finds her family’s concern embarrassing and despises being treated “wie 
zerbrechliches Glaszeug” (Fenitschka 33). Nonetheless, Max gives credence to the emotional 
imperative of feminine shame (as practiced by Irmgard, Nadeschda, and the Damen), which also 
alters his perception of Fenia. The narrator carefully describes Max’s (Mᶜ) observations through 
internal focalization while Fenia stands in front of a window with her back turned to the others in 
the room:  
 Irgend etwas trieb ihn, sich ihre ein wenig gezwungene Haltung gelöst zu denken, 
  passiv geworden, -- er meinte vor sich zu sehen, wie ihre Hände den Vorhang 
  zusammenfassen und vor das Gesicht ziehen, -- wie der Kopf sich tiefer und tiefer 
  herabneigt in die schweren tiefrotschimmernden Falten, -- wie der Rücken  
  gebeugt ist, -- die Schultern weiche, gleitende Linien bekommen, -- bis die ganze 
  Gestalt in sich gesunken dasteht und, das Antlitz im Vorhang geborgen, weint. -- 
  (Fenitschka 34) 
In the narration that follows, readers discover that Max’s (Mᶜ) vision of Fenia’s passivity and 
tears was simply an illusion. She turns around and proves to be “ein Bild sorgloser Gesundheit 
und lächelnder Freude” (Fenitschka 35). Unlike her cousin Nadeschda and Max’s fiancée 
Irmgard, Fenia expresses neither shame nor concern for her reputation. It is secrecy that she 
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cannot tolerate. She wishes that she could share her secret with the world and openly proclaim 
her happiness and sense of peace in her relationship. Just as Fenia offers an alternative to the 
image of love as demonic, she also questions the emotional imperative of shame: “Ja, es mag 
notwendig sein, so wie die Welt nun einmal ist,10 aber es ist das Erniedrigendste, was ich noch je 
gehört habe. Etwas verleugnen und verstecken müssen, was man aus tiefstem Herzen tut! Sich 
schämen, wo man jubeln sollte!” (Fenitschka 38, emphasis added). The recurrent motif of the 
window has again become a symbol of social constraints and Fenia’s efforts to overcome them. 
An analysis of Max’s (Mᶜ) false vision shows that he sees Fenia in terms of nineteenth-
century gendered emotional codes and reads her emotions on her body. His perception proves to 
be less of a passive ‘looking,’ however, and more of an active ‘gazing.’ Narration through the 
‘male gaze’ suggests that Max’s vision of Fenia becoming limp, collapsing into the curtains, and 
weeping corresponds to popular cultural narratives and reflects how he would like to see her: as a 
weak, passive woman in need of his protection. Fenia’s alternate concept of love and rejection of 
feelings of feminine shame present a challenge for Max (Mᶜ). While his vision contrasts with 
reality, it preserves the illusion that she also embodies the emotional style of the other refined 
ladies in his social circles.  
As in Effi Briest, the emotions of feminine shame and masculine honor are intimately 
related in Fenitschka. Ideals of masculine honor still commonly held by aristocratic and 
bourgeois men at the fin de siècle influence Max’s understanding of himself. When he first learns 
that a rumor about Fenia is circulating in St. Petersburg, he enthusiastically offers to defend her 
                                                 
10 Max and Fenia’s discussion here recalls similar ones in Theodor Fontane’s Irrungen, Wirrungen (1888) and Effi 
Briest (1895): “Die Sitte gilt und muss gelten, aber daß sie’s muß, ist mitunter hart (Fontane, Dichter über ihre 
Dichtungen 364). “[D]ie Dinge verlaufen nicht, wie wir wollen, sondern wie die andern wollen. … unser 
Ehrenkultus ist ein Götzendienst, aber wir müssen uns ihm unterwerfen, solange der Götze gilt” (Fontane, Effi Briest 
280). 
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reputation: “da könnte ich am Ende noch hier für Fenia gegen irgendeinen sibirischen Drachen 
zu Felde ziehen?” (Fenitschka 31). Max demonstrates willingness to fight for Fenia, even though 
dueling, which was gradually becoming an outdated practice in fin-de-siècle Europe, could only 
restore masculine honor, not feminine virtue. His mention of a mythical Siberian dragon not only 
exposes his vision as removed from reality, but also indicates his desire to pursue heroic 
masculinity. The phrase “Irgend etwas trieb ihn…” attributes the source of Max’s vision to an 
unknown or unconscious impulse or drive. This suggests that the nineteenth-century emotional 
practices of masculine honor and feminine shame have become so ingrained in Max that they 
seem natural and unquestionable and, therefore, shape his perception. This becomes especially 
evident in a later passage in which internal focalization and thought report depict Max’s inner 
struggle to resist seeing Fenia in gendered terms: “Warum nur? Warum hatte er in beiden Fällen 
ihr Wesen so typisch genommen, so grob fixiert? fragte er sich. Es war ganz merkwürdig, wie 
schwer es fiel, die Frauen in ihrer reinmenschlichen Mannigfaltigkeit aufzufassen, und nicht 
immer nur von der Geschlechtsnatur aus, nicht immer nur halb schematisch” (Fenitschka 36).  
Although this passage shows that Max (Mᶜ) has begun to recognize his inclination to define 
Fenia as a type or attribute to her a fixed identity based on her gender, the repetition of the 
interrogative [Warum nur? Warum…] and the expression “wie schwer es fiel” emphasize that 
resisting these tendencies does not come effortlessly. 
Fenia’s perceptive gaze contrasts sharply with Max’s (Mᶜ) “gewaltsame Vereinfachung” 
and reluctance to accept alternate ways of feeling (Fenitschka 36). Although the novella’s mode 
of narration never allows readers to assume Fenia’s perspective, the narrator describes her gaze 
using internal focalization through Max: “An Fenia fielen ihm [Max] nur die intelligenten 
braunen Augen auf, die jeden Gegenstand eigentümlich seelenoffen und klar -- und jeden 
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Menschen wie einen Gegenstand – anschauten…” (Fenitschka 8). I do not interpret “wie einen 
Gegenstand” [like an object] to be a negative qualification in this case but simply to mean 
gender-neutral, which contrasts with Max’s (Mᶜ) gendered perception (compare Allen 484). The 
adjectives seelenoffen and klar carry positive connotations and suggest that Fenia’s perception is 
not based on rigid methods of classification, but resists emotional essentialism and aims for a 
deeper understanding of others, as evident in the Paris café scene.  
3.8 “SIE WOLLTE ES SO”: ACKNOWLEDGING FENIA’S AGENCY 
How readers understand Lou Andreas-Salomé’s Fenitschka as a whole depends on its final scene 
and open ending. At the end of the novella, Fenia decides to free herself by rejecting her lover’s 
marriage proposal and returning to her “ganz andre Existenz” as a young intellectual (Fenitschka 
66). Yet she finds it impossible to part from the man whom she loves. Since she cannot bring 
herself to say goodbye, Fenia promises her lover that she will return to him after a few days. A 
break in the narration reveals the final outcome of their relationship, however: “[Fenia] hatte sich 
in dieser Stunde für immer von ihm getrennt—getrennt aus einem unerträglichen Zwiespalt 
heraus, in den sie mit sich selbst geraten war, aber sie dankte ihm…” (Fenitschka 66). In 
choosing to be alone, Fenia preserves her independence and ability to determine her own path, 
but her expressions of thankfulness toward her lover—“Ich danke dir! ich danke dir!”—recall 
that, for her, love means peace, gratitude, and freedom. Max, who overhears the conversation 
during their final meeting from the other room, also sees Fenia for the last time. He enters the 
room after her lover leaves, and the narrator recounts how he observes Fenia standing in front of 
the window before he silently departs and returns to Germany to meet Irmgard: “Sie wendete 
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ihm den Rücken zu. Mit den Händen hatte sie in die Vorhänge hineingefaßt und ihr Gesicht darin 
verborgen. Er sah nur die gebeugte Rückenlinie, und es durchfuhr ihn das Gefühl, als hätte er 
dies alles schon einmal erlebt —. Aber er hatte nur in seiner Phantasie Fenia schon einmal 
trauernd und gebeugt gesehen” (Fenitschka 66-67). This image, which recalls Max’s (Mᶜ) earlier 
impression of Fenia staring out the window and weeping at her uncle’s estate, again features 
internal focalization through Max. Fenia’s back is turned, and readers do not learn her final 
thoughts, feelings, or expressions. This recurring motif of Fenia looking out a window, which 
calls to mind Caspar David Friedrich’s Frau am Fenster (1822) and Gustave Caillebotte’s 
double portrait Intérieur, femme à la fenêtre (1880), expresses a sober consciousness of the real 
social limitations that women still faced around 1900. 
 
Figure 2. Caspar David Friedrich, Frau am Fenster 
(1822) 
 
Figure 3. Gustave Caillebotte, Intérieur, femme à la 
fenêtre (1880) 
 
At the same time, it also points toward future possibilities that lie on the horizon of a modern 
world. The open ending has the effect that no single solution is foreclosed. Fenia is neither 
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demonized nor commended for her decision. Instead, Fenitschka leaves its ending open to 
various interpretations and invites readers to continue the dialogue that occupies the center of the 
novella.  
As discussed in the introduction to this chapter, readers who focus on Fenia’s dilemma 
will likely wonder about her emotional state in the final scene. Such readers may be inclined to 
ask: Is Fenia happy to have freedom to pursue her intellectual aspirations? Or is she acting 
against her ‘true feminine nature’ and denying her desire to love because such love is not 
possible in her world outside the bonds of marriage? Does Max’s feeling of déjà vu suggest that 
the illusion he experienced weeks before has now become reality, or does the expression “aber 
nur in seiner Phantasie” dismiss this possibility altogether?  
Readers who pay more attention to Max’s struggles throughout the novella, however, 
might ask different questions: Does Max experience growth or change by the end of the novella? 
Will he continue to judge others, especially women like Fenia, according to rigid categories? 
Since he is anxious to return to Irmgard and read “das Geständnis ihrer Liebe aufs Neue aus den 
Augen und von den Lippen” (Fenitschka 58), can he only find comfort in a relationship that does 
not challenge his understanding of nineteenth-century gendered emotional codes and social 
mores? 
What largely deflects these types of questions, I find, is a careful reading of the novella’s 
last lines, particularly the final sentence as it pertains to both figures: “Zwei Tage später reiste er 
aus Rußland fort, ohne Fenitschka wiedergesehen zu haben. Sie wollte es so” (Fenitschka 67). 
This unassuming final sentence does not merely indicate that Max has fulfilled Fenia’s last 
request by departing without taking notice of her [“Aber wenn du hier wieder durchgehst, ― 
beachte mich nicht”] (Fenitschka 64). “Sie wollte es so” expresses Max’s acceptance of Fenia’s 
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agency and striving for self-realization. A reconsideration of his final encounter with Fenia is 
revealing: “Sie wendete ihm den Rücken zu. Mit den Händen hatte sie in die Vorhänge 
hineingefaßt und ihr Gesicht darin verborgen. Er sah nur die gebeugte Rückenlinie, und es 
durchfuhr ihn das Gefühl, als hätte er dies alles schon einmal erlebt —. Aber er hatte nur in 
seiner Phantasie Fenia schon einmal trauernd und gebeugt gesehen” (Fenitschka 66-67). 
Although Max is still the character-focalizer in this passage, he resists his usual tendency to read 
Fenia’s emotions on her body and project his desires onto her. The narrator (Mⁿ) reports that 
Max (Mᶜ) only sees the slight bend of Fenia’s back—he does not try to interpret her posture or 
make assumptions about her emotional state based on how nineteenth-century social mores 
determine that she ‘should’ feel in this situation.  
The last sentences also indicate that the narrative voice, Max (Mⁿ), who reflects upon his 
friendship with Fenia after their parting, has accepted her and grown to understand himself in 
relation to her. His resistance to projecting emotions onto Fenia and assertion of her agency 
suggest that he recognizes her individuality and complexity and does not expect her to conform 
to nineteenth-century social mores and gender roles. He abandons the attempt to determine who 
Fenia ‘is’ because she cannot be pinned down, but is always in the process of becoming. Max’s 
(Mᶜ) Bildung is attested to by this shift from an essentialist to a performative model of emotion, 
as well as by his acceptance of Fenia and her pursuit of self-realization.  
The idea that Max (Mⁿ) has come to terms with Fenia presents a new way of reading the 
novella’s unpretentious title, Fenitschka. As the Russian diminutive of Fiona or Fenia, 
Fenitschka signifies a bond of friendship between the narrator (Mⁿ) and the title heroine. This is, 
of course, not an invention of Andreas-Salomé’s, but a custom in Russian literature to use the 
diminutive forms of Russian names to reveal the closeness of relationships between characters at 
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certain points in the plot (Midgley 116). Conversely, the diminutive Fenitschka also reflects 
Max’s (Mᶜ) earlier compulsion to see Fenia as ‘smaller’ than she really is or passive and 
childlike, a habit that, by the time he leaves St. Petersburg at the end of the novella, he has 
overcome.  
3.9 CONCLUSION 
“Dann siegte ein andres Gefühl” marks a turning point in Lou Andreas-Salomé’s Fenitschka and 
encapsulates what the novella does as a whole: create a space for other ways of feeling 
(Fenitschka 18). Situated against the background of fin-de-siècle Europe, Fenitschka implies that 
emotions and interpersonal relationships change over time as social structures shift. It highlights 
Max’s and Fenia’s differing orientations to late nineteenth-century gendered emotional codes 
and traces Max’s evolving perception of Fenia and what she represents. On a larger scale, the 
novella brings to light the psychological impact of broad cultural shifts and the emergence of 
differing emotional styles around 1900. That is, it makes palpable the fact that the transition from 
nineteenth-century bourgeois morality to modernism witnessed a proliferation of differing ways 
of feeling. Emotional codes like feminine shame and masculine honor began to decline in 
modernizing societies at this time, but the familiar narratives associated with them were difficult 
to abandon, as Max’s (Mᶜ) emotional struggles reveal. Through narrative techniques such as 
thought report and internal focalization, Fenitschka articulates Max’s (Mᶜ) resistance to changes 
in emotional practices (e.g. a new concept of love, the decline of feminine shame and masculine 
honor, and the rise of empathy and solidarity across social boundaries). In this way, the novella 
represents the uncertainty and anxiety that many Europeans felt at the fin de siècle. It does not 
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advocate naïve compliance with established cultural narratives or new ideologies. Instead, 
Andreas-Salomé encourages critical thinking that leads to progress, acceptance, and greater 
understanding through dialogue, as exemplified by her novella’s inquiring and perceptive 
heroine. Cognizant of the challenges of self-realization, as in the case of Fenia, and of accepting 
social change, as in the case of Max, Fenitschka validates alternate emotional styles and 
imagines new opportunities for individuals in modern society. 
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4.0  “DAS WAREN GANZ BEHÄBIGE UND GLÜCKLICHE GENERATIONEN 
DAMALS…”: READING MANN’S BUDDENBROOKS (1901) AS A LITERARY 
GENEALOGY OF EMOTIONS 
Part V of Thomas Mann’s (1875-1955) multigenerational family saga, Buddenbrooks: Verfall 
einer Familie (1901), introduces a concept central to the novel as a whole: emotional and cultural 
change over time. Mann’s narrator distinguishes between the representatives of earlier 
generations of the Buddenbrook family and Consul Jean Buddenbrook, who was “mit seiner 
schwärmerischen Liebe zu Gott und dem Gekreuzigten, der erste seines Geschlechtes gewesen, 
der unalltägliche, unbürgerliche und differenzierte Gefühle gekannt und gepflegt hatte” 
(Buddenbrooks 283, emphasis added). Mann’s narrator asserts that emotions previously 
unknown to the Buddenbrook family first find their expression through Consul Jean’s religious 
ecstasy. Although Jean’s children do not share his Pietistic sensibility, the narrative progression 
reveals that these so-called uncommon, unbourgeois, and differentiated emotions take unique 
forms in each generation of the family. How should readers interpret this striking reference to 
‘uncommon, unbourgeois, and differentiated emotions’? Does Mann’s narrator imply that the 
assimilation of previously unknown forms of feeling brings about the decline of this semi-
fictional nineteenth-century bourgeois family?  
When read in the context of the novel’s subtitle Verfall einer Familie, this quoted passage 
hints that the integration of ‘unbourgeois’ emotions contributes to the Buddenbrooks’ decline. In 
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this way, Mann’s novel participates in debates about cultural pathology and decadence found in 
European literary, philosophical, and medical discourses at the fin de siècle. Yet other passages 
convey the impression that emotional and cultural change through the generations is not only 
inevitable, but also necessary. Moreover, even the committed attempts of figures such as Tony 
and Thomas Buddenbrook to conform to the family ethos and emotional code do not secure 
marital or financial success. On the contrary, the decisions that these figures make with the 
Buddenbrook ethos in mind ironically and tragically hasten the process of degeneration. 
Buddenbrooks therefore offers readers a more complex literary account of late nineteenth-
century emotionality than the idea that ‘other’ feelings threatened and brought about the decline 
of high bourgeois emotions and values. It conceives of different ways of feeling as potentialities, 
i.e. competing emotional styles that struggle to emerge at a given point in history. 
Even though the narrated time in Buddenbrooks spans the years 1835 to 1877, the novel’s 
mid-nineteenth-century setting should not deceive readers. In Buddenbrooks Thomas Mann 
tackles some of the major themes and questions that preoccupied other writers, philosophers, 
artists, and critics of his day. His earliest stories and novellas published in the 1890s depict 
outsider figures and artists as they undermine bourgeois values and experiment with 
unconventional roles in society. Buddenbrooks stands out among these early works because 
Mann does not just tell the story of a decadent young artist who rejects bourgeois values. 
Through the form of a family chronicle, he provides an account of how the outsider figure came 
to be. According to Mann’s own recollection of his plans for Buddenbrooks, the life of Hanno, 
the sensitive latecomer [“des sensitiven Spätling”] and last male representative of the family, 
played the fundamental role in the novel’s conception (see GW XI, 554; Selbstkommentare 67). 
Yet the novel does not open with Hanno’s story. Instead, by narrating the history of the family 
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through four generations and tracing the origin of the ‘sensitive latecomer’ as an emotional type, 
Mann creates a literary genealogy or history of emotions that introduces ‘uncommon, 
unbourgeois, and differentiated emotions’ alongside the Buddenbrook family’s nineteenth-
century ‘bourgeois’ emotions and values. 
Thomas Mann’s Buddenbrooks and the questions it raises about emotional and cultural 
change remain relevant—and now more than ever, given the current rise in historical 
investigations of emotions. As other examples will attest, the inclination to scrutinize the past 
and the concern with emotions in Buddenbrooks are not unique to the novel; these were two late 
nineteenth-century preoccupations. These trends converged in the work of Friedrich Nietzsche 
(1844-1900), who stressed the need to analyze changes in emotions and their cultural contexts 
over time. Nietzsche called for something akin to a genealogy or history of emotions in Book 
One of Die fröhliche Wissenschaft (1882): “Bisher hat alles das, was dem Dasein Farbe gegeben 
hat, noch keine Geschichte: oder wo gäbe es eine Geschichte der Liebe, der Habsucht, des 
Neides, des Gewissens, der Pietät, der Grausamkeit?” (§7 “Etwas für Arbeitsame”). Here, 
Nietzsche proposed that researching emotions or ‘all kinds of passions’ [“alle Arten Passionen”] 
among different peoples and through historical periods is necessary for the proper study of moral 
questions properly. By tracing how certain social practices became moral values in Zur 
Genealogie der Moral (1887), he further highlighted the existence of alternatives to established 
principles, which he considered inimical to human flourishing, and heralded a ‘new’ morality 
expressive of the will to power. Along the same lines, a genealogy of emotions identifies 
alternatives to current emotional codes and suggests that emotions, too, are not constant but 
contingent. Buddenbrooks, which imagines changes in the emotional life of a nineteenth-century 
family of the Lübeckian patriciate, accomplishes precisely this and thus demonstrates an affinity 
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with Nietzsche’s way of thinking about the history of emotions and moral values. While I do not 
claim that Mann or Nietzsche presents an accurate or complete historical narrative, the 
genealogical method evident in Buddenbrooks and Zur Genealogie der Moral serves an 
important social-critical function in each work. 
This chapter considers the extent to which we can read Buddenbrooks as a literary 
‘genealogy’ or ‘history of emotions,’ as well as the implications that such a reading has for our 
understanding of Thomas Mann’s perspective on the shifting ways of feeling around 1900. 
Mann’s realist mode and psychological narration in Buddenbrooks affectively engage readers, 
and, not unlike Nietzsche’s critique of Judeo-Christian morality in Zur Genealogie der Moral, 
the novel stimulates critical assessments of emotions and social mores that many assume to be 
unchanging and self-evident even today. Using genealogy, Mann traces the prehistory of the 
emotional type of the ‘sensitive latecomer’ and negotiates between ‘bourgeois’ and 
‘unbourgeois’ emotional styles. Despite its historicizing gesture and resonance with Nietzsche’s 
critical methodology, however, Mann’s Buddenbrooks departs from Nietzsche’s polemical 
genealogy. The Buddenbrooks’ ‘bourgeois’ emotional code, distinguished by an unreflective 
sense of pride, duty, honor, and the suppression of love and individual interests, is best 
represented by Johann the elder and his granddaughter Tony. As the narrative progresses, 
however, the family’s ‘bourgeois’ emotional style is increasingly ironized and represented as 
outmoded and difficult to sustain in the modern period. Yet Tony’s pride, although an object of 
irony, manifests itself as a powerful and life-preserving alternative to the decadent and life-
negating ‘unbourgeois’ emotionality that culminates in the fourth generation (Hanno). An 
examination of the structure of Buddenbrooks as a ‘genealogy-of-emotions,’ together with its 
narrative situation and depiction of a range of emotional styles, will show that, while the novel 
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resists moral relativism, it does not entirely invalidate or uphold any single emotion or 
perspective represented in the diegetic world. Instead of advancing a single ideological 
viewpoint, then, I argue that Buddenbrooks employs heteropathia as an aspect of Mann’s poetic 
criticism [‘dichterischer Kritizismus’]1 to identify a middleground between the unwavering 
bourgeois pride and self-confidence of German programmatic realism and the decadent 
sensibility that became fashionable during the fin de siècle. 
Buddenbrooks does not just mediate between differing affective perspectives (e.g. Tony’s 
life-affirming bourgeois pride and Hanno’s life-negating decadent sensibility), however. It also 
draws attention to its own act of artistic mediation. Exemplifying Mann’s concept of 
‘Mittlertum,’ which refers to the mediating function of art and literature, the novel negotiates 
between different ways of feeling, both at the intradiegetic and extradiegetic levels. Mann’s 
empathetic-ironic narrator alternates between acknowledging and critiquing the figures’ 
‘bourgeois’ and ‘unbourgeois’ emotions, thereby implying a need for both ways of feeling and 
prompting readers to reflect critically upon the emotional structures of the late nineteenth-
century bourgeoisie. This entire process of artistic mediation is mirrored by the figure Kai Graf 
Mölln. Like his best friend Hanno, Kai is a decadent artist who is sensitive to the ways of the 
world, but he also exhibits a powerful, robust masculinity and life-affirming pride and 
productively transforms his experiences through irony in the stories he writes. The sensitive, 
ironic writer Kai, and not Hanno, best embodies Mann’s vision of the modern artist and ideal of 
poetic criticism. And with his figure, a structural metaphor for the heteropathic mediation of 
emotion in Buddenbrooks, Mann imagines the artist as the one most capable of mediating 
between differing ways of feeling during periods of cultural change. Moreover, Mann locates the 
                                                 
1 Mann used the term “der dichterischer Kritizismus” to describe his Nietzsche-inspired blurring of Kunst and Kritik 
in his essay “Bilse und ich” (Essays I: 45). 
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freedom to evaluate and experiment with different emotional styles in the process of artistic 
creation and reception itself. 
4.1 BUDDENBROOKS—THE WORK OF A ‘KALTER KÜNSTLER’? 
Despite the novel’s status as a celebrated work of German and European literature, critics have 
judged Buddenbrooks harshly due to its ironic depictions of living persons by a supposedly cold, 
emotionally distant narrator.2 At the time of its publication in 1901, Buddenbrooks stirred up the 
emotions of its readers. It is well known that Thomas Mann, who was born into a bourgeois 
merchant family in Lübeck in 1875, based his multigenerational novel on the history of his own 
family and his childhood memories of growing up in the north German Hanseatic city. Readers 
and critics considered Buddenbrooks a roman à clef or Schlüsselroman because Mann used 
family members and other living subjects as models, and Schlüssellisten that attempted to 
decipher the models for Mann’s hundreds of named minor characters circulated widely in 
Lübeck at the time. Although Buddenbrooks was and continues to be Mann’s bestselling novel, 
the initial response of many in Lübeck was not particularly favorable. The case of Thomas 
Mann’s Onkel Friedel, the source of inspiration for the figure of Christian Buddenbrook, 
illustrates this. Friedrich Mann resented his nephew’s unflattering and ironic portrayal and 
reacted by sending him a postcard with the following note and maxim: “Dein Buch ‘Die 
Buddenbrooks’ haben mir viele Leiden bereitet. Ein trauriger Vogel, der sein eigenes Nest 
                                                 
2 See Wißkirchen 301-321, for a comprehensive survey of positive and critical responses to Buddenbrooks in the 
novel’s early reception from 1901 to 1905. 
 
 136 
beschmutzt! Dein Onkel Friedrich Mann.”3 In 1906 Thomas Mann responded to similar 
disapproving sentiments and the accusation that he produced a scandalous Schlüsselroman or 
“Bilse-Roman”4 in his essay “Bilse und ich,” which defends the rights of authors to fictionalize 
the lives of living persons and provides the strongest statement of his concept of art during this 
early period of his creative work (see Essays I: 36). Mann enlists the help of Shakespeare and 
Goethe to support his position and asserts that true artists, “statt frei zu ‘erfinden,’ sich lieber auf 
irgend etwas Gegebenes, am liebsten auf die Wirklichkeit stützen” (Essays I: 39). Thus, for 
Mann, pure fabrication or invention does not give rise to great works of literature. Instead, he 
emphasized that an author should draw inspiration for his literary figures from reality but must 
creatively shape and animate this content to make it his own.5 A precursor to this view is already 
discernible in Buddenbrooks, where Kai, an aspiring young writer, exemplifies a similar concept 
of art: “Kais Geschichten waren anfangs kurz und einfach, wurden dann aber kühner und 
komplizierter und gewannen an Interesse dadurch, daß sie nicht gänzlich in der Luft standen, 
sondern von der Wirklichkeit ausgingen und diese in ein seltsames und geheimnisvolles Licht 
rückten…” (Buddenbrooks 572). As the final clause in this passage hints, however, and as Mann 
clearly states in “Bilse und ich,” an author’s subjective identification with his figures can lead to 
misunderstandings (see Essays I: 42-44). The creative process casts reality in a ‘strange and 
                                                 
3 Thomas Mann shared Onkel Friedel’s message with his brother Heinrich Mann in a letter dated January 8, 1904. 
The letter is reproduced in Hanjo Kesting, Heinrich Mann und Thomas Mann: Ein Deutscher Bruderzwist 
(Göttingen: Wallstein, 2003): 24-26. 
 
4 With the implication that Thomas Mann had written a new, scandalous Schlüsselroman in the style of Prussian 
writer and lieutenant Fritz Oswald Bilse (1878-1951), the Lübeck attorney Enrico von Brocken disparagingly called 
Buddenbrooks a “Bilse-Roman” in 1905 (see Essays I: 36-38).  
 
5 In “Bilse und ich,” Mann considers the act of Beseelung [animation, ensoulment] of reality, not Erfindung 
[invention, fabrication], the true skill of the poet: “Die Beseelung…da ist es, das schöne Wort! Es ist nicht die Gabe 
der Erfindung – die der Beseelung ist es, welche den Dichter macht” (Essays I: 41).  
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mysterious light,’ that is, the author introduces aspects of his own personality that are foreign, 
and, perhaps, offensive to the real-life models themselves. 
Yet for Thomas Mann the danger of criticism stemmed not only from his reliance upon 
reality and real-life models for his work, but more generally from his ironic narrative tone, which 
critics have often interpreted as a coldness or indifference. Referring specifically to the narrative 
style in Tonio Kröger (1903), the critic Karl Muth called Mann a “kalter Künstler”6 in 1904, and 
thereafter Mann continued to face and defend himself against similar accusations throughout 
much of his life. He, of course, refuted these claims and privately alluded to his own sensibility 
in letters, as in this one to his patroness in Lübeck, the German writer Ida Boy-Ed (1852-1928), 
written on August 19, 1904:  
Ich bin ein ‘kalter Künstler,’ es steht in mehr als einer Zeitschrift. Ich habe durch 
eine übertriebene Anbetung der Kunst jedes Verhältnis zum Gefühl und zum 
lebendigen Leben verloren… Wahrhaftig, ich wünsche zuweilen, es wäre so, ich 
würde dann ein besserer Arbeiter sein und mich nicht jeden Augenblick durch das 
‘Leben’ und Gott weiß welche Abenteuer des Gefühls vom Pfade des Schaffens 
ablocken lassen! (Briefe an Otto Grautoff 1894-1901 und Ida Boy-Ed 1903-1928, 
150) 
In his essays, too, including “Bilse und ich,” Mann more publicly addresses the issue of artistic 
coldness. He claims that the artist’s view is both colder and more passionate [“zugleich kälter 
und leidenschaftlicher”] than that of the non-artist and considers it erroneous to view the two 
qualities as mutually exclusive: “Nichts unkünstlerischer, als der Irrtum, daß Kälte und 
                                                 
6 Karl Muth, “Vom kalten Künstler,” Hochland, 2 (1904): 614-616. 
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Leidenschaft einander ausschlössen!” (Essays I: 46, 47). To some extent, however, the notion of 
the ‘kalter Künstler’ still informs how Mann’s works are often interpreted.   
Thomas Mann’s Buddenbrooks offers rigorous literary depictions of and keen insights 
into emotion. Even critics who do not focus on the representation of emotion in the novel have 
noted the skill with which Mann represents a range of human feelings, as, for example, Todd 
Kontje: “Buddenbrooks also plays on the full register of human emotions, ranging at various 
times from melancholy to sarcasm, farce to tragedy, philosophical contemplation to seething 
rage” (26). Nevertheless, few critical studies of emotion in Buddenbrooks or Mann’s other works 
exist. I attribute the limited scholarly attention to emotion in Buddenbrooks to the two 
interpretive obstacles already discussed here: 1. the tendency to read the novel as a 
Schlüsselroman and focus on biographical aspects, and 2. the reluctance to inquire beyond the 
dichotomy of emotional warmth and coldness. While I recognize the biographical aspects of 
Mann’s literary prose and the fact that he believed to be writing only about himself,7 I emphasize 
that Buddenbrooks not only dealt with Mann’s own experiences but also addressed, and 
continues to address, national and general human experiences and concerns, as Mann himself 
was amazed to learn.8 
The need to consider Mann’s oeuvre from an emotion studies perspective has recently 
been recognized. In 2010, a group of young Thomas Mann researchers organized a conference in 
Göttingen titled “Ein ‘kalter Künstler’? Emotionen und Aspekte von Emotionalität bei Thomas 
Mann” and produced eight web-based articles that explore different aspects of emotionality in 
                                                 
7 In “Bilse und ich” Mann tries to dissuade readers from reading Buddenbrooks only as a roman à clef and assures 
them that he writes only about himself: “Nicht von Euch ist die Rede, gar niemals, seid des nun getröstet, sondern 
von mir, von mir…  […] Fragt nicht immer: Wer soll es sein? Noch immer male ich Männerchen, bestehend aus 
Umrissen, und gar niemanden stellen sie vor, wenn nicht mich selber” (Essays I: 50).  
 
8 “Man gibt das Persönlichste und ist überrascht, das Nationale getroffen zu haben. Man gibt das Nationalste – und 
siehe, man hat das Allgemeine und Menschliche geroffen…” (Selbstkommentare 71).  
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Mann’s works (Brockmeier and Schermuly). In an article on Buddenbrooks, Birte Lipinski aims 
to provide a more balanced reading of the young artist figure Kai and points out that, in spite of 
his skepticism and ironic use of language, Kai is a passionate and empathetic figure, not a “kalter 
Künstler” (par. 12). The other contributions, most of which also engage with the notion of the 
‘kalter Künstler,’ study Gefühlskälte or particular emotions (Liebe, Angst, or Ekel) in Mann’s 
other works, including Der Tod in Venedig (1912), Lotte in Weimar (1939), and Joseph und 
seine Brüder (1933-1943). Since new approaches in emotion studies are still being developed 
and have the potential to challenge more conventional ways of interpreting the social contexts 
and textual construction of emotions in literature, the investigation of emotion in Mann’s works 
has by no means been exhausted.  
Three recent publications raise interesting questions about and invite further 
investigations of the representation of emotion in Buddenbrooks. In the conclusion of his book 
on family life and social change in Buddenbrooks, Martin Swales draws attention to Mann’s 
literary construction of emotional experience by citing from Rainer Maria Rilke’s (1875-1926) 
“Fourth Duino Elegy” (1915): “Wir kennen den Kontur des Fühlens nicht: nur, was ihn formt 
von außen” (Rilke qtd. in Swales 113). Swales emphasizes that, while Mann shows us the 
outside forces that form human emotions in Buddenbrooks, he also represents the inner space of 
feeling as shaped by external pressures, that is, the ‘contour of feeling’ that Rilke’s “Fourth 
Duino Elegy” deems unknowable (113). His comments suggest that emotions as represented in 
Mann’s novel are not insulated from the outside world but, like other aspects of culture, are 
subject to change over time. Although he did not intend to make a key contribution to Thomas 
Mann scholarship, Lothar Pikulik opens his monograph Leistungsethik contra Gefühlskult (1984) 
with a discussion of Buddenbrooks, which he uses to explain the theoretical framework for his 
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survey of eighteenth-century Empfindsamkeit (16). Pikulik identifies various gradations of 
“Bürger” in Buddenbrooks, considers the role that emotions play in the “Entbürgerlichung” of 
the Buddenbrook family, and, consequently, asks how well the (eighteenth-century) bourgeois 
mentality tolerates sensibility as an aspect of class identity (57). Manuel Braun, too, briefly 
refers to Buddenbrooks at the beginning of his essay on medieval emotions. Braun contrasts the 
depiction of Trauer in the Nibelungenlied with Mann’s suppression of Trauer in the scenes that 
follow the death of Konsul Jean Buddenbrook, which leads him to inquire whether the study of 
literary history can provide insight into the history of emotions (53, 61). The fact that Braun and 
Pikulik both open their studies of emotions in other historical periods with a reference to 
Buddenbrooks calls for an in-depth analysis of emotion in the novel. In light of the novel’s 
narrative situation, staging of emotional styles, and resonance with Nietzsche’s Genealogie, my 
reading of heteropathia in Buddenbrooks will show that the text not only negotiates between 
differing ways of feeling, but also envisions the modern writer as the one best suited for the role 
of mediator. 
4.2 THE HETEROPATHIC IMPULSE OF BUDDENBROOKS 
4.2.1 Mann’s Empathetic-Ironic Narrator 
Buddenbrooks features an extradiegetic narrator who functions as the chronicler of a 42-year 
period in the history of a semi-fictional north German bourgeois family from 1835 to 1877. The 
experience of reading Mann’s generational novel, however, differs from the experience of 
reading an historical chronicle. In his essay “Thomas Manns Buddenbrooks” (1902), Rainer 
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Maria Rilke insightfully described Mann’s narrative style and distinguished between the 
traditional chronicler and Mann’s modern, innovative interpretation of that role. Rilke notes that, 
more than a calm reporter of events, Mann’s chronicler includes thousands of details, which 
grant the figures warmth and substance and contribute to the liveliness of his literary 
representation (8). To be sure, while the extradiegetic narrator of Buddenbrooks is situated 
outside of the diegetic world, he does not stand high above his own account or narrate from a 
single point of view as a traditional chronicler would. Frequent shifts from zero to internal 
focalization tend to blur the perspectives of the narrator and the figures, especially in the second 
half of the novel. Part X Chapter 5, for example, narrates Thomas Buddenbrook’s Schopenhauer-
Erlebnis, one of the most famous scenes that features such focalization shifts, and blurs the 
narrator and character perspectives: 
Und siehe da: plötzlich war es, wie wenn die Finsternis vor seinen Augen zerrisse, 
wie wenn die sammtne Wand der Nacht sich klaffend teilte und eine unermeßlich 
tiefe, eine ewige Fernsicht von Licht enthüllte..Ich werde leben! Sagte Thomas 
Buddenbrook beinahe laut und fühlte, wie seine Brust dabei vor innerlichem 
Schluchzen erzitterte. Dies ist es, daß ich leben werde! Es wird leben…und daß 
dieses Es nicht ich bin, das ist nur eine Täuschung, das war nur ein Irrtum, den 
der Tod berichtigen wird. So ist es, so ist es!... Warum? – Und bei dieser Frage 
schlug die Nacht wieder vor seinen Augen zusammen. (Buddenbrooks 723) 
Thomas reads “Über den Tod und sein Verhältnis zur Unzerstörbarkeit unseres Wesens an sich,” 
a chapter from Schopenhauer’s Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung (1818), and the narrator uses 
thought report to reveal Thomas’s unspoken perceptions and contemplations about life and death 
during his Schopenhauer experience (see Buddenbrooks 722). As in this scene, focalization shifts 
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throughout the novel bring the reader close to the figures and allow her to see through their eyes. 
Mann’s narrative style thus yields a kind of multiperspectivism, which, through its depiction of 
an assortment of figures with different emotional styles and worldviews, conveys an impression 
of a complex social reality and imparts a deeper understanding than one perspective alone would 
communicate.  
The extradiegetic narrator of Buddenbrooks knows all: he tirelessly describes in detail the 
physical appearance, clothing, speech, posture, facial expressions, and unexpressed thoughts and 
feelings of the novel’s multitude of figures using zero focalization. Only on a few occasions does 
he choose to withhold details or relinquish his omniscience, such as when he supposes that 
Thomas “dachte wahrscheinlich an das kleine Blumenmädchen mit dem malayischen 
Gesichtstypus, die vor kurzer Zeit den Sohn ihrer Brotgeberin geheiratet hatte…” (Buddenbrooks 
256, emphasis added). Thomas sacrifices his clandestine relationship with the flower seller, 
Anna, for the sake of the Buddenbrook family honor, but the narrator’s speculation hints that he 
still loves her, although his love, like the narrator’s overt comment in this passage, is suppressed. 
An extended instance of limited narration occurs in Part X Chapter 5, in which readers, like 
Thomas and Hanno who stand outside of the music room door, never discover what actually 
transpires between Thomas’s wife, Gerda, and Lieutenant von Throta during the long, silent 
pauses that punctuate their ecstatic Wagnerian duets (see Buddenbrooks 712-716). Strategic use 
of limited narration heightens the dramatic effect of such passages and enables readers to 
develop their own interpretations. Mann’s Wagnerian leitmotif technique provokes a similar 
response. Repeated references to Hanno and Gerda’s blue-shadowed eyes, Thomas’s small 
yellow teeth, and Tony’s trumpeting sounds, for example, make these figures memorable and 
provide clues to their personality, health, and emotions, emphasizing changes over time. Many of 
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the novel’s leitmotifs foreshadow death and decline, either of the Buddenbrooks or other figures. 
Although the Hagenströms, the family’s rivals, achieve great economic and social success by the 
end of the novel, their move into the old Mengstraße house, along with repeated references to 
Moritz Hagenström’s jaundiced complexion and bad teeth, underline the similarities between the 
two families and hint that the Hagenströms will follow a similar downward trajectory. 
Some critics may have considered Thomas Mann a ‘kalter Künstler’ for the ironic 
portrayal of his figures, but irony constitutes only one aspect of Mann’s narrative style in 
Buddenbrooks. Techniques such as internal focalization and interior monologue stimulate 
sympathetic identification or empathy with the novel’s figures rather than laughter. Hugh Ridley 
has argued that Mann’s Buddenbrooks aims to communicate knowledge, not empathy, but both 
pathos and irony work together in the novel as a means to knowledge and critical reflection 
(compare Ridley 70). Additionally, narrative irony and literary techniques that promote empathy 
have the potential to move readers to laughter or tears and, thus, intensify the humorous and 
melodramatic features of the novel that give it its broad appeal (compare Schonfield 107). 
Inspired by the ‘double optic’ that Nietzsche identified in Richard Wagner’s (1813-1883) operas, 
Mann was determined to reach two audiences at once, as he made known in a letter to Hermann 
Hesse (1877-1962) dated April 1, 1910: “Nietzsche spricht einmal von Wagners ‘wechselnder 
Optik’: bald in Hinsicht auf die gröbsten Bedürfnisse, bald in Hinsicht auf die raffiniertesten. 
[…] Die Künstler, denen es nur um eine Coenakel-Wirkung zu thun ist, war ich stets geneigt, 
gering zu schätzen. Eine solche Wirkung würde mich nicht befriedigen” (see Kurzke 120). 
Mann’s empathetic-ironic narrative style allows him to write for both audiences simultaneously: 
a general public and an educated elite. The constant alternation between the narrative 
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transmission of empathy and irony in Buddenbrooks at once engages and entertains the masses, 
and, at the same time, this narrative tension offers intellectual readers a sharp-witted critique.  
Free indirect speech makes possible Mann’s empathetic-ironic narrative style in 
Buddenbrooks: it supports greater understanding of the figures’ perspectives and simultaneously 
draws attention to the narrator’s presence and distance to the narrated events. The narrator’s 
more detached, objective insights contrast with the figures’ subjective perceptions of events in 
the diegetic world, a discrepancy that generates narrative irony and interrupts the reader’s 
sympathetic identification with the figures. By revealing their perspectives through irony-
charged free indirect speech, Mann’s empathetic-ironic narrative technique at once substantiates 
the figures’ emotions and values and opens them up for critical assessment. 
Passages that feature internal focalization and free indirect speech already occur in the 
first parts of Buddenbrooks, albeit with less frequency and intensity than in the second half of the 
novel. In Part I Chapter 1, for example, readers observe a gathering of three generations of the 
Buddenbrook family in their newly acquired house on Mengstraße, but they receive little 
background information about them or the history and traditions of the family. This lack of 
narrative introduction assumes readers who are already acquainted with the Buddenbrooks and 
require no explanation regarding their history, values, or class standing. At the novel’s opening, 
the Buddenbrook family ethos is likewise unquestioned by the figures themselves. A notable 
exception occurs in Part I Chapter 7, in which free indirect style clues readers in to the private 
thoughts of the Buddenbrooks’ house doctor and family friend, Dr. Grabow, who does not wish 
to interfere and, therefore, suppresses his critique of the family’s lifestyle (see Buddenbrooks 39-
40). Apart from the scene with Dr. Grabow, the early chapters of the novel feature dialogues and 
lengthy exterior descriptions of individual figures and scenes rather than interior monologues. 
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The gradual shift in narration, which stretches across 42 years of narrated time and over 800 
pages, suggests that each successive generation of the family becomes more introspective9 and 
conflicted than those who came before.  
Mann’s frequent and extended use of internal focalization and interior monologue in the 
final parts of the novel allows readers to ‘feel into’ [einfühlen] the thoughts and emotions of the 
last two generations of the family in particular. Long, intense passages containing reflective free 
indirect speech10 convey the thoughts and emotions of Thomas and Hanno, and, to a more 
limited extent, of Tony. Thomas’s and Hanno’s interior monologues, which invite readers to hear 
their thoughts and feelings, reveal an inner tension and psychological struggles as they 
contemplate their individual and family identity, bourgeois values, and life and death. The 
blurring of the narrator’s perspective with the perceptions of Thomas and Hanno signals the 
narrator’s empathy with these figures in particular and betrays his own status as a ‘sensitive 
latecomer’ figure. Yet Mann’s narrator, like the young writer Kai, is also a master of irony, and 
narrative irony acts as a counterweight to sentimentalism and narrative empathy. The narrative 
situation of Buddenbrooks thus moves readers to compassion or laughter by way of its 
empathetic-ironic style, and, by depicting changes through the generations, the novel treats the 
                                                 
9The gradual increase in the number of passages that employ free indirect speech or interior monologue is well-
documented (see Furst; Hoffmeister; Ryan; Swales). Judith Ryan relates this shift in Mann’s literary portrayal to two 
nineteenth-century approaches to empirical observation: the ‘clinical’ or naturalizing approach and the 
‘introspective’ approach evident in the emerging psychology of the 1880s and 1890s (125). 
 
10 Werner Hoffmeister uses the paradoxical term “stille erlebte Rede,” which he also calls “erlebte Rede als 
Reflexion” (67). He regards Thomas, Hanno, and Tony as the central figures in Buddenbrooks because reflective 
free indirect speech is reserved for these figures (69). 
 
 146 
different nineteenth-century emotional styles and mentalities of its figures as the primary subject 
of narration.11 
4.2.2 ‘Bourgeois’ and ‘Unbourgeois’ Emotional Styles 
The figures’ emotional styles and the changes they undergo through the generations become 
more apparent once readers identify the established Buddenbrook emotional code, which is 
based upon a sense of family honor, bourgeois pride, and the suppression of individual emotions 
and desires for the benefit of the whole (e.g., declining a Liebesehe for a Vernunftehe). The 
house on Mengstraße, the Familienchronik, the idealized memory of the elder Johann 
Buddenbrook, and the family motto12 and sayings that echo through the novel symbolically 
convey the status of the family’s values and emotional code. Beginning with Jean and ending 
with Hanno, the male heirs of the Buddenbrook family become increasingly introspective and 
exhibit emotional styles that increasingly conflict with the family’s ‘bourgeois’ emotional code. 
Significantly, in Buddenbrooks Mann does not project the feelings that conflict with this 
emotional code, i.e. the ones the narrator distinguishes as “unalltägliche, unbürgerliche und 
differenzierte Gefühle,” onto ‘Other’ figures, as Gustav Freytag (1816-1895) does in Soll und 
Haben (1855). Instead, ‘bourgeois’ and ‘unbourgeois’ feelings intermingle, force the later 
generations to confront and resolve conflicting emotions, and shape the history of the 
Buddenbrook family. Mann’s depiction of different generational perspectives on politics, 
modernization, religion, philosophy, art, and emotional experience and expression suggests that 
                                                 
11 Compare Hoffmeister 160-169, who also considers the “Denk- und Fühlweisen” of characters both a means and 
subject of narration in Buddenbrooks and the ‘modern novel’ in general (161). 
 
12 “Mein Sohn, sey mit Lust bey den Geschäften am Tage, aber mache nur solche, daß wir bey Nacht ruhig schlafen 
können” (Buddenbrooks 190, 530). 
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emotions and social mores change through history to reflect the needs and values of people in 
society. Buddenbrooks thus questions the notion of the intact bourgeois subject and undermines 
the assumption that a set of ideal and unchanging emotional codes exist. 
Yet I do not read Buddenbrooks as a mere harbinger of the decline of nineteenth-century 
bourgeois emotional codes and the values that were once self-evident and undisputed in German 
programmatic realism. Mann’s narrative style also preserves a certain critical distance to the later 
generations’ decadent sensibility, introspection, and ‘unbourgeois’ feelings. For example, the 
narrator portrays Christian Buddenbrook’s shamelessness, lack of discipline, and nervous 
constitution ironically and critically in the novel, with little attempt to let readers see through his 
eyes via internal focalization or free indirect speech. Moreover, passages featuring free indirect 
speech demonstrate understanding for Tony and Thomas in their devotion to the family and firm 
and persistent attempts to conform to the Buddenbrook emotional code. Even Tony’s relentless 
class-based pride [Stolz, Hochmut], though an object of narrative irony, has redeeming qualities 
and provides a counter-narrative to the trajectory of life-negating degeneration that structures the 
novel. The effect of Buddenbrooks as an aesthetic whole is that it validates a variety of emotional 
styles, both bourgeois and unbourgeois, albeit not without a good measure of skepticism and 
humor.  
4.2.3 The Genealogy-of-Emotions Structure of Buddenbrooks 
A theoretical model of emotion that resonates with Nietzsche’s genealogical method organizes 
the narrative events in Buddenbrooks. According to Mann’s retrospective account, an ‘epic 
instinct’ compelled him to chronicle the prehistory of the Buddenbrook family in addition to the 
life experiences of the family’s last male descendant, the decadent young artist, Hanno:  
 148 
Ich erinnere mich wohl, daß, was mir ursprünglich am Herzen gelegen hatte, nur 
die Gestalt und die Erfahrungen des sensitiven Spätlings Hanno waren. Da aber 
ein epischer Instinkt mich trieb, ab ovo zu beginnen und die gesamte 
Vorgeschichte mit aufzunehmen, so entstand statt der Knabennovelle, die sich 
nicht viel von anderen damals in Deutschland hervorgebrachten unterschieden 
hätte, ein als Familien-Saga verkleideter Gesellschaftsroman…. (GW XI 554) 
Mann’s decision to open his social novel from the earliest possible chronological point in the 
history of the Buddenbrook family and firm has important implications. Not only does 
Buddenbrooks attempt to trace the origin of the ‘sensitive latecomer’ as an emotional type, but, 
in so doing, the novel also depicts subtle changes in the emotional life of the members of the 
family over time. Thus, the family saga configuration of Buddenbrooks gives rise to a fictional 
genealogy of emotions, in which nineteenth-century emotional styles are depicted as culturally 
contingent, not constant practices. By drawing attention to the genealogy-of-emotions structure 
of Buddenbrooks, I do not imply that Mann presents an objective, complete nineteenth-century 
history of the emotional life of the German bourgeoisie. Even the most ‘realistic’ literary works 
remain aesthetic constructions: they illuminate aspects of, but do not simply mirror reality. 
Instead, I emphasize that Mann’s Buddenbrooks, whose mobilization of genealogy recalls 
Nietzsche’s technique employed in Zur Genealogie der Moral, provides readers with a vivid 
literary interpretation of history.13 
                                                 
13 The historical accuracy of the narratives that Nietzsche provides in Zur Genealogie der Moral has been contested. 
Bernard Williams finds the Genealogie “infuriatingly vague” due to its perplexing relationship to history (157). 
Although Williams considers Nietzsche’s narratives of moral change to be fictions, he nonetheless attributes critical 
force to these accounts (159). Others like David Owen and Raymond Geuss instead accept the claim advanced by 
Alexander Nehamas in Nietzsche, Life as Literature (1985) that Nietzsche’s genealogical method is “history, 
correctly practiced,” that is, that the Genealogie gives truthful expression to the history of morality and gains its full 
critical force through this truthful expression (Owen 143).  
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The role of genealogy remains a topic of debate in Nietzsche scholarship: some argue that 
the genealogical method constitutes Nietzsche’s critique of morality (see, e.g., Angier 410; 
Katsafanas 191), while others assert that it destabilizes morality, yet does not itself achieve the 
revaluation of moral values (compare Janaway 10; Leiter 177). These varying assessments echo 
Nietzsche’s own ambivalence regarding the relevance of history for moral philosophy. On the 
one hand, Nietzsche cautions that a genealogy of morality is by no means identical with a 
critique of morality: “Die Frage nach der Herkunft unsrer Werthschätzungen und Gütertafeln 
fällt ganz und gar nicht mit deren Kritik zusammen, wie so oft geglaubt wird…” (Der Wille zur 
Macht §254). Then again, Nietzsche refers to the three parts of Zur Genealogie der Moral as 
“Drei entscheidende Vorarbeiten eines Psychologen für eine Umwerthung aller Werte,” which 
implies that the genealogical method plays an instrumental role in laying the foundation for a 
revaluation of moral values (Ecce Homo, “Genealogie der Moral”). Although no clear consensus 
on the status of genealogy in Nietzsche’s work has been reached, the conclusions of recent 
scholarship, together with Nietzsche’s own comments on the Genealogie, suggest that, at the 
very least, the genealogical method sets Nietzsche’s critique of moral values in motion. The 
critical potential of genealogy is evident in Buddenbrooks as well. By imagining the origins of 
the ‘sensitive latecomer’ and his forbears through nineteenth-century history, Mann’s multi-
generational novel exposes the contingency of emotional styles and moral attitudes. Thus, 
Mann’s Buddenbrooks and Nietzsche’s Genealogie employ similar genealogical methods that 
examine and subvert orientations to ways of thinking and feeling that may have previously gone 
unquestioned by readers at the fin de siècle: they historicize nineteenth-century emotional and 
moral codes, subject them to critical scrutiny, and envision alternatives.  
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In addition to the genealogical method, Buddenbrooks and Zur Genealogie der Moral 
exhibit rhetorical techniques that force readers to confront and question their own emotions and 
values. Mann accomplishes this by way of his empathetic-ironic narrative style and 
multiperspectivism and Nietzsche, through a range of rhetorical strategies that persuade, shock, 
or repel readers. Christopher Janaway, who has most compellingly argued that Nietzsche’s 
“emotive style” in the Genealogie warrants careful study, claims that, without Nietzsche’s 
rhetorical provocation of sympathy, antipathy, ambivalence, and disgust, readers would hardly 
be able to comprehend, let alone revalue their current moral values (4-5). Indeed, Nietzsche 
strove for the “Umwerthung aller Werthe,” yet he simultaneously recognized that only with great 
difficulty could individuals and societies transform their deep-rooted moral values and habits of 
feeling: “Wir haben umzulernen, – um endlich, vielleicht sehr spät, noch mehr zu erreichen: 
umzufühlen” (GM III §27; Morgenröte §103). Investigating the prehistory of moral attitudes in 
the Genealogie with the intention of revaluing them is “not a dispassionate exercise for 
Nietzsche, but includes an engagement of one’s own affects and prejudices” (Janaway 12). Only 
after working upon and dislodging his readers’ passions could Nietzsche hope to challenge their 
attachment to modern morality. Not just the genealogical method, then, but also narrative and 
rhetorical techniques thus constitute an essential aspect of Nietzsche’s and Mann’s critiques of 
emotions and values.  
Although I highlight Mann’s and Nietzsche’s similar deployment of the genealogical 
method and narrative and rhetorical techniques in their respective works, the type of critique 
generated in Buddenbrooks diverges from the critique delivered in the Genealogie. As the 
subtitle of the Genealogie (“Eine Streitschrift”) elucidates, Nietzsche offers a polemic against a 
specific set of moral values. With the help of his genealogical method, which reveals modern 
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morality’s suspect past, Nietzsche refutes this value system and calls for a ‘new’ morality to take 
its place. The morality of the future that Nietzsche envisions requires the restoration of 
aristocratic or master morality [“aristokratische Werthgleichung (gut = vornehm = mächtig = 
schön = glücklich = gottgeliebt)”], which, according to his narrative in the Genealogie, preceded 
modern Judeo-Christian ‘slave’ morality [“Sklaven-Moral”] (GM I §7, 8). Nietzsche objects to 
modern morality primarily because he considers it inimical to human flourishing: by valorizing 
weakness, it encourages agents to limit their power.14 While Mitleid [compassion] occupies the 
center of Schopenhauer’s ethics, and likewise holds a place of importance in Paul Rée’s (1849-
1901) Der Ursprung der moralischen Empfindungen15 (1877), Nietzsche condemns Mitleid 
[pity], which, for him, exemplifies weakness and endangers ascending life. He considers Mitleid 
a symptom of the decadence that he diagnoses in late nineteenth-century European culture in the 
Genealogie: “ich verstand die immer mehr um sich greifende Mitleids-Moral, welche selbst die 
Philosophen ergriff und krank machte, als das unheimlichste Symptom unsrer unheimlich 
gewordnen europäischen Cultur…” (GM Vorrede §5). In addition to Mitleid, Nietzsche writes 
critically about love and ressentiment. Although he expressed the need to ‘feel differently’ 
[umfühlen] in Morgenröte §103, no particular emotion plays the central, positive role in his 
philosophy. As Robert Solomon has pointed out, however, for Nietzsche, who values the 
strength of the emotions, the will to power holds the place of a general “positive passion” in his 
philosophy (136). Nietzsche’s polemic, which strives for the revaluation of Judeo-Christian 
                                                 
14 Recent publications on Zur Genealogie der Moral describe Nietzsche’s central argument in his polemic against 
modern morality similarly. In other words, most critics agree Nietzsche rejects modern morality not only because of 
its revolting history, but due to its inverse relationship between actual and perceived increases in power. Compare, 
e.g., Janaway 3 and Katsafanas 171-173.  
 
15 Following Schopenhauer and other Mitleidsfreunde, Paul Rée focuses on the virtues of (unegoistic) Mitleid and 
alternately refers to it as Wohlwollen [goodwill] and Nächstenliebe [charity]: “Also: Unegoistische Theilnahme am 
Schicksale anderer, mag man sie nun Mitleid, Wohlwollen oder Nächstenliebe nennen, existirt” (Rée 4).  
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morality, leaves little room for the coexistence of moral values or ways of feeling that are at 
variance with this concept of power. 
Unlike Nietzsche in Zur Genealogie der Moral, Mann neither entirely condemns nor 
fully supports a single value system or emotional style in Buddenbrooks: the valorization of 
power and the polemical quality of Nietzsche’s model remain absent in the novel. Instead, while 
Buddenbrooks examines nineteenth-century emotional and moral codes, including bourgeois 
pride and decadent sensibility, it does not suggest the superiority of one perspective or way of 
feeling. Over 42 years of narrated time, Buddenbrooks represents the simultaneity of emotional 
styles in the nineteenth-century history of the family and admits the inevitability and necessity of 
emotional and cultural change over time. By showing the difficulty of preserving old ways of 
thinking and feeling in modern society, because cultural contexts are different, it breaks the 
mythology that a single set of enduring emotional codes exists. As I demonstrate in the following 
readings of key passages, different forms of ‘bourgeois’ and ‘unbourgeois’ feeling are set against 
each other, and, as described in the novel, these emotional styles become objects of narrative 
irony and empathy. Yet Mann’s empathetic-ironic narrative style and the depiction of emotional 
change over time in Buddenbrooks do not mean that the novel weighs all perspectives equally or 
hesitates to raise ethical questions about the dangerous impact that certain emotional codes can 
have on individuals or society. Chapter 2 of Part 11, also known as the Schulkapitel, which 
depicts the authoritarian emotional regime of the Wilhelmine school system as Thomas and 
Heinrich Mann experienced it growing up in the Kaiserreich, provides the clearest evidence 
against reading moral relativism in the novel. Thus, Buddenbrooks aims for truth, but this truth is 
not embedded in one emotional style. By depicting the co-presence of distinct ways of feeling in 
the novel, Buddenbrooks both acknowledges and permits emotional alterity, while 
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simultaneously searching for the glimpses of a truth offered by each perspective. Additionally, it 
highlights the role of literature and the artist in mediating between these ways of feeling in 
search of truth. 
4.3 EMOTIONAL CHANGE THROUGH FOUR GENERATIONS 
The opposition of ‘bourgeois’ and ‘unbourgeois’ emotions introduced in Buddenbrooks, together 
with the genealogical structure of the novel, recalls the pseudo-historical narrative of the ‘slave 
revolt’ in morality that Nietzsche provides in Zur Genealogie der Moral. ‘Bourgeois’ emotions, 
best embodied by Johann the elder and Tony Buddenbrook, are correlated positively with power 
and vitality, like Nietzsche’s aristocratic morality. ‘Unbourgeois’ emotions, which first find their 
way into the history of the family with Jean and conclude with Hanno’s rejection of the 
bourgeois world and denial of the will to live, are negatively correlated with power and vitality, 
and, therefore, correspond to Nietzsche’s slave morality. There is of course no one-to-one 
correspondence between Nietzsche’s and Mann’s genealogical narratives. Nietzsche critiqued 
Judeo-Christian bourgeois morality as a whole as a morality of weakness. He rejected bourgeois 
customs and principles because they required submission to ancestors or other authorities and 
limited freedom of self-realization. Thus, not just the life-negating emotions and decadent 
sensibility of the sensitive latecomer Hanno, but also the established Buddenbrook ethos, which 
was meant to ensure the continued success of the family, would have been an object of 
Nietzsche’s critique. Despite the lack of direct alignment between the two narratives, I 
nonetheless find Nietzsche’s genealogical method useful for an analysis of the tension between 
bourgeois and unbourgeois emotional styles in Buddenbrooks.  By beginning his novel with 
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Johann Buddenbrook the elder and tracing the prehistory of the ‘sensitive latecomer’ Hanno, 
Mann depicts an alternative to the introspection, loss of vitality, and decadent emotionality that 
Nietzsche criticized in the Genealogie.  
Although the adjective ‘unbürgerlich’ itself only appears in one passage of the novel, 
references to the Buddenbrooks’ bourgeois feelings including Würde, Moral, Ehrgeiz, Strenge, 
Vornehmheit, Familiensinn, Ehre and Stolz and values like Arbeit, Erfolg, Erwerb, Macht, 
Reichtum, and Pflicht abound and are easy to identify (see Buddenbrooks 426, 682). As a high 
bourgeois, or more precisely, a patrician merchant family of a north German Hanseatic town, the 
Buddenbrooks define themselves in terms of these emotions and values, which make up their 
class and family identity. The family chronicle and motto, two symbols of this identity 
referenced throughout the novel, serve to reinforce and impart these feelings and values to future 
generations. A passage featuring free indirect speech indicates that the Buddenbrooks’ class and 
family identity or Familiensinn, which Thomas conceives of as “…dieses ererbte und 
anerzogene, rückwärts sowohl wie vorwärts gewandte, pietätvolle Interesse für die intime 
Historie seines Hauses,” influences his thinking and determination to raise his son Hanno in 
accordance with his own bourgeois value system (Buddenbrooks 681). The adjectives ‘ererbte’ 
and ‘anerzogene’ emphasize the long history of these bourgeois feelings and values, and this 
Familiensinn, which unites past and future generations of the Buddenbrook family, is revered. 
Some of the ‘bourgeois’ emotions and values represented in the novel can be traced back 
to the aristocracy, which entered a slow state of decline after the Revolution of 1848 and the rise 
of industrialization. The nineteenth-century bourgeoisie adopted aristocratic social practices and 
emotional codes like the Vernunftehe instead of a Liebesehe, as well as aristocratic attitudes 
toward social status evident in expressions of class pride and family honor. Mann takes great 
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care to depict the Buddenbrooks’ enforcement of these emotional practices. Out of all of the 
members of the later generations of the family, it is Tony who is most attached to these notions 
of class pride and family honor. She makes a direct link to aristocratic ways of thinking and 
feeling in a conversation with Thomas: “Ja, Tom, wir fühlen uns als Adel und fühlen einen 
Abstand und wir sollten nirgend zu leben versuchen, wo man nichts von uns weiß, und uns nicht 
einzuschätzen versteht, denn wir werden nichts als Demütigungen davon haben, und man wird 
uns lächerlich hochmütig finden” (Buddenbrooks 425).16 Tony emphasizes the sense of 
aristocratic distinction that she feels in relation to people of lower social classes and uses this to 
justify her decision to leave her second husband, Alois Permaneder, who leads an easygoing and 
unglamorous lifestyle in Munich, where Tony’s social status and family history are rendered 
meaningless. The Buddenbrooks’ patrician Familiensinn, which encompasses notions of class 
pride and family honor, thus manifests itself as an emotional code that needs to be defended 
continuously out of fear of public humiliation or a loss of social status. 
‘Uncommon, unbourgeois, and differentiated,’ i.e. ‘other’ feelings are imagined as 
conflicting with these emotions and values that form the Buddenbrook family ethos. This 
dualistic tension between ‘bourgeois’ and ‘unbourgeois’ emotions is complicated by the 
genealogical structure of the novel, which depicts gradations of this previously unknown 
emotional style as changes occurring with each generation. Jean Buddenbrook is the first in the 
family to dwell on his dreams, emotions, and religious convictions, which his father, Johann 
Buddenbrook the elder, dismisses as “idées” or “Sentimentalität” (see Buddenbrooks 26, 53). 
Unlike his father, who embodies Enlightenment skepticism, Jean exhibits strong Pietistic 
                                                 
16 Tony’s words recall a line from Zur Genealogie der Moral, in which Nietzsche emphasizes that “die Vornehmen 
sich eben als Menschen höheren Ranges fühlten” (GM I §5, emphasis added). Nietzsche finds evidence for the 
aristocrats’ feeling of power and superiority over others in their names for themselves, e.g. “die Mächtigen, die 
Herren, die Gebietenden” (GM I §5). 
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convictions and sentiments that influence his decisions and actions. Appealing to the human duty 
“die Gefühle eines Anderen zu achten,” for example, Jean tries to use his religious convictions to 
persuade his daughter Tony to marry Bendix Grünlich against her will (Buddenbrooks 160). 
Jean’s own inclination to feel and act upon emotions such as pity is described by the narrator as 
“die schwärmerische Ehrfurcht seiner Generation vor menschlichen Gefühlen, die stets mit 
seinem nüchternen und praktischen Geschäftssinn in Hader gelegen hatte” (Buddenbrooks 247). 
Although the narrator reveals that Jean occasionally becomes overwhelmed with feelings of 
mercy [Erbarmen], as he does during his meeting with Grünlich, the narrator assures that Jean 
quickly becomes “Herr seiner Gefühle” again (Buddenbrooks 243). Thus, despite his penchant 
for ‘unbourgeois’ religious sentiments and the Judeo-Christian ‘pity-morality’ attacked by 
Nietzsche, Jean regains his composure after such moments of vulnerability and ultimately acts 
with the best interests of the family firm in mind (see GM Vorrede §5). 
Although Thomas Buddenbrook lacks his father’s religious sentiments, he has an even 
greater capacity for differentiated emotions and introspection, as the narrator’s frequent use of 
interior monologue to disclose his thoughts and feelings suggests. For that reason, Thomas 
perceives his brother Christian, who exhibits “diese ängstliche, eitle und neugierige 
Beschäftigung mit sich selbst,” as a danger to him because he senses his own similar inclinations 
(Buddenbrooks 290). Determined to bring honor to the Buddenbrook family and firm, Thomas, 
much like Tony, sacrifices his true love for the flower shop girl, Anna, for a marriage along class 
lines. He values and strives for “die Haltung, das Gleichgewicht,” that is, he tries to balance 
bourgeois and unbourgeois emotions (Buddenbrooks 290). These competing orientations to 
emotion contribute to Thomas’s inner conflict, which Mann illustrates using free indirect speech: 
“War er ein praktischer Mensch oder ein zärtlicher Träumer? Ach, diese Frage hatte er sich 
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schon tausendmal gestellt, und er hatte sie, in starken und zuversichtlichen Stunden, bald so 
und—in müden—bald so beantwortet. Aber er war zu scharfsinnig und ehrlich, als daß er sich 
nicht schließlich die Wahrheit hätte gestehen müssen, daß er ein Gemisch von Beidem sei” 
(Buddenbrooks 516-517). The narrator suggests that Thomas’s constant attempts to regulate his 
emotions and behaviors to project an image of intactness and refinement, for which the novel 
employs the mask metaphor, brings about nervous exhaustion. 
With Hanno Buddenbrook, we see the culmination of these ‘unbourgeois’ emotions. In a 
passage that brings to mind Nietzsche’s valuation of power, the narrator reports that Thomas 
hopes he can turn his son Hanno into “einen echten Buddenbrook, einen starken und praktisch 
gesinnten Mann mit kräftigen Trieben nach außen, nach Macht und Eroberung” (Buddenbrooks 
559). This notion of the ‘true Buddenbrook’ posits a fixed, narrowly defined view of the family’s 
identity to which neither Thomas nor Hanno can conform. Hanno’s alternate name, “der kleine 
Johann,” as well as the observation that he has “die Buddenbrookschen Hände,” nonetheless 
reflect the family’s hopes that Hanno will take after his great-grandfather Johann and secure 
success and honor for the Buddenbrook family and firm (Buddenbrooks 465-466, 551). Contrary 
to these hopes, Hanno epitomizes many of the qualities that Nietzsche detested in late 
nineteenth-century Europeans: weakness, mistrust of life, hopelessness, refinement, decadence, 
and introspection (see GM II §7). 
In this narrative of the Buddenbrooks’ decline through four generations, the influence of 
Nietzsche’s genealogical method and diagnosis of cultural decadence on Mann’s thinking and 
writing is evident. The assimilation of ‘uncommon, unbourgeois, and differentiated emotions,’ 
along with the increased proclivity towards introspection correlate with the family’s decline. 
Although these previously unknown emotions take different forms in each generation, they 
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coincide with declining vitality, the most obvious sign of which is the progressively shortened 
lifespan of each male heir.17 The Buddenbrook emotional code, which was meant to secure the 
success of the family and firm, thus manifests itself as a kind of unattainable past ideal. Thomas, 
for example, contrasts his forefathers’ bourgeois practicality with his own introspective 
sensibility, and, perceiving their power to be greater than his own, concludes: “daß sie praktische 
Menschen gewesen, daß sie es voller, ganzer, starker, unbefangener, natürlicher gewesen waren, 
als er, das war es, was feststand!...” (Buddenbrooks 517). Thomas, and to a greater extent Tony, 
remain devoted to upholding the Buddenbrook family honor and lifestyle, but the narrator 
demonstrates a more skeptical attitude toward the Buddenbrooks’ high bourgeois emotions and 
values. Accordingly, Buddenbrooks is not merely a narrative of familial decline or a diagnosis of 
cultural pathology or decadence. Whereas Nietzsche traces the genealogy of modern morality 
and criticizes the sinister symptoms of modern late nineteenth-century European civilization in 
his polemic, Mann’s narrator is more accepting of the sensitive latecomer type and uses a 
genealogical method to examine and inspire critical reflection on both bourgeois and 
unbourgeois emotional styles.  
4.4 MODERNIZATION AND THE NECESSITY OF ACCOMPANYING 
EMOTIONAL AND CULTURAL SHIFTS 
The Buddenbrook ethos and emotional code are imagined as powerful, life-affirming ideals 
meant to stand the test of time, communicate the family’s status and history, and ensure its 
                                                 
17 The dates provided in the novel indicate that Johann Buddenbrook the elder (1765-1842) died at age 77, Konsul 
Jean Buddenbrook (ca. 1800-1855) at age 55, Senator Thomas Buddenbrook (1826-1875) at age 49, and Hanno 
Buddenbrook (1861-1877) at age 16. 
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continued success, but Mann’s narrator already undermines these high bourgeois values early in 
the novel. Every Thursday the Buddenbrooks host a “ganz einfaches Mittagbrot” with friends 
and family in the new Mengstraße house; however, the narrator’s detailed description of the 
elaborate feast exposes the reference to the simplicity of the meal as a gross understatement 
(Buddenbrooks 13). The narrator’s account actually conveys the stifling formality of the event 
and the strict observance of etiquette, with the figures following the example of Johann 
Buddenbrook the elder, who preserves “den feinsten Anstand” (Buddenbrooks 38). Christian 
Buddenbrook cries out in discomfort due to indigestion at the end of the feast and is examined by 
the house doctor and family friend, Dr. Grabow. Free indirect speech, although rarely used to 
convey the thoughts and feelings of minor characters, allows readers to hear Dr. Grabow’s 
suppressed critique of the family’s high bourgeois lifestyle in Part I Chapter 7: 
Doktor Grabow lächelte vor sich hin, mit einem nachsichtigen und beinahe etwas 
schwermütigem Lächeln. […] Er, Friedrich Grabow, war nicht derjenige, welcher 
die Lebensgewohnheiten aller dieser braven, wohlhabenden und behaglichen 
Kaufmannsfamilien umstürzen würde. Er würde kommen, wenn er gerufen 
würde, und für einen oder zwei Tage strenge Diät empfehlen, -- ein wenig Taube, 
ein Scheibchen Franzbrot ... ja, ja -- und mit gutem Gewissen versichern, daß es 
für diesmal nichts zu bedeuten habe. (Buddenbrooks 39-40)  
While the family’s banquets of “schwere und gute Dinge” and sedentary lifestyle occupy the 
center of Dr. Grabow’s contemplations in this scene, the word ‘Lebensgewohnheiten’ implies a 
broader sense of the Buddenbrooks’ high bourgeois habits and family culture (Buddenbrooks 
39). Free indirect speech reveals that, on the one hand, Dr. Grabow is unwilling to question the 
Buddenbrooks’ lifestyle and values. He accepts them as self-evident practices shared by other 
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wealthy merchant families. His usual prescription of a strict diet involving roast pigeon and 
French bread is only a temporary remedy, which does more to ease his conscience than it does 
for his patients’ long-term health, and, with his repeated lines, “Ein wenig Taube, --ein wenig 
Franzbrot…,” Dr. Grabow himself becomes an object of humor and narrative irony 
(Buddenbrooks 40). At the same time, Dr. Grabow’s indulgent and somewhat mournful smile 
foreshadows a future crisis and prompts readers to reflect upon his reluctance to intervene.  
Introducing the themes of death and decline, this scene provides an alternative narrative 
to the claim that ‘unbourgeois’ emotions ultimately lead to the Buddenbrooks’ demise. It 
suggests instead that the unsustainability of the Buddenbrooks’ lifestyle and inflexibility of the 
family’s bourgeois values contributed to their decline. Dr. Grabow is the first character in the 
novel to observe and ‘diagnose’ potential problems with the Buddenbrooks’ high bourgeois 
lifestyle, yet the withholding of his criticisms and the narrator’s ironic treatment of his character 
suggest that he is not well-suited for cultural critique or reform. When interpreted in the context 
of Buddenbrooks as a whole, this scene demonstrates that it is not the physician, but the ironic 
artist who is most capable of using creative means to expose social problems and to evaluate and 
negotiate between emotional and cultural codes. 
First evident in Dr. Grabow’s suppressed critique in Part I of Buddenbrooks, the sense 
that old bourgeois-aristocratic ways of life cannot endure in modern society becomes clearer as 
the narrative progresses. In the second half of the novel, passages alluding to the rapid 
modernization underway in the north German Hanseatic town communicate the perception that 
the changing conditions of modern society necessitate different ways of thinking and feeling. 
When Thomas first takes over the family firm, the narrator reports that he is “ganz voll von dem 
Wunsche, der Firma den Glanz zu wahren und zu mehren, der ihrem alten Namen entsprach, 
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liebte es überhaupt, im täglichen Kampf um den Erfolg seine Person einzusetzen” 
(Buddenbrooks 293). Already at this point, however, Thomas admits through direct speech that 
his need to show his personality and engage directly in business negotiations does not correspond 
to the recent trend because “das kommt leider allmählich aus der Mode, dies persönliche 
Eingreifen des Kaufmannes…” and he already fears that “der Kaufmann eine immer banalere 
Existenz wird, mit der Zeit” (Buddenbrooks 294). Changing business relations and a constantly 
increasing pace of work over the years lead to what the narrator tellingly calls “das freudlose 
Tempo” in the family firm (Buddenbrooks 514). References to these accelerating business 
conditions and the joyless work tempo indicate that it has become increasingly difficult to fulfill 
the first part of the family motto, “sey mit Lust bey den Geschäften am Tage” (Buddenbrooks 
190, 530, emphasis added). For Thomas, the experience of a rapid, joyless work tempo contrasts 
so much with the motto’s romanticization of merchant life that he mocks it on the occasion of the 
one hundredth anniversary of the family firm: “‘Ja, ja,’ sagte er plötzlich mit ziemlich 
spöttischem Accent, ‘eine ungestörte Nachtruhe ist eine gute Sache…’” (Buddenbrooks 530). 
The broader effects of modernization and recent developments in the town, as well as the 
inevitability of shifts in mentality are the subjects in the following passage, in which Thomas 
speaks with his barber, Herr Wenzel: 
Das waren ganz behäbige und glückliche Generationen damals, und der Intimus 
meines Großvaters, wissen Sie, der gute Jean Jacques Hoffstede, spazierte umher 
und übersetzte kleine unanständige Gedichte aus dem Französischen ... aber 
beständig so weiter konnte es nicht gehen; es hat sich Vieles geändert und wird 
sich noch immer mehr ändern müssen ... Wir haben nicht mehr 37000 Einwohner, 
sondern schon über 50, wie Sie wissen, und der Charakter der Stadt ändert sich. 
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Da haben wir Neubauten, und die Vorstädte, die sich ausdehnen, und gute Straßen 
und können die Denkmäler aus unserer großen Zeit restaurieren. Aber das ist am 
Ende bloß äußerlich. Das Meiste vom Wichtigsten steht noch aus…. 
(Buddenbrooks 396) 
Here, Thomas Buddenbrook speaks directly and without the narrator’s intervention through 
irony, which suggests that the narrator is in agreement with Thomas’s characterization of the past 
and modernity. With references to the social realities of population growth, building projects, 
urbanization, and the evolving character of the town, this passage contains one of the most 
extended and detailed comments about late nineteenth-century modernization in the novel. It 
illustrates a simultaneous yearning for an unattainable past ideal, yet also recognizes the need for 
new ways of thinking and feeling in the present. Thomas’s identification of the generations 
represented by Johann Buddenbrook the elder and his friend Jean Jacques Hoffstede as 
“behäbige und glückliche Generationen” historicizes their calm, unreflective happiness as an 
emotional style shaped by the eighteenth-century French Enlightenment. His assertion, 
“…beständig so weiter konnte es nicht gehen,” indicates a perceived discontinuity between past 
and present ways of feeling. Mann’s use of the town poet Hoffstede to signify this previous way 
of life that has been lost is revealing. It not only signals a movement away from the unreflective 
irreverence and playful joviality (“scherzhafte Heiterkeit”) typical of this generation, but also 
alludes to a changing perspective on the artist’s role in society (Buddenbrooks 198). Reminiscent 
of a court jester, the poet Hoffstede functions primarily as an entertainer and amuses his high 
bourgeois audiences with poems and suggestive jokes translated from French, welcome 
diversions from the propriety and practicality of bourgeois merchant life. Hoffstede’s 
characterization contrasts with Thomas’s construal of modern poets as artists who can express 
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their privileged inner life with self-assurance and beauty, and thereby enrich the emotional world 
of other people.18 
4.5 NEGOTIATING BETWEEN ‘BOURGEOIS’ AND ‘UNBOURGEOIS’ 
EMOTIONS 
The narrator of Buddenbrooks, not to mention Mann himself, is a writer who closely resembles 
the type of modern artist Thomas Buddenbrook describes. Yet more than merely enriching the 
emotional world of readers with beautiful expressions of a privileged inner life, Mann and his 
narrator provide insight into nineteenth-century emotional styles, and, through narrative empathy 
and irony, subject them to critical assessment. Notwithstanding the historicization and 
subversion of the Buddenbrooks’ high bourgeois lifestyle and emotional codes in the two 
passages cited above, the narrator also preserves his distance to the later generations’ decadent, 
‘unbourgeois’ emotions. This distance is evident, for example, in the ironic portrayal of 
Christian’s eccentric and neurasthenic qualities and in the ironic, detached narration of Thomas’s 
undignified collapse in the street after a molar extraction and the townspeople’s bewildered 
reaction to his death ‘from a tooth.’19 Diverging from Nietzsche’s polemical use of genealogy, 
Mann’s application of a genealogical method in Buddenbrooks makes possible both the 
acknowledgement and critique of different ways of feeling, which, despite gradations, the novel 
depicts as a dualistic tension between ‘bourgeois’ and ‘unbourgeois’ emotions. That the narrator 
                                                 
18 “…Dichter, die ihr bevorzugtes Innenleben mit Sicherheit und Schönheit auszusprechen vermögen und damit die 
Gefühlswelt der anderen Leute bereichern” (Buddenbrooks 290). 
 
19 “An einem Zahne…Senator Buddenbrook war an einem Zahne gestorben, hieß es in der Stadt. Aber, zum 
Donnerwetter, daran starb man doch nicht!” (Buddenbrooks 759).  
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of Buddenbrooks strives for a balance between powerful, life-affirming emotions and decadent, 
introspective emotions becomes most apparent in light of the narrator’s rendering of the 
characteristic emotions enacted by Tony and Hanno. 
4.5.1 Tony Buddenbrook’s Bourgeois Pride 
As the only member of the family present from the first to the final chapter of the novel, Tony 
Buddenbrook is one of the few figures who could claim main character status in Buddenbrooks. 
Tony is also the figure most devoted to preserving her family’s honor and high bourgeois 
lifestyle. In spite of the male heirs’ gradual resignation to ‘unbourgeois’ feelings and the 
concurring decline of the family, Tony’s emotions remain fairly constant and predictable. Some 
critics have argued that, because Tony retains many of her childlike qualities, she does not 
develop or, even worse, that she becomes a caricature in the second half of the novel (compare, 
e.g., Kurzke 78; Worley 204). From an emotion studies perspective, Tony deserves careful 
consideration because of her close association with the emotion pride. With Stolz/stolz appearing 
40 times and Hochmut/hochmütig appearing 14 times, the German emotion words for pride are 
mentioned in the novel directly, but the narrator also refers to Tony’s pride indirectly through 
free indirect speech and descriptions of Tony’s gestures and expressions. The pride that Tony 
exemplifies relates specifically to her high bourgeois-patrician class standing and family history. 
Her duties to her family are a primary source of pride, as the narrator reports: “Sie war sich ihrer 
Verpflichtungen gegen die Familie und die Firma wohl bewußt, und sie war stolz auf diese 
Verpflichtungen (Buddenbrooks 115). Tony continues to perceive the Buddenbrooks as above 
others and to defend her class pride and family honor until the very end, at which point, given the 
decline of the family, her pride might seem unwarranted. Although Tony’s pride, which does not 
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correspond to the reality of the family’s state of affairs at the end of the novel, becomes an object 
of narrative irony, Mann’s narrator does not fully dismiss her pride, arguably the most 
‘bourgeois’ emotion featured in Buddenbrooks.  
In the depiction of Tony and her bourgeois pride, Mann’s narrator alternates between 
empathy and irony. Internal focalization and free indirect speech, which blend Tony’s 
perspective with that of the narrator, convey narrative empathy. When Tony reads the 
Buddenbrook family chronicle before becoming engaged to her first husband, Bendix Grünlich, 
free indirect speech discloses her thoughts and emotions in response to reading her family 
history: 
Die ehrerbietige Bedeutsamkeit, mit der hier auch die bescheidensten Thatsachen 
behandelt waren, die der Familiengeschichte angehörten, stieg ihr zu Kopf…Sie 
stützte die Ellenbogen auf und las mit wachsender Hingebung, mit Stolz und 
Ernst. … Was würde hinter ihrem Namen, den sie von ihrer Großmutter 
Antoinette empfängen hatte, in Zukunft noch zu berichten sein? … Sie lehnte sich 
aufatmend zurück, und ihr Herz pochte feierlich. Erfurcht vor sich selbst erfüllte 
sie, und das Gefühl persönlicher Wichtigkeit, das ihr vertraut war, durchrieselte 
sie… ‘Wie ein Glied in einer Kette’ hatte Papa geschrieben… ja, ja! Gerade als 
Glied dieser Kette war sie von hoher und verantwortungsvoller Bedeutung, - 
berufen, mit That und Entschluß an der Geschichte ihrer Familie mitzuarbeiten! 
(Buddenbrooks 172-173) 
This passage reveals that it is not Jean’s appeal to Christian duty or mercy, but Tony’s own 
pride, sense of familial duty, and desire to contribute positively to the history of her family that 
ultimately motivates her to marry Grünlich. Aside from the narrator’s remark that Tony’s 
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personal importance was a feeling that was familiar to her [“das Gefühl persönlicher Wichtigkeit, 
das ihr vertraut war”], the narrator avoids irony and does not dismiss her feelings of family duty 
and pride in this scene. Detailed descriptions of Tony’s physiological reactions (“Die 
ehrerbietige Bedeutsamkeit…stieg ihr zu Kopf” and “ihr Herz pochte feierlich”) give substance 
to the narration of her emotions, showing how much she is moved by what she reads. 
Exclamatory statements convey Tony’s excitement and conviction to do her part for her family 
by agreeing to a marriage of convenience, one of the few ways possible for a high bourgeois 
woman of her time to bring honor to her family. With the knowledge that Tony does not love 
Grünlich, readers can appreciate her sacrifice for the sake of her family’s honor. Only in 
retrospect, after Tony divorces Grünlich, does this scene take on a tragicomic effect.  
In other scenes, Mann’s narrator expresses skepticism towards Tony’s unreflective 
bourgeois pride. He refers to Tony’s admission of her penchant for luxury, and asserts that she  
würde mit der gleichen Ruhe erklärt haben, daß sie leichtsinnig, jähzornig, 
rachsüchtig sei. Ihr ausgeprägter Familiensinn entfremdete sie nahezu den 
Begriffen des freien Willens und der Selbstbestimmung und machte, daß sie mit 
einem beinahe fatalistischen Gleichmut ihre Eigenschaften feststellte und 
anerkannte … ohne Unterschied und ohne den Versuch, sie zu korrigieren. Sie 
war, ohne es selbst zu wissen, der Meinung, daß jede Eigenschaft, gleichviel 
welcher Art, ein Erbstück, eine Familientradition bedeute und folglich etwas 
Ehrwürdiges sei, wovor man in jedem Falle Respekt haben müsse. (Buddenbrooks 
222) 
Recalling Dr. Grabow’s suppressed critique of the Buddenbrooks’ bourgeois-aristocratic 
lifestyle, this passage is highly subversive. The narrator hints that Tony’s acceptance of tradition 
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and strong sense of family [Familiensinn] have negative consequences of which she remains 
unaware. It becomes evident in this passage that the narrator values the capacity to self-reflect, 
distinguish between one’s positive and negative attributes, and correct undesirable qualities. His 
humorous assertion that Tony would have considered even her frivolousness, quick temper, and 
vengefulness [Leichtsinn, Jähzorn, Rachsucht] inherited traits worthy of respect highlights and 
ridicules her own inability to do so. Tony’s tendency to view all of her habits, both positive and 
negative ones, as part of her Buddenbrook family inheritance and identity, and thus as dignified 
and honorable aspects of her personality, prevents her from modifying her emotions and 
behaviors. Despite changing social economic conditions that diminish material differences 
between ‘old money’ families like the Buddenbrooks and ‘parvenu’ families like the 
Hagenströms, Tony continues to perceive her family as above others because of their family 
history and, as a result, she clings to her inherited emotional code and value system. Narrative 
irony reveals skepticism toward Tony’s convictions and already suggests the need for an 
understanding of emotionality and identity development that allows for change over time. 
Consequently, Tony’s pride is exposed as unreflective and inflated. As the narrator suggests 
here, this impairs her free will and limits her self-development, which is the most important 
critique of the Buddenbrooks’ ‘bourgeois’ emotions expressed in the novel.  
The extent to which Tony’s pride is depicted in Buddenbrooks suggests the importance of 
pride in Mann’s thinking about emotion at the fin de siècle. When the word ‘pride’ does not 
appear directly, it becomes evident in the narrator’s description of her body language: “Tony 
ihrerseits zog ein wenig die Schultern empor, legte den Kopf zurück, suchte trotzdem das Kinn 
auf die Brust zu drücken und grüßte gleichsam von einer unabsehbaren Höhe herab…” 
(Buddenbrooks 383). Through their repetition, these phrases that Mann uses to describe Tony’s 
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pride lend a comic element to the narration. Structurally, these narrative descriptions act as 
leitmotifs, highlighting the tenacity of Tony’s pride in contrast to the Buddenbrooks’ decline. In 
spite of it all, the narrator reports that Tony “war gewillt, den Kopf hoch zu tragen, solange sie 
über der Erde weilte und Menschen auf sie blickten” (Buddenbrooks 833). Tony’s ability to 
withstand hardships may cause readers to overlook the misfortunes she endures because of her 
desire to contribute to the Buddenbrook family honor and history. The narrator mockingly calls 
Tony’s airing of grievances against those who have wronged her and her family “kleine 
Trompetenstöße des Abscheus” [little trumpet blasts of disgust], but he also notes the positive 
effects of her ability to express her emotions openly: “Ihr Magen war nicht ganz gesund, aber ihr 
Herz war leicht und frei – sie wußte selbst nicht, wie sehr. Nichts Unausgesprochenes zehrte an 
ihr; kein stummes Erlebnis belastete sie. … Sie wußte, daß sie bewegte und arge Schicksale 
gehabt, aber all Das hatte ihr keinerlei Schwere und Müdigkeit hinterlassen…” (Buddenbrooks 
739). Thus, Tony’s pride is life-affirming—despite occasional stomach problems, she remains 
healthy, and, in the final scene of the novel, her family pride plays a role in keeping the 
Buddenbrook women together. She takes possession of the Buddenbrook family chronicle after 
Hanno’s death and suggests that the women gather weekly to read the family papers after dinner, 
which shows that Tony holds on to her sense of family pride and honor.20 The emotion is 
undoubtedly subject to scrutiny, but moments of identification with Tony, together with the 
novel’s conclusion, show that pride, like Nietzsche’s will to power, has an important life-
preserving function. 
                                                 
20 “‘…solange ich am Leben bin, wollen wir hier zusammenhalten, wir paar Leute, die wir übrig bleiben…Einmal in 
der Woche kommt ihr zu mir zum Essen…Und dann lesen wir in den Familienpapieren-’ Sie berührte die Mappe, 
die vor ihr lag. ‘Ja, Gerda, ich übernehme sie mit Dank’” (Buddenbrooks 835). 
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4.5.2 Hanno Buddenbrook’s Decadent Sensibility 
In many ways, Tony is a character foil to her nephew, Hanno Buddenbrook. Nowhere is this 
clearer than in the analogous scene in which Hanno reads the Buddenbrook family chronicle, as 
Tony had done years earlier: “Mit einem Bein auf dem Schreibsessel knieend, das weich 
gewellte hellbraune Haar in die flache Hand gestützt, musterte Hanno das Manuskript, ein wenig 
von der Seite, mit dem matt-kritischen und ein bißchen verächtlichen Ernste einer vollkommenen 
Gleichgültigkeit…” (Buddenbrooks 575). Unlike Tony, Hanno does not become filled with pride 
or the desire to assume the expected role in the family upon reading the chronicle; the narrator’s 
account emphasizes his apathy, if not contempt. For him, the Buddenbrook family tree is merely 
“das ganze genealogische Gewimmel,” not something with which he identifies (Buddenbrooks 
575). While Tony exhibits a life-affirming sense of family pride and infatuation with the high 
bourgeois-aristocratic lifestyle, Hanno exemplifies life-negating pity, fear, and hopelessness and 
an aversion to the bourgeois world. With Hanno, ‘unbourgeois’ emotions reach their climax and 
the Buddenbrook family line ends.  
Considering Nietzsche’s influence on Thomas Mann, it is probably not surprising that the 
‘sensitive latecomer’ Hanno exhibits many of the emotions and qualities that Nietzsche 
diagnosed as symptoms of decadence, including pity, ‘emasculated’ emotions, pessimism, 
mistrust of life, hopelessness, diseased refinement, and introspection (see Nietzsche GM Vorrede 
§5, §6; GM II §7, §16). Although the figure Hanno is less psychologically complex than Thomas 
Buddenbrook, Hanno inspires more compassion, both from the narrator and readers, due to the 
blending of his perspective with that of the narrator and the detailed depictions of his suffering. 
The avoidance of narrative irony is another sign of the narrator’s alignment with Hanno, whose 
emotions and experiences are generally represented with greater intensity than those of the other 
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figures. This evidence suggests that Mann and his narrator demonstrate more acceptance of and 
identification with Hanno’s decadent emotionality than Nietzsche would have afforded. Even so, 
Buddenbrooks also registers the potential dangers of Hanno’s decadent sensibility—in addition 
to distancing techniques, as applied in the penultimate chapter, the Typhus-Kapitel, the other 
characters voice their concerns about Hanno, often in a very Nietzschean way.  
Internal focalization and interior monologue are used to convey Hanno’s thoughts and 
emotions in most of the scenes in which he appears, and several of these depict Hanno’s 
reception or own performances of music or poetry. On the occasion of the one hundredth 
anniversary of the Buddenbrook family firm, Hanno prepares to recite a poem, but his mother’s 
attempt to provide reassurance (“Keine Aufregung!”) inspires just the opposite reaction, which 
the narrator reports through free indirect speech and interior monologue:  
Er wußte wohl, was geschehen würde. Er würde weinen müssen, vor Weinen dies 
Gedicht nicht beenden können … weinen, wie es immer geschah, wenn man von 
ihm verlangte, daß er sich produziere, ihn examinierte, ihn auf seine Fähigkeit 
und Geistesgegenwart prüfte, wie Papa das liebte. Hätte nur Mama lieber nichts 
von Aufregung gesagt! Es sollte eine Ermutigung sein, aber sie war verfehlt, das 
fühlte er. Da standen sie und sahen ihn an. Sie fürchteten und erwarteten, daß er 
weinen werde…war es da möglich, nicht zu weinen? (Buddenbrooks 532) 
Free indirect speech blends the narrator’s report with Hanno’s own thoughts and feelings in this 
passage, but the irony that commonly accompanies free indirect speech for other characters in 
Buddenbrooks is decidedly absent. Narrative irony is neither necessary nor possible because it 
typically operates on a discrepancy between reality and appearance or the ignorance of a 
character, and the narrator admits Hanno’s knowledge (“Er wußte wohl…“), not ignorance. 
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Hanno, whose introspection gives him an uncanny awareness of his own feelings and 
motivations and those of others, easily predicts what will happen next: he will cry before he 
finishes his recitation of the poem. Due to the blurring of perspectives, it remains unclear 
whether the rhetorical question at the end (“war es da möglich, nicht zu weinen?”) is Hanno’s 
own thought or a question posed by the narrator to readers. Either way, the passage as a whole 
suspends judgment and enacts empathy for Hanno’s situation.  
Yet the same scene also conveys another perspective. Just as Hanno predicts, his father 
tests his abilities. Employing limited narration to heighten the emotional impact of the scene, the 
narrator notes that “die Wimpern hielt [Hanno] so tief gesenkt, daß nichts von seinen Augen zu 
sehen war. Wahrscheinlich schwammen schon Thränen darin” (Buddenbrooks 533). Thereafter, 
the narrator uses free indirect speech to communicate Thomas’s perspective: “Das war grausam, 
und der Senator wußte wohl, daß er dem Kinde damit den letzten Rest von Haltung und 
Widerstandskraft raubte. Aber der Junge sollte ihn sich nicht rauben lassen! Er sollte sich nicht 
beirren lassen! Er sollte Festigkeit und Männlichkeit gewinnen…” (Buddenbrooks 533). The 
blending of the narrator and character perspectives makes it difficult to distinguish whether the 
phrase “Das war grausam,” which undoubtedly refers to Thomas’s relentless demands of Hanno, 
reflects Thomas’s own admission of his cruelty or the narrator’s condemnation. Although the 
passages cited above demonstrate empathy for Hanno, Thomas’s thoughts, in this very 
Nietzschean moment, reflect a genuine concern for Hanno and the desire to teach him strength 
and resistance, so as not to allow others to rob him of his power. Significantly, Tony voices 
similar concerns in conversation with Hanno’s governess, Ida Jungmann, in another passage: 
“Aber ich will dir sagen, Ida, es ist nicht gut, ich halte es nicht für gut, daß ihm Alles so nahe 
geht. … Das Kind – so viel weiß ich schon – neigt dazu, Alle Dinge zu sehr zu Herzen zu 
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nehmen… Das muß an ihm zehren, glaube mir” (Buddenbrooks 510). The two women discuss 
Hanno’s tendency to cry so easily while reading poetry, and, although the narrator alludes to 
Tony’s lack of insight into her own emotions, she recognizes the danger of Hanno’s decadent 
sensibility. While Hanno is highly introspective, he lacks the resistance Tony possesses, which 
explains why she voices her concerns so clearly.  
We find the most extensive use of internal focalization and interior monologue for Hanno 
in Part XI Chapter 2, better known as the Schulkapitel. The narrator’s empathy with Hanno in 
this chapter is especially evident in the critical depiction of Kandidat Modersohn, the English 
teacher on trial at Hanno’s school. Internal focalization and free indirect speech convey Hanno’s 
introspection and ability to see through the actions of Herr Modersohn, who singles Hanno out 
for his weakness and tyrannizes him, using him as a scapegoat when the other students 
misbehave. Alternating with free indirect speech, interior monologue conveys Hanno’s thoughts 
and feelings in response to his punishment: 
Selbst das Mitleid wird einem auf Erden durch die Gemeinheit unmöglich 
gemacht, dachte Hanno. Ich nehme nicht daran teil, Sie zu quälen und 
auszubeuten, Kandidat Modersohn, weil ich das brutal, häßlich und gewöhnlich 
finde, und wie antworten Sie mir? Aber so ist es, so ist es, so wird es immer und 
überall sich verhalten, dachte er, und Furcht und Übelkeit stiegen wieder in ihm 
auf. Und daß ich Sie obendrein so widerlich deutlich durchschauen muß!... 
(Buddenbrooks 814) 
Recalling Nietzsche’s arguments against the modern ‘Mitleids-Moral,’ this passage provides an 
illustration of the potential danger of pity, which both Hanno and the narrator recognize here. 
Hanno demonstrates compassion for Modersohn, but the teacher only uses it to assert power and 
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authority over Hanno by mistreating him. Despite the perception that “Selbst das Mitleid […] 
einem auf Erden durch die Gemeinheit unmöglich gemacht [wird],” compassion or pity is only 
exposed as dangerous when it is applied to cruel (Modersohn) or dishonest (Grünlich) 
individuals who try to exploit others. When Hanno shows compassion for his father, who 
agonizes over the thought of Gerda’s unfaithfulness with Lieutenant von Throta, the narrator 
describes its positive effect: the foreignness and coldness in their father-son relationship melt 
away (see Buddenbrooks 716). Hence, the narrator of Buddenbrooks does not attack Hanno’s 
decadent sensibility or pity, but, as we saw in the critique of Tony’s emotions, he values the 
ability to distinguish between situations and modify one’s behaviors.  
Focalized almost entirely from Hanno’s perspective, the Schulkapitel, which concludes 
with the narrator’s comment “Dies war ein Tag aus dem Leben des kleinen Johann,” illustrates in 
great detail how Hanno perceives the world (Buddenbrooks 828). The narrator’s use of the 
indefinite article (“ein Tag”) suggests that this day, which begins with Hanno’s feelings of fear, 
disgust, and sickness at school and ends with his melancholic retreat into the tragic and ecstatic 
realm of Wagnerian music, is nothing out of the ordinary, but a common occurrence. Although 
the Schulkapitel depicts only a single day in Hanno’s life, it is the longest chapter in 
Buddenbrooks. Compared to the novel’s other chapters, which generally cover longer periods of 
narrated time, the Schulkapitel slows down the narrative speed dramatically, thus intensifying the 
narration of Hanno’s thoughts and emotions. Thus, Mann’s narrator does not dismiss Hanno’s 
fears, suffering, and exhaustion, but gives them an even greater impression of reality.  
The subsequent Typhus-Kapitel marks a shift in narrative technique. Utilizing the form of 
an entry on typhus found in a nineteenth-century medical manual, the narrator reports Hanno’s 
death indirectly in this chapter. A distanced, impersonal medical description of the different 
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stages of the disease that ultimately claims Hanno’s life serves to report his experience of the 
illness and final days. Hanno is not even mentioned by name in the Typhus-Kapitel; instead, ‘der 
Mensch,’ ‘der Patient,’ and the pronoun ‘er’ add to its impersonal, diagnostic tone (see 
Buddenbrooks 828-832). The conclusion of the chapter implies that it is possible for the typhus 
patient to recover, i.e. that the patient himself has the power to choose between life and death:  
Wallt es dann auf in ihm, wie ein Gefühl der feigen Pflichtversäumnis, der 
Scham, der erneuten Energie, des Mutes und der Freude, der Liebe und 
Zugehörigkeit zu dem spöttischen, bunten und brutalen Getriebe, das er im 
Rücken gelassen: wie weit er auch auf dem fremden, heißen Pfade fortgeirrt sein 
mag, er wird umkehren und leben. Aber zuckt er zusammen vor Furcht und 
Abneigung bei der Stimme des Lebens, die er vernimmt, bewirkt diese 
Erinnerung, dieser lustige, herausfordernde Laut, daß er den Kopf schüttelt und in 
Abwehr die Hand hinter sich streckt und sich vorwärts flüchtet auf dem Wege, der 
sich ihm zum Entrinnen eröffnet hat ... nein, es ist klar, dann wird er sterben. – 
(Buddenbrooks 832) 
Yet Hanno embraces the negation of the will outlined in Schopenhauer’s philosophy, and, out of 
fear of and aversion to the “Stimme des Lebens” [voice of life], chooses death. Here, the life-
negating potential of Hanno’s decadent sensibility is fully realized. In this way, by suggesting 
that the sensibility fashionable in late nineteenth-century European society could impair the will 
to live, the novel participates in the fin-de-siècle discourses of decadence and neurasthenia. As if 
to keep sentimentalism at bay and offset the narrative empathy shown in previous chapters, the 
Typhus-Kapitel reflects an attempt to create more distance between the narrator or readers and 
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Hanno. By way of its emotional restraint, however, the composed, detached manner of narration 
nonetheless appeals to empathy. 
4.6 HETEROPATHIA AS EXPRESSION OF MANN’S ‘POETIC CRITICISM’ 
As illustrated by the examples of Tony’s bourgeois pride and Hanno’s decadent, unbourgeois 
sensibility, neither way of feeling is fully embraced or invalidated in the novel. Hence, the 
manner in which Buddenbrooks scrutinizes and historicizes nineteenth-century emotional codes 
is relativist in orientation, yet the novel does not fully defend a position of emotional and moral 
relativism. Mann’s empathetic-ironic narrative style is selective: it allows readers more fully to 
comprehend the emotions and motivations of figures like Tony, Hanno, and Thomas 
Buddenbrook despite skepticism toward their perspectives, while figures like Tony’s ex-
husbands, Bendix Grünlich and Alois Permaneder, and Christian Buddenbrook are portrayed 
more critically. In order to claim that Buddenbrooks espouses moral relativism, one would have 
to overlook these partialities and the novel’s critical depiction of the emotional regime at 
Hanno’s school. Instead, the novel exemplifies Mann’s ‘dichterischer Kritizismus’ or poetic 
criticism, distinguished by its ‘relentless quest for knowledge through observation and its critical 
incisiveness of expression.’21 
In the Schulkapitel more than any other chapter of Buddenbrooks, Thomas Mann resists 
relativism and exposes troubling contradictions in the modern period. Early in the chapter, the 
narrator reports that the Gothic architectural style of the old monastery school, once attended by 
                                                 
21 “…die Rücksichtslosigkeit der beobachtenden Erkenntnis und die kritische Prägnanz des Ausdrucks…” (Mann, 
Essays I: 45).  
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Thomas and Christian Buddenbrook and now by Hanno, was preserved. The maintenance of the 
Gothic ribbed vaults contrasts with the efforts to modernize the school facilities after German 
unification in 1871:  
Der Stil des Ganzen war gewahrt worden, und über Korridoren und Kreuzgängen 
spannten sich feierlich die gotischen Gewölbe. Was aber die Beleuchtung und 
Heizung, was die Geräumigkeit und Helligkeit der Klassen, die Behaglichkeit der 
Lehrerzimmer, die praktische Einrichtung der Säle für Chemie-, Physik- und 
Zeichenunterricht betraf, so herrschte der vollste Komfort der Neuzeit…. 
(Buddenbrooks 780) 
The narrator catalogues these improvements in heating, lighting, and classroom equipment, all of 
which herald a ‘Neuzeit’ [modern period] characterized by rapid developments and greater 
comfort. Yet an ellipsis in the final clause suspends the narration and indicates that the narrator’s 
initial comments only tell part of the story. Focusing on these modern conveniences temporarily 
obscures a more significant change in the atmosphere of the school, namely, that “…ein anderer, 
ein neuer Geist in die alte Schule eingezogen [war]” (Buddenbrooks 796). Mann’s telling choice 
of the verb herrschen [to dominate; to reign] in this passage already alludes to an oppressive 
emotional regime that is later shown to have transformed the school during the Wilhelmine Era.  
Only 16 pages later, after internal focalization enables readers to observe through 
Hanno’s eyes the Wilhelmine authoritarianism and militarism instituted at the school, does the 
narrator resume his remarks about the changes that have taken place. Readers learn that when 
Prusssian Direktor Wulicke takes over the school in 1871, the founding year of the Deutsches 
Kaiserreich, “Autorität, Pflicht, Macht, Dienst, Karriere,” together with the “kategorische 
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Imperativ unseres Philosophen Kant,” 22 become the key values and motto impressed upon 
students (Buddenbrooks 796). The following speculations of Mann’s narrator cast doubt upon 
these values and the progress and comfort of the modern period: “Allein es blieb die Frage, ob 
nicht früher, als weniger Komfort der Neuzeit und ein bißchen mehr Gutmütigkeit, Gemüt, 
Heiterkeit, Wohlwollen und Behagen in diesen Räumen geherrscht hatte, die Schule ein 
sympathischeres und segenvolleres Institut gewesen war...” (Buddenbrooks 796). Although the 
narrator avoids the direct condemnation of Direktor Wulicke and his authoritarian emotional 
regime in this passage, this follow-up to his initial comments complicates the reader’s first 
impression of the school and reflects a strong preference for pre-1871 conditions over the 
comforts of the modern period. Judged against the string of positively connoted substantives 
(“Gutmütigkeit, Gemüt, Heiterkeit, Wohlwollen und Behagen”), all of which signify good-
heartedness or bonhomie, the expression “der vollste Komfort der Neuzeit” appears shallow and 
insincere (Buddenbrooks 780; 796). This passage implies that modern conveniences and 
technology contribute only in a superficial way to human well-being and comfort. Moreover, it 
cautions that modernization and the humanization of social and emotional codes do not always 
coincide. Thus, by raising such ethical questions about modernization in the Schulkapitel, 
Mann’s Buddenbrooks promotes the critical examination of emotional codes and social practices, 
not a moral relativism that tolerates malevolence.23 Here, the ellipsis and rhetorical question 
                                                 
22 The narrator’s reference to Kant’s categorical imperative in this context recalls Nietzsche’s comment about its 
cruelty in Zur Genealogie der Moral: “Und dürfte man nicht hinzufügen, das jene Welt im Grunde einen gewissen 
Geruch von Blut und Folter niemals wieder ganz eingebüsst habe? (selbst beim alten Kant nicht: der kategorische 
Imperativ riecht nach Grausamkeit…)” (GM II §6). 
 
23 We find a similar reference to the limits of moral relativism or tolerance in a dictum from Mann’s Zauberberg 
(1924). Settembrini instructs Hans Castorp “Prägen Sie sich immerhin ein, daß Toleranz zum Verbrechen wird, 
wenn sie dem Bösen gilt” (Zauberberg Chapter 6, “Als Soldat und brav”). 
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(“Allein, es blieb die Frage, ob…”) do not convey the narrator’s uncertainty as much as they 
serve to open up a dialogue and involve readers in the search for an answer. 
Mann’s narrator portrays the emotional regime at Hanno’s school unsympathetically and 
disapprovingly in the Schulkapitel. Since Buddenbrooks depicts both positive and negative 
aspects and outcomes of all other emotional styles, however, no single way of feeling emerges as 
completely unproblematic or exempt from critique. Instead, the novel negotiates between 
bourgeois and unbourgeois orientations to emotion and self-reflexively locates this act of 
mediation within the processes of literary creation and reception. Offering readers opportunities 
to identify with and distance themselves from the perspectives of the figures represented in the 
diegetic world, literary works permit the experimentation with and evaluation of contrasting 
emotional styles and value systems. 
4.7 KAI GRAF MÖLLN: MODERN ARTIST AND STRUCTURAL METAPHOR 
FOR THE MEDIATION OF EMOTION IN BUDDENBROOKS 
In Buddenbrooks, the figure Kai Graf Mölln best embodies this kind of artistic mediation, which 
Mann termed ‘Mittlertum.’24 Like Hanno, the aspiring young writer Kai is sensitive to the ways 
of the world and possesses a highly developed critical gaze, which enables him to see through 
[durchschauen] individual motivations and social practices. Despite Hanno and Kai’s similar 
perceptive capacities, common status as decadent young artists, and mutual homoeroticism, the 
                                                 
24 For Mann, ‘Mittlertum’ or the mediation of the artist is the source from which irony arises. He discusses 
‘Mittlertum’ in his Schopenhauer essay (1938): “Die vermittelnde Aufgabe des Künstlers, seine hermetisch-
zauberhafte Rolle als Mittler zwischen oberer und unterer Welt, zwischen Idee und Erscheinung, Geist und 
Sinnlichkeit kommt hier zum Vorschein…. Dies Mittlertum ist die Quelle der Ironie” (GW IX 534). 
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two figures stand in sharp contrast to each other. While Hanno represents the last male heir of a 
declining bourgeois merchant family, Kai comes from an aristocratic family that has already seen 
its demise. The two friends also differ in their expression of masculinity, with Kai performing a 
“stürmisch aggressive Männlichkeit” that acts as a counterweight to Hanno’s subdued, refined 
manner (Buddenbrooks 569). The most significant difference between the two figures, however, 
is evident in their orientations toward emotion and artistic creation. The distinction between the 
two artists’ emotions is voiced most clearly in Hanno’s dialogue with Kai in the Schulkapitel: 
Ich fürchte mich vor dem Ganzen…. Mit dir ist es so anders. Du hast mehr Mut. 
Du gehst hier herum und lachst über das Ganze und hast ihnen etwas 
entgegenzuhalten. Du willst schreiben, willst den Leuten Schönes und 
Merkwürdiges erzählen, gut: das ist etwas. Und du wirst sicher berühmt werden, 
du bist so geschickt. […] Wir denken dasselbe, aber du schneidest eine Fratze und 
bist stolz … Ich kann das nicht. Ich werde so müde davon. Ich möchte schlafen 
und nichts mehr wissen. Ich möchte sterben, Kai! … Nein, es ist nichts mit mir. 
Ich kann nichts wollen. Ich will nicht einmal berühmt werden. Ich habe Angst 
davor, genau, als wäre ein Unrecht dabei! […] Ich habe so vielerlei Sorgen, und 
alles fällt mir so schwer. […] Ich habe gar keine Hoffnung…. (Buddenbrooks 
819-820) 
Hanno’s self-characterization in this passage exemplifies exactly that which Nietzsche detests in 
modern society: weariness with humanity and weakness. He cites his all-encompassing fear (“Ich 
fürchte mich vor dem Ganzen”), denial of the will to live (“Ich möchte sterben…ich kann nichts 
wollen”), worries (“vielerlei Sorgen”), and hopelessness (“Ich habe gar keine Hoffnung). 
Hanno’s improvisations of Wagnerian music become the means by which to enact these 
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emotions and escape the bourgeois world. In Kai, Hanno sees the qualities that he himself lacks, 
namely, courage (“Du hast mehr Mut”) and pride (“du … bist stolz”). These emotions, along 
with Kai’s sense of humor and desire to write, facilitate the artistic process. Unlike Hanno, Kai 
possesses a powerful will to live and to create, which allow him to productively transform his 
experiences through irony in his stories and produce beautiful works for the enjoyment of others.  
Critics might consider Kai a minor character in Buddenbrooks because he only appears or 
is mentioned in five chapters25 of the novel, and only in scenes in which Hanno is also present. 
Nevertheless, I find sufficient evidence to make the case that Kai is the true stand-in for Mann’s 
vision of the modern artist. Kai has much in common with Mann’s narrator: he demonstrates a 
realist conception of art,26 mastery of irony, affection for Hanno, and fascination with the theme 
of decline, as his aspiration to write a story like Edgar Allan Poe’s “The Fall of the House of 
Usher”27 reveals. Moreover, Kai essentially serves as a structural metaphor for the mediation of 
emotion in Buddenbrooks. This sensitive yet ironic artist figure highlights what Mann’s novel 
does as an aesthetic whole, namely, mediate between narrative empathy and irony at the 
extradiegetic level, and life-affirming pride and decadent sensibility at the intradiegetic level. 
The details of Kai’s story prove significant for the understanding of Mann’s perspective 
on emotion, decadence, and artistic mediation (Mittlertum) around 1900. This characterization of 
Kai in the Schulkapitel, especially Hanno’s allusion to his pride (“du…bist stolz…Ich kann das 
                                                 
25 Kai appears in Part VIII Chapter 7, Part X Chapters 2 and 3, and Part XI Chapter 2 (Schulkapitel). In the final 
chapter of the novel (Part XI Chapter 4), his name is also mentioned once by the narrator, who recounts how before 
Hanno’s death “Kai hatte ihm [Hanno] unaufhörlich beide Hände geküßt” (Buddenbrooks 836) 
 
26 “Kais Geschichten […] gewannen an Interesse dadurch, daß sie nicht gänzlich in der Luft standen, sondern von 
der Wirklichkeit ausgingen und diese in ein seltsames und geheimnisvolles Licht rückten…” (Buddenbrooks 572). 
 
27 “Kai verfiel in Gedanken. ‘Dieser Roderich Usher ist die wundervollste Figur, die je erfunden worden ist!’ sagte 
er schnell und unvermittelt. ‘Ich habe eben diese ganze Stunde gelesen…Wenn ich jemals eine so gute Geschichte 
schreiben könnte!” (Buddenbrooks 794). 
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nicht”) invites a comparison with the narrative rendering of Tony’s pride. Alternately termed 
Stolz or Hochmut, Tony’s pride is life-affirming, but it derives entirely from her strong 
identification with her class identity and family history. Kai’s pride is not grounded in such 
narrow terms as social class or familial distinction, but in a more general concept of human self-
worth and the desire to contribute to society through his art. Significantly, Kai’s pride and will to 
create, in contrast to Tony’s class-based Hochmut and love of all things vornehm, do not become 
objects of narrative irony in Buddenbrooks. Consequently, while Mann uses the figure Kai, who 
shows the creative power of decadent sensibility and introspection, to problematize Nietzsche’s 
dismissive view of fin-de-siècle decadence, the novel suggests that powerful, life-affirming 
emotions like pride, courage, and a zeal for life are also necessary. 
4.8 CONCLUSION 
My reading of heteropathia in Buddenbrooks in this chapter demonstrates that Thomas 
Mann, much like Theodor Fontane and Lou Andreas-Salomé, addresses the fin-de-siècle 
dilemma of how to negotiate between emotional codes and social mores and find a new point of 
orientation in the course of rapid cultural change. Yet the multigenerational family saga structure 
of Buddenbrooks sets Mann’s novel apart from Effi Briest and Fenitschka, both of which cover a 
much shorter span of narrated time. Depicting the gradual deterioration of the Buddenbrooks’ 
bourgeois emotional code and transition to other, ‘unbourgeois’ ways of feeling in the course of 
four generations, Buddenbrooks offers critical assessments of a range of emotional styles through 
its empathetic-ironic narration. The narrator’s treatment of Tony’s bourgeois pride and devotion 
to the Buddenbrook family honor in contradistinction to Hanno’s decadent sensibility, 
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introspection, and pity best illustrates the novel’s negotiation between bourgeois and 
unbourgeois emotions. Mann draws on a Nietzschean genealogical method for this purpose, but 
his approach also contrasts with that of Nietzsche, who used genealogy to discredit modern 
morality and scorned the ‘effeminization of emotions’ [“Gefühlsverweichlichung”], diseased 
refinement [“krankhafte Verzärtlichung”], and introspection that he diagnosed in late nineteenth-
century Europe (see Nietzsche GM Preface §6; GM II §7, §24). Rather than advance a single 
ideological viewpoint, Mann uses genealogy to find a middle ground between the unwavering 
bourgeois pride and self-confidence stimulated by German programmatic realism and the 
decadent sensibility that became fashionable at the fin de siècle. 
With its figure of the young writer Kai, who exemplifies both powerful, life-affirming 
pride and decadent sensibility, Buddenbrooks imagines the artist as the one most capable of 
negotiating between differing ways of feeling. Kai’s irony and strong will to live and to create 
for the enjoyment of others sustain him, preventing him from suffering the same fate as Hanno. 
Thus, it is Kai, not Hanno, who best represents Mann’s vision of the modern artist and ideal of 
poetic criticism. To use the words that Mann put into the mouth of his figure Thomas 
Buddenbrook, “Es wird immer Menschen geben, die zu diesem Interesse an sich selbst, diesem 
eingehenden Beobachten ihrer Empfindungen berechtigt sind, Dichter, die ihr bevorzugtes 
Innenleben mit Sicherheit und Schönheit auszusprechen vermögen und damit die Gefühlswelt 
der anderen Leute bereichern” (Buddenbrooks 290). These words describe Thomas Mann’s own 
contributions as a writer—yet his debut novel, Buddenbrooks, does not simply enrich, but also 
provides insight into the emotional world of his readers, bourgeois and unbourgeois alike.
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5.0  CONCLUSIONS 
“We have to learn to think differently in order at last, perhaps very late on, to attain even 
more: to feel differently.”1 
 
What does it mean to ‘feel differently’? For Friedrich Nietzsche in the above passage from §103 
of Morgenröte, feeling differently is a necessary step toward achieving the transvaluation of all 
moral values. Although Nietzsche’s aphorism provided the initial inspiration for the title of this 
dissertation, my analysis has shown that the literary works discussed here represent positions that 
are more moderate. The authors of these works, particularly Lou Andreas-Salomé and Thomas 
Mann, were undeniably influenced by Nietzschean thought; however, these ‘heteropathic’ texts 
negotiate between differing affective perspectives, rather than call for a new morality or 
prescribe one way of feeling. In light of the analysis offered in the preceding chapters, “Feeling 
Differently at the Fin de Siècle” reflects three distinct insights: 1. that emotions have a history, 2. 
that differing emotional styles existed simultaneously at the fin de siècle, and 3. that literary 
works created spaces for readers to feel differently during this period of unprecedented 
Kulturwandel. These three understandings implied by my title summarize the primary 
contributions of my dissertation.   
                                                 
1 “Wir haben umzulernen, – um endlich, vielleicht sehr spät, noch mehr zu erreichen: umzufühlen” (Nietzsche, 
Morgenröte Book II §103). 
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As an intervention in the interdisciplinary field of emotion studies, my dissertation has 
taken up the question of the history of emotions. The premise that emotions are always-already 
social guided my discussions in each chapter. Since emotions arise in social and institutional 
contexts that change over time, I argued that emotions also have a history. In an attempt to build 
a bridge between the history of emotions and literary studies, my project investigated how 
literary works have represented emotions, taken up extra-literary emotion discourses, and 
contributed to the emotion discourse of their own time. Examples cited from literary and non-
literary texts provided evidence that emotions such as compassion and honor have been 
conceptualized and valued differently through cultural history. In addition, my analyses have 
drawn attention to emotional practices that were part of the emotional repertoire in late 
nineteenth-century Wilhelmine society, i.e. decadent sensibility, bourgeois pride, masculine 
honor, and feminine shame, all of which have largely fallen out of fashion or declined in 
relevance since the early twentieth century. 
By focusing on the fin de siècle, however, this project contributes primarily to 
scholarship on the literature and history of Wilhelmine Germany around 1900. After 1871, the 
Deutsches Kaiserreich became increasingly differentiated and pluralized, and this, together with 
the accelerated and irregular nature of modernization, had a destabilizing effect. Particularly the 
turn of the century in Wilhelmine society is often described as having been riddled by cultural 
tensions and contradictions (compare Marchand and Lindenfeld 1-6). My analysis of emotion in 
literary and non-literary sources of this period has offered new insights into these tensions. I have 
shown that emotional codes and social mores—especially the ‘social’ emotions of compassion, 
honor, shame, love, pride, and pity—were contested topics of public and intellectual debate 
around 1900. A co-presence of differing orientations to these emotions is evident in the fin-de-
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siècle literary works analyzed in this dissertation, as my discussions of heteropathia in each 
chapter have attested.  
The question of how writers have represented emotions in literary works written during 
periods of rapid social change guided this research and narrowed my focus on the fin de siècle, 
more precisely, the 1890s. Yet literature does not simply represent emotions. Nor does literature 
merely supply emotional scripts, which passive readers then imitate. Literary works, because of 
their capacity to affectively engage readers, can crystallize readers’ emotions and values, call 
these into question, negotiate between differing emotional styles, and imagine and validate 
alternatives. In the preceding chapters, I suggested that fin-de-siècle literary works negotiated 
between late nineteenth-century emotional codes and social mores and created spaces for readers 
to feel differently during a period of uncertainty and rapid cultural change. My readings of Effi 
Briest, Fenitschka, and Buddenbrooks have demonstrated how these works juxtapose, subvert, 
and validate differing affective perspectives and provide opportunities for readers to reflect 
critically upon their own emotions and values. 
Through these contributions, I have made the case for a more nuanced way of reading 
emotion in German literary and cultural history. The perceived antithesis between emotion and 
reason continues to influence how the German literary and cultural periods are taught and 
understood. This especially holds true for late nineteenth-century German Realism, which, when 
compared to German Romanticism, is often considered ‘unemotional’ or ‘repressed.’ It is an 
oversimplification, however, to say that each cultural period exalted or appealed more either to 
the emotions or to reason. In an effort to go beyond this tendency to dismiss emotions or describe 
them narrowly in terms of emotional (non-)expression or intensity, this dissertation has 
examined how, for which reasons, and to what effect fin-de-siècle German literary works written 
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in the realist mode represent emotions. Defining emotions as embodied, discursive social 
practices rather than simple, involuntary affective responses, has enabled me to focus on literary 
representations of emotion in relation to the socio-cultural contexts in which emotions arise and 
are given meaning. 
For the purpose of my literary analysis, I developed the concept heteropathia, along with 
a method of reading the heteropathic representation of emotion in novelistic prose texts. 
Heteropathia refers to the co-presence of differing ways of feeling represented within a single 
literary work or cultural object. It expands the focus of Bakhtinian discourse analysis to examine 
not the unity of diverse utterances or social speech types in the novel, but the narration of and 
interaction between distinct affective perspectives as they are presented in a single text. In 
addition to Bakhtinian analysis, I have drawn on and adapted approaches in narrative theory and 
interdisciplinary research on emotion for this methodology. My analyses of heteropathia in Effi 
Briest, Fenitschka, and Buddenbrooks concentrated on the three aspects of a novelistic prose text 
that significantly influence the mediation of emotion in the work as a whole: narrative situation 
(voice and focalization), representations of emotional styles, and references to theoretical models 
of emotion. My readings have broken new ground in interpreting these canonical texts because I 
investigated previously neglected aspects of these works, and, with the concept heteropathia, I 
have proposed an alternate and nonreductive way of analyzing emotion in German literary 
history.  
In the preceding chapters, I explored how heteropathia manifests itself in three German 
novelistic prose works written in the realist mode around 1900: Theodor Fontane’s Effi Briest 
(1895), Lou Andreas-Salomé’s Fenitschka (1898), and Thomas Mann’s Buddenbrooks: Verfall 
einer Familie (1901). These works evidence a deep engagement with extra-literary emotion 
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discourses and social questions that were of central importance at the fin de siècle. They indicate 
the authors’ awareness of and concerns with the most pressing issues of the time, including the 
women’s movement, modernization, social leveling, decadence, gendered social mores, morality, 
shifting social relations, and changes in business and family life. Emotion is at once an end itself 
and the means by which these writers represent differing perspectives on these social questions. 
My analyses have revealed how each novel concentrates on different emotions and social 
contexts, and resonates with distinct theoretical models of emotion. Yet I have found that all 
three works attend to a crisis in emotional codes and social mores in European culture around 
1900 and depict broad cultural shifts as coinciding with, or even necessitating, shifts in affective 
perspectives in modern society.  
In Chapter Two, I demonstrated how compassion and honor are represented as emotional 
antipodes associated with different moral systems in Fontane’s Effi Briest. The nineteenth-
century aristocratic and bourgeois emotional code of honor preserved social hierarchies and 
defended retributive justice. Mitleid or compassion, by contrast, implied solidarity and the 
softening of social mores. The tension between these two ways of feeling is enacted most vividly 
in the servants’ responses to the news of Effi’s adultery, Innstetten’s duel, and Crampas’s death, 
but this tension manifests itself throughout the entire novel. My interpretation has shown that Effi 
Briest makes room for compassion in a society undergoing modernization by critically 
examining and subverting the emotional imperatives of masculine honor and feminine shame. 
My analysis has confirmed that Fontane was influenced by Schopenhauer’s Mitleidsethik, the 
theoretical model of emotion that structures Effi Briest. Fontane’s novel does not imagine a 
society driven only by compassion, however. Instead, in Effi Briest Fontane adapts the 
philosopher’s ethics of compassion to fit his own worldview. The novel ultimately acknowledges 
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the need for both compassion and self-regulatory emotions, and its open ending enables the 
dialogic negotiation between affective perspectives to continue.  
Unlike Fontane’s Effi Briest, which inspires compassion for its passive title heroine, 
Andreas-Salomé’s Fenitschka (1898) constructs an active heroine who pursues self-realization 
and, in resistance to late nineteenth-century gendered emotional codes and social mores, defines 
her own emotional style, as I have shown in Chapter Three. Written against the historical 
background of the Sittlichkeitsbewegung and women’s movement, Fenitschka examines differing 
views on nineteenth-century romantic love and feminine shame, passivity, and sexual purity. The 
novella negotiates between differing orientations to the emotions of feminine shame and love, 
which it places in dialogue through its title heroine, Fenia, and extradiegetic-homodiegetic 
narrator and character focalizer, Max. The novella contributes to the fin-de-siècle emotion 
discourse by critiquing gendered emotional imperatives and double standards through the 
subversion of Max’s male gaze and attempts to categorize Fenia. Initially, Max assumes that all 
refined ladies must feel the same: they desire sensation, seek love within marriage, and feel 
shame and fear for their reputation. In her conversations with Max, Fenia questions the 
‘naturalness’ and universality of these emotional practices, however. My reading of Fenitschka 
highlights a shift from an essentialist model to a performative model of emotion that 
acknowledges emotional alterity, a shift that corresponds to Max’s Bildung through the course of 
the novella. Through both its title heroine and narrator, Fenitschka champions self-realization 
and validates alternate ways of feeling, albeit not without admitting the difficulty in challenging 
dominant cultural narratives. 
As the longest of the three literary works studied in my dissertation, Mann’s 
multigenerational novel Buddenbrooks stands apart from Effi Briest and Fenitschka. In Chapter 
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Four I demonstrated how the novel offers a critique of a wide range of emotional styles, from 
unreflective bourgeois pride to life-negating decadent sensibility, across four generations. 
Established ‘bourgeois’ emotional codes become increasingly difficult to preserve in the diegetic 
world of Buddenbrooks. The Buddenbrooks’ high bourgeois pride becomes ever more ironic in 
view of the rise of the nouveaux riches and other signs of social leveling depicted in the second 
half of the novel. In response to an ever-increasing work tempo in a rapidly modernizing society, 
life-negating decadent sensibility emerges as an alternate form of feeling. I suggested that Mann 
draws on a Nietzschean genealogical approach in Buddenbrooks, but, rather than advancing a 
single ideological viewpoint, Mann uses genealogy to mediate between these ‘bourgeois’ and 
‘unbourgeois’ emotions. Buddenbrooks self-reflexively highlights the role of literature in 
renegotiating emotional codes and social mores through its figure of the young writer Kai, who 
embodies both life-affirming pride and artistic sensibility. Kai, who, in contrast to Hanno, 
represents the creative power of decadent sensibility and introspection, problematizes 
Nietzsche’s dismissive view of fin-de-siècle decadence. Yet, through its association of Tony’s 
and Kai’s pride with vitality, the novel suggests that powerful, life-affirming emotions like pride 
and courage are also important. Thus, Mann’s Buddenbrooks most clearly recognizes that which 
I have argued all three fin-de-siècle novels do, namely, negotiate among differing orientations to 
emotion, offer social critique, and validate alternate ways of feeling. 
My interpretations of Effi Briest, Fenitschka, and Buddenbrooks have demonstrated that 
the heteropathic representation of emotion in these turn-of-the-century literary works evokes a 
sense of the period’s transitional status, contradictions, and social tensions. These novels feature 
literary techniques such as focalization shifts, free indirect speech, thought report, and narrative 
irony, all of which accommodate heteropathia and multiperspectivism. They represent differing 
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orientations to compassion, honor, shame, love, pride, and decadent sensibility, and they place 
these perspectives in dialogue with each other. I have shown that the novels’ representation of 
these differing affective perspectives and open endings foster a sustained dialogue between 
viewpoints. Through these open endings, readers are invited to continue the debates about 
emotions and cultural change. In other words, Effi Briest, Fenitschka, and Buddenbrooks do not 
teach readers how to think or feel, nor do they define one set of emotional codes and social 
mores. As we have seen, each novel blurs the lines between art and social criticism and raises its 
own ethical questions, but these works generally remain ambivalent about the ethical questions 
that they raise (e.g. Fontane’s famous expression, “Das ist ein (zu) weites Feld,” in Effi Briest). 
By representing issues from multiple viewpoints and declining to embrace any way of feeling 
uncritically, these works teach readers to question rather than impose values. Collectively, they 
acknowledge emotional alterity in a differentiated and pluralized society during a period of swift 
cultural change. While they offer no ‘new mythology,’ or single ideological approach to 
navigating the tides of social and emotional change around 1900, they promote dialogue, not 
only within the diegetic worlds, but also between readers. 
My dissertation has focused on the representation of emotion in German novels published 
around 1900, but the concept heteropathia invites broader applications and comparative projects. 
Future research could expand the scope of this study to include analyses of texts of other genres 
and cultural periods. In the present analysis, I restricted my application of heteropathia to 
novelistic prose works. I reasoned that, compared to works of other genres, a novel has the 
greatest capacity to represent a plurality of differing affective perspectives because of its length, 
number of characters, and diegetic levels. Additionally, I maintained that the genre’s length and 
openness of form make novels particularly well suited to engage with extra-literary emotion 
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discourses. As I indicated in my introduction, the concept heteropathia is also applicable to 
visual culture and other literary genres. The method of reading for heteropathia must be adapted 
for other types of cultural objects, however. Drama, poetry, and film enact differing ways of 
feeling in meaningful ways, but these genres require interpretive approaches that address how 
their distinguishing characteristics shape the representation of emotion. Once heteropathia is 
adapted for drama and poetry as well as novelistic prose, a comparative project using this 
approach would yield a more complex picture of the literary and emotional landscape of the fin 
de siècle. Alternately, my approach could assess the representation of emotion in works across 
literary and cultural periods. Such an undertaking could lead to a clearer understanding of the 
relationship between emotions, historical and cultural change, and literary representations.  
Another avenue for future research would be to address literary and extra-literary 
discourses on emotions that I did not discuss in detail in this dissertation. My project has focused 
primarily on ‘social’ or ‘moral’ emotions (i.e. compassion, shame, honor, love, guilt, pride). 
Although I consider all emotions always-already social and subject to variation across cultures 
and through history, these emotions in particular facilitate social interaction. They play a role in 
determining power or status and influence group cohesion or dissolution. Some examples of 
other emotions worthy of consideration in future research include fear, joy, sadness, surprise, 
anger, and disgust, the emotions that psychologist Paul Ekman and his supporters have 
considered to be universal and biologically basic. Analyses of these emotions and their literary 
representations in relation to their socio-historical contexts would give literary scholars and 
historians of emotion a stronger voice in current debates about the extent to which these ‘basic 
emotions’ are universal and biologically basic or culturally and historically determined. 
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Studying representations of emotion in literary and cultural history not only provides 
insight into past ways of feeling and questions of continuity and change, it also prompts us to 
reflect critically upon our own emotions and values and consider how they resemble or diverge 
from those of figures depicted in a diegetic world. Some of the emotions and debates at the heart 
of Effi Briest, Fenitschka, and Buddenbrooks might be unknown to twenty-first-century readers. 
For example, masculine honor has declined in importance since the late nineteenth century, and 
dueling to settle matters of honor is no longer practiced. Earlier notions of honor and personal 
dignity have reportedly been replaced by a new moral code, namely, a “victimhood culture” 
(Campbell and Manning 714-718). Additionally, the kind of bourgeois or class-based pride 
depicted in Buddenbrooks has largely given way to individual understandings of pride, personal 
achievement, and self-worth. Other emotions and debates represented in these novels might 
strike twenty-first-century readers as surprisingly familiar. Compassion, for example, continues 
to unite and divide people in contemporary politics, particularly now, as evident in national 
responses to the global refugee crisis. Romantic love and marriage continue to be reimagined and 
redefined, and different ideas about love exist simultaneously (e.g. love is a choice, love is a 
feeling). At the fin de siècle in Wilhelmine Germany, Effi Briest, Fenitschka, and Buddenbrooks 
created spaces for readers to feel differently and reflect critically upon their emotions and values 
during a time of contradictions and uncertainty. These works remain highly relevant for us today 
because, although I have repeatedly described the fin de siècle as a period of rapid cultural 
change, society is always changing. Thus, emotions and social mores will always need to be 
renegotiated. Literature and other media play a critical role in that process. 
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